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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Jamaica Observer, 8 February 2005. 
 
 
Research Rationale 
In 2005, Neville Duncan, a noted Caribbean political scientist declared: “I 
cannot see that the Caribbean has any other choice but to develop a relationship 
with China.”1 This sentiment is echoed in the cartoon shown above, and both are 
                                                 
1 Inter Press News Agency, "Grenada Could Be Latest Convert to China," December 17 
2004. http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/interna.asp?idnews=26719 
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indicative of a general mood across the Caribbean wherein China is seen as not 
only an important player in the international system, but also one that the 
Caribbean states2 should position themselves to reap some benefits from. 
 
The decision by English-speaking Caribbean states to increasingly engage 
with China is seemingly unproblematic, but upon close examination it will 
become clear that there are important variations across the Caribbean in their 
approach to China as seen in their support for the One China policy. Since the 
1970s Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have consistently 
recognized China and not Taiwan.3 On the other hand, countries such as the 
Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia have vacillated between recognition 
of China and Taiwan. 
 
The English-speaking Caribbean states share a similar colonial history and 
have similarly structured economies and political systems. In addition, since 1973 
they have been participants in a free trade area, the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM), which identifies foreign policy coordination as an important 
component of this integration initiative. If all the Caribbean states are so similar, 
                                                                                                                                     
 
2 I will use the term ‘Caribbean states’ and ‘Caribbean’ interchangeably. The preferred 
terminology is ‘Caribbean states’ as it better captures the subtle yet important differences 
among the Caribbean states instead of depicting them as one homogenous group. My 
definition of the Caribbean as used in this research project is provided in the next section. 
 
3 Recognition of China is defined as support for the “One China Policy.” 
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why do we see variation in their interactions with China? This dissertation argues 
that the variable explaining this divergence is resource endowment. 
 
Resource endowment is typically understood to be related to natural 
resources which by definition are simply factors of production that are provided 
by nature.4 These include land, water and sea resources. This dissertation will 
look at natural resource endowment, but will also include a less discussed 
resource—sovereignty. A resource is simply, “anything that can contribute to 
economic activity.”5 The identification of sovereignty as a resource is quite 
unusual, but this dissertation will show that the rights associated with 
sovereignty—especially in relation to the ability to vote in international bodies 
and to recognize other states6—can be traded and this trade can in fact result in 
economic gains. 
 
Brief Overview of Caribbean-China Relations 
In terms of the specifics of the relationship between Caribbean states and 
China, it is useful to divide the various aspects of the relationship into economic, 
                                                 
4 John Black, Oxford Dictionary of Economics (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
 
5 Ibid., 403. 
 
6 The dissertation will also explore other aspects of sovereignty that have also been traded 
in the Caribbean. These include the sale of flags of convenience, the establishment of 
offshore financial centers, and the sale of economic citizenship. These will be discussed 
in some detail in Chapters 2 and 4. 
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cultural and political areas (see Table 1 below). Economically, the Caribbean 
states that officially recognize China and support the ‘One China Policy’ are the 
recipients of vast amounts of loans, grants, and technical assistance in areas such 
as railway, irrigation, and water systems. The loans are provided to Caribbean 
governments at low rates of interest and are devoid of explicit conditionalities that 
have been the subject of much discontent in loans obtained from, for example, the 
IMF or World Bank.  
 
Table 1. A Typology of China-Caribbean Relations 
Economic Relations Political Cultural 
Loans 
Grants 
Trade (natural resources 
from the Caribbean and 
Chinese goods) 
Technical Assistance 
Ports 
Voting in IGOs 
Military Assistance 
Cooperation in Isolating 
Taiwan 
Geopolitical Strategizing 
Scholarships 
Language Teachers 
Sport Exchanges 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite the fact that these loans are devoid of any explicit conditionalities, 
this study will highlight the existence of implicit conditionalities. For example, 
the loan agreements do not mention the need for Caribbean states to support the 
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“One China Policy,” but in most official speeches that relate to China, Caribbean 
government officials consistently invoke their unwavering support for the policy. 
In addition, Chinese companies have been awarded several contracts for 
development projects that are being financed by these Chinese loans and these 
companies tend to import labor from China.7 These negative aspects of the 
relationship with China will be explored in more detail in the case studies. It will 
be shown that the net benefits accruing to Caribbean states are actually much 
lower than it would initially appear. 
 
Politically, there has been an increase in the number of high-level 
governmental contacts between Caribbean states and various arms of the Chinese 
government and the business sector. The Caribbean states have worked and 
continue to work with China in many international fora and have also supported 
various Chinese initiatives in these fora. For example, in 2005 Jamaica voted 
against a motion to grant Taiwan observer status in the World Health Assembly, 
something that was a high priority for China as it sought to continue the isolation 
of Taiwan in international bodies. In addition, the Jamaican Prime Minister in 
2004 declared Jamaica’s commitment to working with China in the reform of the 
United Nations and the country’s support for China’s objection to the inclusion of 
                                                 
7 Given the implicit nature of the conditionalities I used the interviews to try to gauge the 
extent to which implicit conditionalities exist. A more detailed discussion of implicit 
conditionalities is provided in chapter 6. 
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Japan as a Security Council permanent member, which is also very important to 
China. 
 
The cultural dimension of the relationship is as interesting as the economic 
and political realms. Cultural contacts include much collaboration at the 
educational level. In addition to scholarships provided by the Chinese 
government, there is China’s agreement in 2003 to send two Chinese language 
teachers to the University of the West Indies free of cost. In this agreement China 
agreed to pay the salaries of the teachers and all their relocation costs. The 
Caribbean governments would only be required to incorporate Mandarin language 
into the foreign language options in the Language Departments.8 Other cultural 
contacts include the exchange of sport coaches. China has sent table tennis 
coaches to several Caribbean states and Jamaica sent several track and field 
coaches to China to assist in the training of Chinese athletes for the Beijing 
Olympics. 
 
 
                                                 
8 The University of the West Indies is the regional university and is funded by the 
English-speaking, former British colonies’ governments in the Caribbean. There are three 
main campuses located in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago and there are also 
distance-learning centers in all the other states. The governments participating in the 
funding of the University are the ones that are the subject of this study. The governments 
do not directly run the University, but given the level of subsidies provided by the 
governments, they have significant influence over the universities. The agreement 
between China and regional leaders vis-à-vis Chinese language teachers was negotiated 
by diplomats without the involvement of University officials. 
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Research Questions 
This dissertation aims to answer four important questions. The first and 
central question is, why is there variation in the strategies employed by different 
Caribbean states vis-à-vis China? Jamaica and Trinidad have had a consistent 
foreign policy of recognizing China since 1972. Dominica, Grenada, and St. 
Lucia on the other hand, have wavered on their commitment to the One China 
policy. The dissertation locates the answer to this variation question in the 
differences in resource endowment. Countries such as Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago have a significantly wider natural resource base than the smaller 
Caribbean states such as Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia.  
 
The argument that will be made is that where natural resources are scarce, 
Caribbean states will become more reliant on their sovereignty as a resource. The 
natural resource-scarce Caribbean states have therefore adopted a strategy of 
using their sovereignty in order to reap some economic gain and their vacillation 
between China and Taiwan can be read as their attempt to gain the most economic 
gain from recognizing either country. 
 
The dissertation aims primarily to explain Caribbean foreign policy vis-à-
vis China, but this study would be incomplete without an understanding of 
China’s motivations in the Caribbean. It will be shown that China’s interest in the 
developing world is increasing and the primary explanation for this expanded 
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interest relates to China’s resource search. The Caribbean states, with the 
exception of Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, lack the natural and 
strategic resources that China demands. The second research question is therefore, 
what motivates China’s interest in the Caribbean? 
 
It will be shown that there are three motivations behind China’s interest in 
the region—economics, recognition, and prestige. At an economic level, China 
regards the Caribbean as another market for its exports and it is attracted to the 
natural resources in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Half of the 
countries that recognize Taiwan are in the Latin America and Caribbean region. 
An important motivator for China in the Caribbean is therefore the isolation of 
Taiwan, which involves getting states that recognize Taiwan to switch recognition 
to China. The third motivation is prestige or the signaling of China’s rise as a 
great power. China needs votes in international bodies and more allies. The soft 
power and economic aid strategies employed by China across the developing 
world are therefore aimed at signaling China’s rise as a great power. 
 
China has a trade surplus with almost every Caribbean state. Chapters 3, 4, 
and 5 will treat those statistics in more detail, but it should be noted that the 
deficit facing most Caribbean states is widening and this is exacerbating an 
already negative balance of trade position. It should also be noted that not only 
does China have a trade surplus with the region, but when China offers aid, FDI 
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and loans, they import Chinese laborers to fill positions that could be filled by 
nationals of the Caribbean countries. This is in fact one of the implicit conditions 
of Chinese aid. If China does not represent a real market for Caribbean exports 
and China imports labor instead of using the vast surplus labor already available 
in the Caribbean, why are these states still willing to engage with China on an 
even closer level? 
 
The third central research question is therefore, why do Caribbean states 
engage with China when doing so does not yield unambiguous benefits? The 
answer to this question is quite complex. At first glance, it would appear that the 
decision to engage with China is a direct result of a “follow the leader” dynamic. 
But the fact is that the articulated rationale for engaging with China has never 
been about following the actions of other Caribbean states or other developing 
countries. The central aim of Caribbean foreign policy is the attainment of 
economic development, and China represents an option for the acquisition of aid 
and investment. As will be shown, in especially the cases of Dominica and 
Grenada, the trade surplus or the implications of increased market access for 
Chinese goods, are never really discussed. 
 
The argument that the dissertation makes is that the reason for the 
continued interaction with China in spite of the apparent low net benefits is two-
fold. First, the Westminster political system that is seen in the Caribbean results in 
 10 
a lack of scrutiny of agreements signed and very little public discussion of the 
relationship between any government and China. Second, the aim of the 
Caribbean states is the attraction of aid and investment. Given that the states are 
currently experiencing significant economic problems, and aid from the US and 
Europe has been curtailed, it follows that their primary goal is attaining 
commitments for aid and investment and little thought is given to the actual or 
expected long-run benefits. 
 
This study will argue that the relationship between Caribbean states and 
China is best conceptualized as a two-way trade. The Caribbean states are 
currently on the international market with something resembling a shopping list, 
which has the attraction of aid and investments at the very top. Caribbean states 
have throughout their brief independent history tried several strategies to attract 
economic aid and investments and are again seeking a new avenue for attracting 
these economic goals.9  
 
China is simultaneously engaged in a much discussed drive for natural 
resources—especially oil and minerals, but less discussed items on its shopping 
list are recognition as a rising and important power and support for its policy of 
                                                 
9 The various strategies that have been employed by Caribbean states to attract 
investments will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
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isolating Taiwan internationally.10 In view of this, the Caribbean states that have 
minerals and oil—namely, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago—are trading them 
for Chinese investments into their natural resource sectors along with receipts 
from the sale of these resources to China. 
 
Where no natural resources exist, Caribbean states are trading another 
important, yet often overlooked resource—their sovereignty. As sovereign states, 
Caribbean states have as a right the ability to recognize other sovereigns and to 
vote in international bodies in which they hold membership. These happen to be 
two rights that China is very interested in and that China is willing to pay for. 
There is therefore a political market value for sovereignty. 
 
There is, however, a fourth important question that is driving the study and 
that will motivate the entire discussion, what are the implications of the 
Caribbean’s strategy towards China for the study of small states in the 
international relations discipline? Small states are understudied and when they are 
studied, they are often misunderstood. This study does not aim at a general theory 
of small state behavior, but instead aims to highlight important and interesting 
aspects of small states and their international relations so as to enhance the 
existing literature pertaining to small state foreign policies, in particular. The 
                                                 
10 For a brief discussion of the prevailing view that a significant component of China’s 
relations with developing countries is related to its search for energy and minerals, see 
David Zweig and Jianhai Bi, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," Foreign Affairs Sept/Oct 
(2005). 
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answers to the first three questions will point to some of these implications. More 
specifically vis-à-vis the fourth research question, the study aims to show that 
small state foreign policy cannot be solely studied at the system level or solely at 
the individual level, but must instead be studied from all three levels of analysis—
the system, state and individual levels.  
 
 
 
Definition of the Caribbean 
There are many definitions of the term ‘Caribbean’. The most common 
one is based on geography. The simplest definition available is those islands 
located in the Caribbean Sea. This definition is, however, inadequate as it 
excludes countries such as Guyana and Belize and in some cases even the 
Bahamas is excluded as it is a chain of islands adjacent to the main archipelago 
and is therefore considered a part of North America.11  
 
Another geographical approach is to view the Caribbean as the islands in 
the Caribbean Sea plus “all those territories whose shores are washed by the 
Caribbean Sea.”12 This would include Mexico, Belize, Honduras, Guatemala, 
                                                 
11 Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, Modern Caribbean Politics (London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1993). 
 
12 Ibid., 1. 
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Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela. This definition of the 
Caribbean is often termed the Caribbean Basin, but this is mainly an artifact of the 
United States, and in particular the Reagan Administration.13 This definition is 
also not useful as most of these states do not identify themselves as a part of the 
Caribbean and the historical and cultural differences are enormous. In addition, 
this definition omits the three Guianas,14 which identify themselves as a part of 
the Caribbean. 
 
Given the problems with geographical definitions, this paper will 
therefore, similar to Payne and Sutton, define the Caribbean in terms of 
geography, history, and identity.15 My general definition of the Caribbean is 
therefore all the islands in the Caribbean Sea (including the Bahamas) plus the 
three Guianas and Belize. All these states were similarly colonized with plantation 
economies and importantly, view themselves as a part of the Caribbean. 
 
                                                 
13 In the 1980s the US offered Caribbean states preferential access to the US market 
through an agreement titled the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). This is the first instance 
that the term Caribbean Basin is used. This concept is therefore a US construct based on 
its estimates of its national interest. 
 
14 The three Guianas are Guyana (former British colony), Suriname (former Dutch 
colony), and Guiana (former French colony). On the face of it, the three Guianas are 
located in South America and have the Atlantic Ocean as their coastline, but they often 
identify themselves as a part of the Caribbean. 
 
15 Payne and Sutton, Modern Caribbean Politics. 
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Having established my general definition of the Caribbean, I will however 
only be dealing with a subset of this region in this project—the English-speaking 
Caribbean. This English-speaking group comprises the former colonies of Britain 
and the dependent colonies of the US and Britain. I will, however, be ignoring the 
dependencies of the US and Britain in this dissertation due to the fact that a 
primary aim of this project is to explore how sovereignty is traded by Caribbean 
states. The American and British dependencies are culturally and historically 
similar to the independent states, but their lack of sovereignty make them 
unimportant to this analysis. The group under study is therefore the former 
colonies of Britain, which are included in my general definition of the Caribbean. 
These countries are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.16 
 
The use of this subset of Caribbean states is useful, as it will help me to 
better develop an analytical framework to understand their behavior vis-à-vis 
China, as I have taken out important differences of history and culture. The 
countries chosen have a similar, history, culture, political system, identity, 
population size, and development rank as identified in the United Nations 
                                                 
16 Belize, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines do not recognize China. 
They will therefore not be included in this analysis. The Caribbean states being discussed 
are therefore Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago. Primary focus will, however, be placed 
on Dominica, Grenada and Jamaica. 
 15 
Development Program’s Human Development Index (HDI). Having isolated these 
cases I can within reason treat these states as homogenous units with the primary 
difference being their natural resource endowment. When the term Caribbean or 
Caribbean states is used in this study, it is therefore only in reference to these 
English-speaking independent states. 
 
This study will, however, focus on three Caribbean states—Dominica, 
Grenada and Jamaica. These three were chosen mainly because the central 
argument that this dissertation will make is that the Caribbean states are trading 
their resources (both natural and sovereign) for Chinese investments and the cases 
selected therefore have diverse resource endowments. Jamaica has bauxite, which 
China wants, and it also has its sovereign rights and influence with the other 
Caribbean states. Dominica and Grenada are included because, unlike Jamaica 
that has natural resources that are of interest to China, Dominica and Grenada’s 
only resource attracting China is their sovereignty and the rights wrapped up in 
this designation. The three Caribbean states selected are therefore sufficiently 
similar—historically, culturally, and politically—while at the same time are 
sufficiently different in relation to their resource endowment (the independent 
variable in this study) to investigate the proposed hypotheses that are highlighted 
below. The study will, however, show that the results obtained vis-à-vis the three 
case studies are in fact generalizable and can be extended to analyses of the other 
English-speaking Caribbean states that also recognize China. 
 16 
 
METHODOLOGY 
This dissertation in its exploration of Caribbean-China relations is 
venturing into a new area. Discussions of China’s engagement with the Third 
World are increasingly popular, but discussions of Caribbean-China engagement 
are largely absent from the academic discourse. There are two possible 
explanations for this absence. The first is fairly obvious; the topic is new. China’s 
renewed engagement with the Third World has intensified since the 1990s as the 
Chinese economy continued its boom and was more interested in the natural 
resources that existed in the developing world. Given that the topic is new it is 
understandable that there would be a relatively thin literature available.  
 
Another reason for the possible academic silence in relation to the more 
specific relations between Caribbean states and China relates to the fact that there 
is very little academic work on the Caribbean in general. In fact, the references to 
the Caribbean are usually intertwined with discussions of Latin America, but as 
will be discussed in chapter 3, the Latin American engagement with China is quite 
different from that existing in the Caribbean. 
 
Given the paucity of academic literature on Caribbean-China relations, the 
dissertation makes extensive use of newspaper articles published across the region 
and extensive interviews conducted. The interviews were conducted with 
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government and private sector officials in Dominica, Grenada, and Jamaica. All 
interviews are confidential and the names of interviewees will not be given in this 
thesis. The access gained to these individuals makes this study one of the first to 
really explore the foreign policy decision-making process in the Caribbean in 
relation to China. 
 
In order to identify the specific motivations for the Caribbean’s links with 
China, interviews were conducted with officials working specifically on China-
related issues at the Foreign and Finance ministries across the region. Analyses 
were also done with respect to the aid packages received from China and the ways 
in which Chinese loans are being used in the region. Given the increasing trade 
links, it was also important to examine what the Caribbean is gaining or losing 
from trading with China. This involved studying the trade data to gauge the 
general trends in trade flows and the extent to which the trade gap between China 
and the region is widening. 
 
In terms of data collection on the China side, there is a small yet 
significant body of work available on China in the Third World. This secondary 
literature will be drawn upon in an effort to identify the links between China’s 
general developing country policy stance and China’s policies in the Caribbean. 
There is very limited work on China’s role in the Latin America and Caribbean 
region and of the existing work, the focus is mostly Latin America, with a few 
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passing mentions of the Caribbean. Given the paucity of secondary sources, this 
analysis focuses on the texts of agreements signed between China and the 
Caribbean. Interviews with Chinese ambassadors in the three selected states were 
also conducted. This is limited, but again not worrisome insofar as the dissertation 
is heavily biased towards an explanation of the Caribbean side. 
 
 
Triangulation and Validity 
Given the fact that accounts of various interviewees will invariably differ, 
the methodological strategy of triangulation was employed.17 Triangulation 
involves the use of multiple methods of data observation to increase the 
credibility of the findings.18 In this study, the accounts of any one interviewee 
were checked against reports in the media. In addition, where available, the 
existing statistics and agreements were used to substantiate both newspaper 
accounts and interviewee statements. The validity of the findings in this thesis 
was therefore enhanced as a result of the use of methodological triangulation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Norman K. Denzin, Sociological Methods: A Sourcebook (Chicago: Aldine Publishing 
Company, 1970). 
 
18 Pamela Maykut and Richard Morehouse, Beginning Qualitative Research: A 
Philosophic and Practical Guide (London: RoutledgeFalmer, 1994). 
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Hypotheses 
There are 2 major hypotheses driving this study: 
1. If a state has natural resources that are of strategic importance to China, 
then it will have a consistent foreign policy vis-à-vis China; 
2. If a state has no natural resources that are of strategic importance to 
China, then its foreign policy vis-à-vis China will be inconsistent. 
 
For the purposes of this study, the independent variable is therefore natural 
resource endowment and the dependent variable is foreign policy consistency. 
Natural resources are simply resources accorded by nature (for example, land and 
sea resources). For the purposes of this study, the natural resources being 
considered are those that China is particularly interested in. Resultantly, the 
beaches and climate in the Caribbean would not be included as these are not 
demanded by China at this time. Foreign policy consistency is represented by a 
consistent policy of recognizing China (no change in recognition of China since 
1972) and an inconsistent foreign policy is one wherein a country switches 
recognition between China and Taiwan. 
 
The year 1972 is selected for two important reasons. First, the Caribbean 
states began gaining independence in 1962 and the foreign policies of Britain 
were adopted en masse. The Caribbean’s attempts to define their own foreign 
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policy really begins in the 1970s as they forged closer relations with other 
developing countries and establish new sets of relationships outside of the 
traditional relationship with the former colonizer and other great powers. Second, 
prior to 1972 China did not have a seat in the UN. At the time of independence in 
1962, the Caribbean states did not have a realistic option to recognize China as 
their relationships were based on membership in the UN. China only assumed its 
seat in the UN in October 1971. The choice of 1972 is therefore based on the 
premise that prior to that year recognition of China was not a valid option for 
these newly independent Caribbean states. 
 
There is also one sub-hypothesis: 
If a state has no natural resources that are of strategic importance to China, 
then it will creatively sell rights accorded by sovereignty 
 
 In relation to the sub-hypothesis, the above definition of natural resources 
applies. In addition, the sovereign rights being sold are votes in international 
bodies and recognition of other states. Natural resource endowment is therefore 
the independent variable and the creative sale of sovereignty is the dependent 
variable in this sub-hypothesis. 
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Extensions to Other Caribbean States 
Table 2 below shows the expected results vis-à-vis resource endowment and the 
consistency of foreign policy towards China. As shown below, there are three 
countries that have natural resources that are of strategic importance to China. 
These are Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. According to the stated 
hypotheses these three countries would be expected to have a consistent policy of 
recognizing China since 1972. The empirical findings do confirm this as all three 
countries have recognized China since 1972 and have never changed recognition 
since then. 
 
Table 2. The Expected Relationship between Strategic Natural Resources and 
Foreign Policy Consistency in Caribbean States that Recognize China 
Country Strategic Natural 
Resources of 
Interest to China 
Expected Outcome 
(Foreign Policy 
Consistent Towards 
China) 
Actual Outcome  
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
NO Inconsistent Inconsistent 
Bahamas NO Inconsistent Inconsistent 
Barbados NO Inconsistent Consistent 
Dominica NO Inconsistent Inconsistent 
Grenada NO Inconsistent Inconsistent 
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Country Strategic Natural 
Resources of 
Interest to China 
Expected Outcome 
(Foreign Policy 
Consistent Towards 
China) 
Actual Outcome  
Guyana YES Consistent Consistent 
Jamaica YES Consistent Consistent 
St. Lucia NO Inconsistent Inconsistent 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
YES Consistent Consistent 
 
 
 Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia do 
not have natural resources, and it is expected that they will have an inconsistent 
foreign policy vis-à-vis China. In these cases the empirical findings do support the 
arguments to be espoused in this dissertation. These five countries have in fact 
had an inconsistent foreign policy wherein they have switched recognition 
between China and Taiwan. The only case that does not neatly fit into the 
discussion is Barbados.  
 
Barbados does not have any resources that are of strategic importance to 
China, but they have consistently recognized China since 1972. One possible 
explanation for this relates to the fact that Barbados has traditionally been one 
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country that has been less reliant on external aid. Barbados is in fact considered to 
be a high human development country with a very high GDP per capita. In fact, 
the average GDP per capita for the countries identified in Table 2 is US$10,280, 
while Barbados’ GDP per capita is US$17,297, which is significantly higher than 
the other countries in the sample. Barbados’ foreign policy is therefore less 
concentrated on economic goals. What we do see from Table 2 above is that the 
results that are obtained for the three case studies can in fact be extended to 
analyses of the wider Caribbean. 
 
Structure of Dissertation 
At a theoretical level, this dissertation is squarely situated in the ongoing 
debate relating to small states in the international system. In view of this, the 
dissertation begins with a discussion of the development of the small state topic in 
the international political economy literature in chapter 1. One of the major 
lacunae in the existing body of work relates to explaining the foreign policy 
behavior of small states. A primary aim of this dissertation is therefore to help 
elucidate small state foreign policy behavior. 
 
Chapter 1 will show that economics is a prime motivation for the foreign 
policies of small states. The Caribbean states routinely argue that their small size 
places them at an economic disadvantage and their attempts to gain concessions in 
various international fora is, by extension, one of the leading foreign policy goals 
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of these states. The chapter will discuss the literature pertaining to the features of 
small states and will show that despite some negative attributes, small states do 
perform quite well at an economic level. The literature relating to the foreign 
policy strategies of small states will also be explored, and the lacunae with respect 
to variations in small state foreign policies will also be highlighted. 
 
Caribbean states place significant emphasis on the use of foreign policy to 
attain economic development, but this dissertation demonstrates that there is in 
fact some heterogeneity in the strategies employed by the Caribbean states under 
study. Chapter 2 therefore highlights some of the important features of Caribbean 
international relations and situates Caribbean foreign policy behavior in the 
existing small state literature. This chapter makes the case that the Caribbean 
states’ relationship with China is rooted in their search for economic survival and 
the persistent need to locate this survival in an external power. It will therefore be 
shown that China is simply the newest great power providing the Caribbean states 
with aid and investment, and this pattern is similar to that seen in their relations 
with Europe and the US in the past. The trading of resources—both natural and 
sovereign—is merely the latest development strategy employed by Caribbean 
states. 
 
Chapter 3 moves the discussion to the Chinese side and explores the roots 
of Chinese interest in the Caribbean. Beginning with a discussion of China’s 
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wider Third World policy, the discussion aims to situate the current relationship 
with the Caribbean into China’s wider international relations. It will be shown 
that there are three motivations driving Chinese actions in the Caribbean—
economics, recognition and prestige. 
 
The need to adjust or strategically reposition is a key motivation behind 
the Caribbean’s renewed interest in China. For Caribbean states, especially 
Dominica and Grenada, foreign policy is seen as merely another tool of their 
adjustment process. Chapter 4 discusses the relationship that Dominica and 
Grenada have with China. The major conclusion in these cases is that their lack of 
natural resources results in an inconsistent foreign policy vis-à-vis China. This 
inconsistency is seen in them switching diplomatic recognition from China to 
Taiwan, and vice versa. Dominica and Grenada are examples of states that 
creatively use their sovereignty by selling votes or recognition. This strategy is 
employed because they do not possess any other natural resources to trade with 
China. 
 
Chapter 5 details the relationship between Jamaica and China. Jamaica is 
discussed as an example of a natural resource-rich country in the Caribbean. 
Jamaica has bauxite and China is interested in gaining increased access to this 
important mineral. The Jamaican example is, however, very different from the 
Dominican and Grenadian cases. Jamaica has had a consistent policy of 
 26 
recognizing China since 1972 and there have been no discussions of changing this 
position. Jamaica’s foreign policy stance is therefore described as a consistent one 
vis-à-vis China. It will also be shown that they do not solely rely on their 
sovereignty as a resource, as they have a natural resource that can be traded with 
China. 
 
One point that the three major case studies points to is the importance of 
foreign policy in the attainment of economic development. In fact, the economic 
aim as expressed in the attraction of aid and investments is the main driver of the 
foreign policies of all these states. The argument to be made in this dissertation is 
that the creative use of sovereignty, which is a key strategy employed by several 
small states, is relatively more important as a strategy for weaker states because 
they traditionally have had fewer natural resources and suffer from other negative 
results of their lack of size and power. 
 
Chapter 6 will pull together the theoretical conclusions emanating from 
the previous chapters. This chapter will return to the theoretical and historical 
foundation laid in chapters 1 and 2 and will discuss the implications of the 
discussion to the development of the literature on small state foreign policy 
behavior. This chapter will highlight the fact that adjustment strategies will 
undoubtedly take place at the foreign policy level, as economic development is a 
prime motivation for small state international relations. It will also show how the 
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existing political system in the Caribbean thwarts transparency and results in 
Caribbean states endorsing agreements with China that are inconsistent with their 
national interest. 
 
 The story that this dissertation weaves is therefore one of two-way trade 
where the Caribbean states are selling resources (bauxite, market access, 
sovereign rights) to China in exchange for aid and investment. It is also a story of 
adjustment wherein Caribbean states are using their relationship with China as a 
tool of economic adjustment. A state that has natural resources that are of interest 
to China will sell it China, but where no natural resources exist, they will have to 
rely on their sovereignty as a resource. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The Foreign Policies of Small States 
 
The Caribbean states are all small states via any definition of small that is 
employed. Not only are the Caribbean states small, but they have pursued a 
foreign policy that is based on the premise that as small states they are uniquely 
disadvantaged in the current international economic system and therefore need 
some concessions from foreign governments and institutions. As will be 
demonstrated in chapters 4 and 5, Dominica, Grenada, and Jamaica expressly 
identify their small size and the resultant vulnerabilities associated with this as 
one of the motivations behind their closer relations with China. This chapter will 
therefore discuss the evolution of the small states literature, with particular 
emphasis on both the nature of the small state dilemma and the special 
characteristics of the foreign policies of small states. 
 
The chapter will begin with the issue that dominates the small state 
literature—the definition of a small state and the special features of these states. It 
will be established that the features highlighted in this literature, especially vis-à-
vis small market size, import dependence and economic vulnerability, are 
consistent with the economic features of Caribbean states. Most of these analyses, 
 29 
however, fail to demonstrate the impact of size on economic outcomes such as 
economic growth and the existing literature does not go far enough in explaining 
the unique foreign policy strategies that are employed by these small states. 
 
The discussion will then move into an analysis of the literature pertaining 
to the ramifications of small size. There are conflicting studies in this regard. 
Some authors argue that small size is debilitating while others argue that small 
states have in fact performed quite well despite their less than favorable economic 
features. It will be shown that Caribbean states can fit into both sides of the 
debate. On one hand, they do in fact possess the negative attributes commonly 
associated with small states such as small market size and diseconomies of scale, 
and these features mean that their production potential is significantly lower than 
that of larger states. On the other hand, they out-perform many larger countries as 
is seen in their high level of human development. This chapter and the rest of the 
chapters in the dissertation will demonstrate that despite these findings, Caribbean 
states still perceive themselves as being at an economic disadvantage and the 
foreign policies pursued are indelibly based on this assumption. There is no 
literature that explains this phenomenon, but one clearly pragmatic explanation is 
evident for this difference between rhetoric and actual performance. This 
divergence can be seen as a strategy aimed at gaining more concessions from 
external donors. It is clear that small states have unique features that can 
potentially thwart their development and Caribbean states are essentially using 
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this reality to gain trade and aid preferences. This reality will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 2. 
 
 
The final section of this chapter will look at the literature relating to the 
foreign policies of small states. It will discuss the major studies of Annette Baker 
Fox, Maurice East and Jeanne Hey. All three, writing in different periods, make 
the case that small state foreign policy is unique and very different from those of 
larger, more powerful states. The existing studies do not, however, examine 
explanations for variations in the strategies of small states. They generally 
conclude that small states pursue a particular type of general foreign policy that is 
limited in scope, addresses a small number of issues, and small states exhibit a 
preference for neutrality. This dissertation will extend the scope of these analyses 
by focusing on the specific foreign policies pursued by a seemingly homogeneous 
group of small states in the Caribbean. It will show that their approach to China is 
very heterogeneous in nature and the general small state foreign policy 
taxonomies presented do not sufficiently explain why this foreign policy variation 
is seen. 
 
Conceptualizing ‘Smallness’ 
 This study seeks to add to the existing literature on small states. One of the 
primary preoccupations of this literature relates to the definition of a small state. 
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There is no agreed definition of small in the political economy literature as 
different authors employ a range of definitions. Definitions focus on, inter alia, 
the size of the economy, the GDP, ability to influence the international system, 
and population size. Countries such as Luxembourg, Switzerland, Zimbabwe, and 
Grenada can be defined as small states depending on the definition employed. 
Caribbean states are, however, ‘small’ along all of the usual measures of country 
size. 
 
But how useful is the distinction of smallness? Neumann and Gstohl argue 
that of the almost 200 states in the UN, only a few dozen are in fact large states, 
and large states are in fact more of an exception in the international system.19 
Most academics would not go as far as Neumann and Gstohl, but the number of 
small states in the world is disputed, with different studies employing a different 
number. The number of small states in the world is ultimately dependent on the 
definition of smallness used. The population size is the most preferred measure, 
but even this is not uniformly employed. For example, the UN defines a small 
state as one with a population under ten million, while the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, on the other hand, defines a small state as one with a population under 
1.5 million. But there is also the category of micro-states which is generally 
agreed to be states with a population under one million. 
                                                 
19 Iver Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, "Lilliputans in Gulliver's World?" in Small States 
in International Relations, ed. Christine Ingebritsen, et al. (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2006). 
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Not only is there no consensus on the population of small states, but 
Croward also points to the fact that the population definition of small states has 
also evolved.20 In the 1950s and 1960s a state was considered small if it had a 
population under 10 or 15 million. In the 1970s and 1980s the upper limit was 
lowered to 5 million and in the 1990s, the limit was again reduced to between 1 
and 1.5 million population.21 It should, however, be noted that these are merely 
general trends, as scholars deviate from these conventions. Whatever the cut-off 
point used in relation to population, it should be noted that population size is a 
continuous variable and as such, any mark or position chosen as the breaking 
point is arbitrary.22 The small state literature does focus much energy on defining 
small states, but this dissertation will not focus on this issue. What is more 
important for this discussion are the ramifications of small size. 
 
Features of Small States 
Several writers have attempted to highlight the key features of small 
states, but some characteristics such as dependence, small market size, and 
vulnerability recur in the literature. Maurice East, one of the earliest writers on the 
                                                 
20 Tom Crowards, "Defining the Category of 'Small States'," Journal of International 
Development 14, no. 2 (2002). 
 
21 Ibid. 
 
22 Ibid. 
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political economy of small states, identifies four characteristics of small states; 
these are a small land area, small population, small GNP and a low level of 
military capabilities.23 The literature pertaining to the economic and political 
features of small states has, however, expanded since then. 
 
Selwyn, for example, argues that there are seven key characteristics of 
small states. These are: dependence on foreign trade; narrow natural resource 
base; heavy dependence on foreign corporations; dependence on foreign 
institutions; diseconomies of scale; and constraints in the use of import 
substitution policies.24 A subset of these seven characteristics is evident in the 
works of several other authors. For example, Paul Streeten who initially states 
that, “we know a small state when we see it,”25 goes on to identify three major 
characteristics of these states; that is the possession of a small land area, 
diseconomies of scale, and the concentration of production in one or few areas.  
 
This dissertation starts with the Streeten and Selwyn arguments that small 
states have features such as a small land area and diseconomies of scale that can 
in fact become economically debilitating. It will also be shown that these features 
                                                 
23 Maurice East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models," World 
Politics 25, no. 4 (1973). 
 
24 Percy Selwyn, "Smallness and Islandness," World Development 8 (1980). 
 
25 Paul Streeten, "The Special Problems of Small Countries," World Development 21, no. 
2 (1993), 197. 
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are important contributors to the Caribbean’s current economic woes and the 
subsequent need for economic adjustment. These points will, however, be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 2. 
 
So far, the features of small states as identified by Streeten, Selwyn and 
East are all depicting negative attributes. The fact is, however, that despite these 
seemingly debilitating economic features, small states have demonstrated some 
amount of economic and political success. Sutton and Payne pick up on this 
reality and provide a more balanced description of the features of small states.26 
The five features identified by Sutton and Payne are openness, resilience, 
enclaveness, weakness and dependence. At first glance it would seem as if the 
differences in the Sutton and Payne list is merely an exercise in semantics, but 
most of the literature defining the features of small states tend to focus on 
negative attributes and this is true of the existing literature pertaining to Caribbean 
foreign policy. The inclusion of resilience as a feature points to the fact that 
despite all the negative attributes, small states are in fact quite stable both 
politically and economically. The Caribbean states in this study do in fact 
demonstrate this resilience. It will in fact be shown that the Caribbean states have 
been quite creative and have devised new methods for attaining economic growth 
                                                 
26 Paul Sutton and Anthony Payne, "Lilliput under Threat: The Security Problems of 
Small Island and Enclave Developing States," Political Studies 41 (1993). 
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and the sale of sovereign rights is one such innovation. This issue will, however, 
be taken up in more detail later in this chapter. 
 
Vulnerability and ‘Islandness’ 
There have also been two recent additions to the literature on the features 
of small states—the concepts of Vulnerability and Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS). The literature on Vulnerability was advanced primarily by Briguglio and 
UNCTAD in the development of the Vulnerability Index in 1997.27 The 
Vulnerability argument is that small states are more likely to be vulnerable to 
exogenous economic, political, strategic, ecological, environmental and 
meteorological factors. This vulnerability is linked to their narrow economic 
structures and their openness to international trade. Caribbean states have 
frequently employed these arguments in making a case for leniency in 
negotiations with countries offering aid and in their negotiations with multilateral 
agencies such as the IMF and World Bank. It will be shown in chapters 2, 4, and 
5, that the changing international trading environment exacerbates their 
vulnerability and this has necessitated some economic adjustment. China is seen 
as an important dimension of this adjustment strategy. 
 
                                                 
27 See UNCTAD, Specific Problems of Island Developing Countries (Geneva: UNCTAD, 
1988). Also see Lino Briguglio, "Small Island Developing States and Their Economic 
Vulnerabilities," World Development 23, no. 9 (1995). 
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Many of the general characteristics of small states highlighted earlier also 
pertain to small islands. The SIDS concept is also relatively new and Briguglio 
was again a major developer of this approach.28 The Commonwealth Secretariat 
also played an important role in the development and study of this concept as the 
majority of SIDS are located in the Caribbean and a significant number are 
members of the British Commonwealth. In terms of actually modeling SIDS, this 
was first done by Briguglio where he added “islandness” as an important 
additional variable constraining small states.29 His argument is that a small state 
that is also an island is expected to be even more vulnerable and disadvantaged as 
they are more susceptible to ecological problems. 
 
More specifically, Sutton and Payne point out that islands possess, “near 
common properties of remoteness, environmental precariousness, insularity, 
rights to maritime zones, and military indefensibility.”30 The usual focus of the 
analysis of SIDs relates to their propensity to be adversely affected by 
environmental factors. In the Caribbean context this specifically means more 
threats from hurricanes, beach erosion, the destruction of coral reefs, and floods in 
low-lying areas. Chapter 4’s discussion of Dominica highlights the devastating 
                                                 
28 Briguglio, "Small Island Developing States and Their Economic Vulnerabilities." 
 
29 Ibid. 
 
30 Sutton and Payne, "Lilliput under Threat: The Security Problems of Small Island and 
Enclave Developing States," 584 
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effects of hurricanes as the infrastructure on the island was severely damaged by 
Hurricane Ivan in 2004. It will be shown that the economic downturn that 
followed this hurricane was indeed a major contributor to the Prime Minister’s 
decision to switch recognition from Taiwan to China. 
 
In Dominica’s presentation at the UN General Assembly Meeting in 
October 2007, Charles Savarin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Labor, 
echoes the view of other SIDs when he argues that they, 
Are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change even though they 
contribute the least to emissions of greenhouse gases. Sea level rise 
threatens the territorial existence of SIDs, and low lying islands in the 
Indian Ocean, the Pacific, and the Caribbean may simply disappear in the 
next thirty years or less, as the melting of the polar ice caps and mountain 
glaciers on all continents becomes the new reality of unchecked climate 
change. The disappearance of beaches, coastal tourism plant and loss of 
coastal communication infrastructure would devastate the tourism 
economy of most island states … Rising sea temperature is causing death 
and bleaching of coral reefs, which in turn are impacting negatively on 
fish stocks, the major protein source of island states. . . . Rising sea 
temperature also provides a fertile ground for the development of tropical 
storms and hurricanes which affect the Caribbean every year. Climate 
change is contributing to the frequency and severity of these storms every 
year. 
 
This concern is echoed across the Caribbean as hurricanes have become 
more frequent and are resulting in more damage. These states are also grappling 
with the destruction of coral reefs due to rising sea temperatures and pollution, 
and this has exacerbated the effects of hurricanes in coastal areas. In addition, 
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there are concerns about beach erosion and this will undoubtedly have a negative 
impact on the fragile tourism industries in the region. 
 
The small states political economy literature therefore highlights several 
important features of these states. These include small domestic markets, limited 
land area, poor natural resource endowment, limited labor force, greater social 
homogeneity, and openness to international trade. Added to these are the 
additional vulnerabilities associated with small states that are also islands. There 
is much consensus on the important economic characteristics of small states, but 
little consensus on the consequences or ramifications of these features.  
 
Are Small States Economically Disadvantaged? 
The general conclusion of much of the economic discussions of small 
states is ultimately that their economic prospects are limited and this disadvantage 
is largely a result of their size.31 In addition, it is argued that micro-states and 
island states are even more disadvantaged. But Armstrong and Read highlight 
important successes such as the Asian tigers and Western European states that 
they argue discredit claims that small states are acutely disadvantaged.32 The 
                                                 
31 See contributions in E. A. G. Robinson, ed., Economic Consequences of the Size of 
Nations (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963). Also see, Streeten, "The Special Problems 
of Small Countries." 
 
32 Harvey Armstrong and Robert Read, "Western Europe Micro-States and EU 
Autonomous Regions: The Advantages of Size and Sovereignty," World Development 
23, no. 7 (1995). 
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empirical results in this dissertation are in accordance with the general 
conclusions reached by Armstrong and Read. 
 
Armstrong and Read correctly note that the critical issue in the political 
economy literature pertaining to small size is not how to define small size or even 
the characteristics of small states, but instead is, “the extent to which small size 
affects fundamental economic ‘givens’ and so constrain domestic economic 
activity in small states and adversely affects their growth performance.”33 In fact, 
the results of some statistical tests have yielded inconclusive and contradictory 
results as to the effects of small size on growth, as will be seen below. 
 
One study conducted by Armstrong and Read on the economic 
performance of European micro-states and autonomous regions found that their 
economic development was in fact greater than that of adjacent EU members and 
their unemployment rates were also lower.34 They found that the most successful 
micro-states and autonomous regions were those that had a well developed 
financial sector, or were endowed with natural resources, or had a strong tourism 
sector. In a similar vein, Streeten shows that between 1973 and 1983, Malta’s 
                                                                                                                                     
 
33 Harvey Armstrong and Robert Read, "The Phantom of Liberty?: Economic Growth and 
the Vulnerability of Small States," Journal of International Development 14 (2002). 
 
34 The European micro-states and autonomous regions studied were Cyprus, Iceland, 
Malta, Liechtenstein, Andorra, San Marino, Canaries, Ceuta and Melilla, Isle of Man, 
Guernsey, Jersey, Gibraltar, Madeira, Azores and Faroes. 
 
 40 
GNP per capita increased on average by 8.1% and this represented the highest 
growth rate in Europe.35 
 
Streeten also found that at an aggregate level, small states have lower 
growth rates than larger states.36 He, however, noted that when the data was 
disaggregated based on geographic regions, differences in growth rates by regions 
were significantly greater than the differences seen when country size was the 
independent variable.37 The general consensus is that small states in many 
instances out-perform larger states. 
 
These results are also borne out by a cursory look at the ranking of 
Caribbean states based on the UNDP’s Human Development Index which ranks 
human development for 177 countries with the country ranked number 1 having 
the highest level of human development and the country ranked number 177 
having the lowest level of human development. Table 3 below highlights the fact 
that some small Caribbean states have performed quite well. Barbados (number 
31), the Bahamas (number 49). St. Kitts and Nevis (number 54), Antigua and 
Barbuda (number 57), and Trinidad and Tobago (number 59) all rank as countries 
                                                 
35 Streeten, "The Special Problems of Small Countries." 
 
36 Ibid. 
 
37 These conclusions were also reached by Easterly and Kraay (2000). 
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with high human development. All the other countries perform relatively well and 
are classified as medium human development countries.38 
 
Table 3. The Rank of Caribbean States on the HDI 
Country HDI Rank 
Barbados 31 
Bahamas 49 
St. Kitts/Nevis 54 
Antigua/Barbuda 57 
Trinidad/Tobago 59 
Dominica 71 
St. Lucia 72 
Belize 80 
Grenada 82 
St. Vincent 93 
Guyana 97 
Jamaica 101 
Source: UNDP Human Development Index, 2007 
 
The statistical tests and the anecdotal evidence emanating from a look at 
the performance of Caribbean states on the HDI demonstrate that small size does 
                                                 
38 It should also be noted that China ranks number 81, which is lower than all but 4 
Caribbean states—Grenada, St. Vincent, Guyana, and Jamaica. 
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not necessarily result in poor economic performance. Despite this evidence, there 
is still an argument that can be made that small states are more vulnerable. In the 
small states literature vulnerability is essentially defined as an increased 
susceptibility to exogenous shocks that emanates from a country’s small size.39  
 
Armstrong and Read in another study specifically on the vulnerability 
argument found that in the short-run vulnerability does not affect growth 
performance. Their evidence however suggested that, “vulnerability is a time-
series phenomenon affecting long-run growth performance but is insignificant as 
a determinant of cross-section levels of income per capita.”40 Vulnerability can 
therefore be seen as an important long-run determinant of a small state’s 
economic future, but the vulnerability variable does not explain differences in 
performance between small states and larger states in the short run. In terms of the 
empirical evidence on SIDS, Armstrong and Read also found that ‘islandness’ had 
no real effect on growth performance.41 
 
This conclusion is borne out in the Caribbean case as these states perform 
quite differently. Barbados is considered to be closer to being a developed country 
                                                 
39 Briguglio, "Small Island Developing States and Their Economic Vulnerabilities." 
 
40 Armstrong and Read, "The Phantom of Liberty?: Economic Growth and the 
Vulnerability of Small States." 
 
41 Ibid. 
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than a developing country while Guyana is one of the worst performing countries 
in the hemisphere. All the English-speaking Caribbean states have similar 
histories, economic structures and political systems, but some have relatively high 
GDP per capitas while others have low levels of GDP per capita. Smallness or 
islandness is therefore not the sole source of underperformance. It is therefore 
clear that there are other domestic institutional variables that explain this 
divergence in performance.  
 
This divergence is also seen in the foreign policies pursued by these 
Caribbean states. This dissertation aims to show why these states have varying 
policies towards China. It will be shown below that the answer is not found in 
much of the work on the foreign policies of small states. The answer to the 
foreign policy variation question is in fact similar to the answer to the economic 
performance question. Variation is indeed a function of the prevailing domestic 
institutional framework. 
 
Quite similarly, Selwyn concluded from his study of the difference in 
economic performance of Mauritius and Swaziland that the ‘island’ category 
“seems illegitimate,”42 meaning that it is not particularly useful as an analytical 
construct. Factors such as history, economics and institutions were seen to be 
                                                 
42 Selwyn, "Smallness and Islandness.", 950 
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stronger explanatory variables explaining difference in the economic performance 
of both countries. 
 
Dommen’s analysis of the social, political and ecological trends relating to 
island states concludes that, “island countries are indeed different and indeed they 
are particularly fortunate places, where life is longer and nature is bounteous 
though the menu may be short. Politics is friendlier. Hurricanes are more 
dangerous than social unrest.”43 Dommen’s description is quite simplistic and is 
in fact a mis-description, as there are many citizens of small states that would 
disagree with this characterization. But Dommen’s conclusion is consistent with 
other authors who argue that there is social and political stability in most small 
states.  
 
The general consensus is therefore that the statistical tests do not support 
the theoretical claims that small states are by virtue of being small, or even small 
islands, at a long run disadvantage. Despite this, subsequent chapters will 
illustrate that actual small state foreign policies in the Caribbean still reflect the 
assumption that small size is debilitating. These discussions that relate to the 
definition and features of small states dominate the small state literature, but they 
do not provide any real framework for understanding the foreign policies of these 
                                                 
43 Edward Dommen, "Distinguishing Characteristics of Island States," World 
Development 8 (1980), 931. 
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states or to understand how economic adjustment takes place in these countries. In 
order to understand this economic adjustment we must engage the literature on 
small European states in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
Economic Adjustment in Small States 
Maurice East argues that economic considerations are a key component of 
the foreign policies of small states.44 This dissertation will argue that a key 
motivator for the increased relations with China on the Caribbean side relates to 
economic adjustment. The Caribbean states are increasingly finding that their 
request for aid and concessionary packages in trade deals are dismissed. This has 
led to significant economic downturns especially in some smaller Eastern 
Caribbean states such as Dominica and Grenada. Katzenstein’s acclaimed analysis 
of small European states provides a useful framework for understanding small 
state economic adjustment.45 He does not discuss the nature of foreign policies, 
but he does help us to understand why small states, despite much literature to the 
contrary, perform so well economically. 
 
Katzenstein’s analysis starts from the same premise as other authors on 
small states—openness and vulnerability to external shocks. But from here he 
                                                 
44 East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models." 
 
45 Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1985). 
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diverges significantly from other small state theorists, such as Kuznets,46 East,47 
and Streeten,48 arguing instead that small European states exhibit a remarkable 
ability to adjust and in the 1970s and early 1980s, were more adaptable than 
larger industrial states to the oil shocks and the general international economic 
slowdown during that period. Instead of locating the explanation of small state 
behavior at the international level or external conditions, Katzenstein provides an 
explicitly domestic explanation for this phenomenon. He argues that,  
International factors affect political strategies and outcomes only 
indirectly: they are funneled through domestic structures that are shaped 
by different histories and embody different political possibilities. … while 
external events induced convergence, internal events drive countries to 
different responses.49 
 
For Katzenstein, the ability of small European states to adjust is therefore 
a function of their political and economic structure, which he describes as 
democratic corporatism. Democratic corporatism has three key components: an 
ideology of social partnership; a centralized system of interest groups; and 
continuous political bargaining between various interest groups, state 
                                                 
46 Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth of Small Nations," in The Economic Consequences 
of the Size of Nations: Proceedings of a Conference Held by the International Economic 
Associations, ed. E. A. G. Robinson (Toronto: MacMillan, 1960). 
 
47 East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models." 
 
48 Streeten, "The Special Problems of Small Countries." 
 
49 Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe, 37. 
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bureaucracies and political parties.50 It is these three features that account for the 
strong performance of the European small states even during the oil shocks of the 
1970s and an international economic downturn. The constant dialogue and 
bargaining accounts for much of the domestic stability witnessed in these states 
and the ideology of social partnership provided the general framework for this 
dialogue and bargaining to take place. 
 
The details of the European cases are not important for the purposes of 
this dissertation, what is useful in this thesis is the identification of the 
explanation of small state behavior outside of the ‘system’ level of analysis and 
the emphasis on domestic political structures in explaining the adjustment 
strategies of these European states.51 The Caribbean political economy bears little 
resemblance to the democratic corporatism associated with the small European 
states, but the general premise that political structures and economic structures 
determine adjustment strategies is generalizable. Katzenstein’s framework, 
despite its European roots, can easily be modified for the Caribbean context. The 
Caribbean states under study are all democracies and have strong democratic 
traditions. More specifically, the Caribbean states have Parliamentary systems of 
government modeled off the British Westminster system. It will be shown in 
chapters 4, 5 and 6 that this political structure is very important in understanding 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 32. 
 
51 The pertinence of the level of analysis question is discussed in more detail below. 
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how decisions are made and how relations are managed in the case of Caribbean-
China relations. 
 
Having discussed the features of small states and the potential economic 
effects of small size the discussion will now focus on the foreign policy strategies 
pursued by small states. This dissertation argues that small states do not have a 
homogenous approach to foreign policy decision-making and that resources are 
key to understanding the variations in the foreign policy strategies of different 
Caribbean states. 
 
 
The Foreign Policy Strategies of Small States 
Jeanne Hey provides a comprehensive list of the commonly cited foreign 
policy attributes of small state behavior.52 Table 4 below reproduces this list. She 
argues that small states have a foreign policy that is, inter alia, limited in scope, 
principled, non-conflictual and dependent on external powers. One of the most 
striking things about the list, in addition to its length, is that there is no ranking of 
the features. The list is therefore more of a taxonomy, pointing to some of the 
more popular features highlighted in the literature. All the points highlighted by 
                                                 
52 Jeanne A. K. Hey, "Introducing Small State Foreign Policy," in Small States in World 
Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior, ed. Jeanne A. K. Hey (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2003). 
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Hey have been a feature of the foreign policies of Caribbean states at some point 
in their history. Chapter 2 will make this point in more detail. 
 
Table 4. Hey’s Characteristics of the Foreign Policy of Small States 
o Low level of participation in world affairs 
o Address a narrow scope of foreign policy issues 
o Limit behavior to close geographical area 
o Employ diplomatic and economic foreign policy instruments, as opposed 
to military instruments 
o Emphasize internationalist principles, international law, and other 
“morally minded” ideals 
o Choose neutral positions 
o Rely on superpowers for protection, partnerships and resources 
o Aim to cooperate and avoid conflict with others 
o Spend a disproportionate amount of foreign policy resources on ensuring 
physical and political security. 
Source: Jeanne A. K. Hey, "Introducing Small State Foreign Policy," in Small 
States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior, ed. Jeanne A. K. 
Hey (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003 
 
The Hey taxonomy is quite similar to that of Maurice East.53 East 
identifies seven key patterns associated with small state foreign policy; a low 
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level of participation in world affairs, high levels of activity in IGOs, high levels 
of support for international legal norms, avoidance of the use of force as a 
technique of statecraft, avoidance of behavior and policies that tend to alienate the 
more powerful states, a narrow functional and geographic range of foreign policy 
concerns, and frequent utilization of moral and normative positions on 
international issues.54 
 
East, adopting a resource-based framework for understanding small state 
foreign policy behavior, argues that it is the lack of political resources that 
accounts for their unique foreign policies.55 Small states therefore try to minimize 
the costs of conducting foreign policy by initiating more joint actions. In addition, 
East argues that the foreign policies of small states are dominated by economic 
considerations. This economic focus is seen in two respects—the heavy 
involvement of economic bureaucracies and the greater utilization of “economic 
techniques of statecraft.”56 
 
It should, however, be noted that East’s conclusions have been challenged. 
Duval and Thompson, for example, refute the conclusions raised by East on three 
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grounds.57 First, they argue that his data set was biased and therefore not 
representative of the total population of small states. Second, they argue that he 
mis-specifies the independent variable by defining a small state as one with 
limited economic surplus. Thirdly, and related to second reason, his 
operationalization of size is faulty as he uses value of economic surplus to 
measure smallness. Despite this criticism, the fact, however, remains that 
numerous scholars have used East’s conclusions as a starting point for discussing 
small state behavior. The criticism, however, demonstrates that care must, 
however, be taken to not solely rely on East’s conclusions. East’s argument 
relating to the importance of political resources in determining foreign policy will 
be modified in this dissertation. The emphasis in this study is on natural and 
sovereign resources, but East’s argument that resource endowment is important is 
useful in the context of this dissertation. 
 
 
Early Views of the Foreign Policies of Small States 
The early literature on the foreign policies of small states focused heavily 
on providing analyses of the inherent problems associated with their lack of 
material capabilities. Rothstein defines a small state as “a small power which 
recognizes that it can not obtain security by use of its own security, and that it 
                                                 
57 Robert D. Duval and William R. Thompson, "Reconsidering the Aggregate 
Relationships between Size, Economic Development, and Some Types of Foreign Policy 
Behavior," American Journal of Political Science 24, no. 3 (1980). 
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must rely fundamentally on the aid of others.”58 But even in the early stages of the 
development of the small state foreign policy literature there were voices arguing 
that the small European states had unique foreign policies that sometimes yielded 
success, despite a lack of comparable material capabilities. One of the first works 
to treat this issue was Fox’s discussion of the policies of small states in WWII.59 
Fox focuses on the alliance patterns of Turkey, Finland, Norway, Sweden and 
Spain. She found that during the War, “Sweden, Spain, Turkey, Switzerland, Eire, 
and Portugal all avoided being drawn into the war and emerged from it 
unwounded and, if anything, stronger than before.”60 This successful international 
maneuvering is credited to their diplomatic prowess. Fox’s conclusion—and the 
conclusion of this dissertation—is therefore that treating small states as just 
pawns limits our understanding of their foreign policies.  
 
This dissertation builds on the underlying premise of Fox’s work that 
small states are not mere pawns in the international system, but in fact do have 
quite interesting and problematic foreign policies that should be studied. The 
Caribbean’s relations with China therefore demonstrates Fox’s argument that 
small states are not just mere pawns in the international system, but are in fact 
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creative states that have devised innovative strategies for dealing with the 
disadvantages associated with their size. 
 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s there was a debate in Britain and across 
the world as the decolonization process proceeded. The British colonies in the 
Caribbean region were set to be decolonized, but these states were considered to 
be too small as political units to be viable.61 In fact, the initial British plan for 
decolonization involved the granting of independence only if the former colonies 
became a federation. The thinking behind this was linked to the earlier work on 
small states, which saw them as having inherent administrative problems. It was 
thought that this would have been even more exaggerated in the Caribbean states 
as they lacked a history of self-government and would have to learn everything 
related to foreign policy formulation and its conduct in a very short time. The 
birth of the Caribbean states therefore took place amidst an important debate 
about their viability as political units.  
 
The early literature on the effects of size on foreign policy options and 
strategies often focused on the lack of material capabilities, but even in the early 
writings of Vital and Singer there was some attempt made to point out some 
                                                 
61 Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, "The English-Speaking Caribbean States: A Triad of 
Foreign Policies," in Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior, 
ed. Jeanne A. K. Hey (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003). 
 
 54 
possible options open to small states.62 Vital argues that not all small states are 
equally disadvantaged, but instead variables such as level of development, 
internal stability and geography can mitigate against some of their weakness.63  
 
In a similar vein, Singer argues that analysts must distinguish between 
“coercive power” and “attractive power”.64 Coercive power relates to one state 
getting another state to do what it wants for example by threatening the use of 
force if the other state does not comply with its demands. Attractive power on the 
other hand is the power derived from some attribute possessed by a state that may 
be useful to another state, such as the possession of an important strategic 
resource. Small states tend to lack coercive power, but that does not preclude their 
possession of attractive power that makes them attractive to external states and 
that can be used to their advantage.  
 
This distinction between coercive and attractive power is useful as it 
shows that Caribbean states that do not have coercive power can exercise some 
attractive power especially when another more powerful state is attracted to its 
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natural resources or ability to vote in international bodies. As will be highlighted 
throughout this thesis, in the China case, the Chinese government is attracted to 
both the Caribbean’s natural resources and sovereign rights. 
 
 
Theoretical Foundations: The Levels of Analysis Question 
As noted in the introductory chapter, there are two major research 
questions driving this study—why do we see variation in the foreign policies of 
Caribbean states vis-à-vis China, and, why do these states align with China given 
the disadvantages associated with this increased relationship? Both these 
questions raise one common, but unresolved issues in international politics—the 
levels of analysis problem.65 
 
The answers to both research questions are found at the domestic level of 
analysis. In relation to the first question, the answer posited is that variation in 
foreign policy is attributed to differences in natural resource endowment. In the 
second case, the explanation lies in the nature of the Westminster political model 
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article, J. David Singer, "The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations," 
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seen in the Caribbean. Both these responses deviate from the typical explanations 
posited for small state foreign policy behavior.  
 
What explains small state behavior? Where should we locate causality? As 
highlighted by Elman and Hey, the usual explanatory variable used in small state 
foreign policy analyses is the international system.66 Many authors argue that 
small states are even more constrained by the international system due primarily 
to their lack of resources (whether diplomatic, military, economic) and they are 
therefore often in a reactive stance.67 They are subsequently unable to dictate the 
rules of the international game. At a political level, they are often subject to the 
whim and fancy of larger states and are treated as pawns, and at the economic 
level, small states given their lack of natural resources cannot make the rules and 
tend to be price takers because of their limited resource base and therefore cannot 
dictate prices. 
 
System level analyses are, however, not without fault as they over-
emphasize the inability of small states to maneuver in the international political 
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and economic system. But as the works of Katzenstein and Armstrong and Read 
discussed above show, there is some amount of flexibility available to these small 
states and the international system is not the dominant explanatory variable 
explaining their economic performance. As noted before, Katzenstein actually 
identifies the domestic structure as the key explanatory variable. This is also one 
of the conclusions that this work will make. 
 
The other popular explanation for small state behavior rests at the 
individual level. Many studies of the foreign policies of individual countries often 
place causality at this level of analysis.68 In these studies differences in foreign 
policy across time are attributed to the leader that is in power at any particular 
time. The importance of leadership (the individual level of analysis) is a newer 
addition to the small state literature. The leadership variable is especially 
important in the Caribbean context as these states are governed under the 
Westminster political system where power is concentrated in the hands of the 
Prime Minister and—at his/her discretion—the Cabinet.  
 
This thesis deviates from the usual emphasis on system level explanation, 
pointing instead to domestic factors explaining the foreign policies of small states 
and agrees with Elman’s declaration that, “political behavior can only be 
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explained in the context of institutionally created incentives and available 
options.”69 For example, Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner argues that the foreign 
policy decision-making process in the Caribbean is highly “politicized.”70 This, 
she notes, is a direct result of the Westminster political system and the weak 
nature of the political system. Donato St. Aimee, building on Braveboy-Wagner’s 
work, correctly notes that in the Caribbean, foreign policy is made at the level of 
the political leader and, “the attitude of that individual will determine policy 
choices and decisions without significant inputs from interest groups and 
parliament.”71   
 
Both system level and individual level analyses are therefore important in 
understanding Caribbean foreign policy behavior vis-à-vis China. However, 
subsequent sections of this chapter will show that it is in fact very hard to 
determine which is the most dominant, but the dissertation ultimately concludes 
that domestic variables such as political system and natural resource endowment 
are in fact the key explanatory variables explaining the foreign policy behavior of 
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Caribbean states. In addition, this dissertation will argue that understanding 
Caribbean foreign policy is actually an exercise in understanding development 
policy. The main motivator of Caribbean foreign policy is economic development 
in the sense of the attainment of external capital flows that will ultimately result in 
increases to GNP. The international economic system provides constraints to the 
actions of Caribbean states, but the real driver of foreign policy in the region is 
the search for resources necessary for domestic economic development. 
. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that this dissertation is therefore 
breaking new ground, as there exists several holes in the discussion of the foreign 
policy of small states. For example, there is limited discussion of variations in the 
foreign policy behavior of small states. What we do have are individual studies of 
individual states and a compendium of the general patterns seen in their foreign 
policies. Discussions of differences in the substance and concerns of foreign 
policy are largely missing. In addition—and even more important for this 
dissertation—there is little discussion of the link between resource endowment 
and foreign policy suffice to say that countries that have specific strategic 
resources will use them in their foreign policy, but these analyses are also quite 
limited. The next chapter will focus on the specific details of the foreign policies 
of Caribbean states. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Caribbean States: Small States in the International System 
 
Smallness in the Caribbean is often discussed in association with concepts 
such as vulnerability, dependency and survival.72 This thesis argues that in order 
to understand the rationale behind the interest in China, the persistent role of 
small size considerations is key. On October 12, 1492 Columbus arrived in the 
Caribbean and claimed the Caribbean states as Spanish colonies. The British 
gained control in the mid 1600s and remained the dominant foreign force until 
decolonization between the 1960s and 1980s.73  
 
For the Caribbean, the current relationship with China is actually rooted in 
two important things: first, the search for survival as small states and second, 
locating the source of that survival in some external power. Georges Fauriol states 
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that the small Caribbean states do not have a foreign policy, they simply have a 
policy of existence.74  If this line of thinking is to be followed, the conclusion 
would be that as small states, the international relations of the Caribbean states is 
therefore simply a story of survival. As has been noted in the previous chapter, 
small states actually do much more than survive. They have been able to adjust to 
external shocks and in many instances have outperformed much larger states at an 
economic level. 
 
The economic survival of the Caribbean has always been intertwined with 
a great power—the Spanish, the British (and then the wider EU), the US and now 
China. The need to survive and the identification of this means in an external 
power are the hallmarks of Caribbean foreign policy and provide a good 
explanation for the recent intensification of relations between the region and 
China. This thesis will argue that the primacy placed on relations with great 
powers is also due to the perception that their survival is threatened and great 
powers represent a source of much needed aid and investments. 
 
Chapter Outline 
This chapter will begin with an overview of the foreign policy stance of 
Caribbean states since the 1960s. It will show that the foreign policies pursued by 
                                                 
74 Georges A. Fauriol, Foreign Policy Behavior of Caribbean States: Guyana, Haiti, and 
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Caribbean countries has changed over time, but the economic foundation of the 
various foreign policies pursued remains constant over time. In addition, great 
powers have always been an important component of Caribbean foreign policy. In 
the 1960s it was the US and Great Britain, but the US eventually became the sole 
major power. During the Cold War period, the US and the Soviet Union, to a 
lesser extent, were the major great power players in the Caribbean. In the post-
Cold War era the emphasis shifted to the US solely, but in recent years China has 
become an important player in the region. The discussion will therefore 
emphasize the relationship between economic development and foreign policy in 
the Caribbean and the importance of great powers in the Caribbean states.  
 
The chapter will then make the case that the current foreign policy stance 
of increased relations with China is in fact due to the current economic downturn 
being experienced by these Caribbean states. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of one of the primary theoretical discussions in the thesis—the notion 
of sovereignty for sale. It will be shown that the creative use of sovereignty for 
economic gain is a strategy that has been employed by Caribbean states in the past 
through their sale of flags of convenience and economic citizenship, and the 
establishment of offshore financial centers. The use of their status as sovereign 
states to vote with China in international bodies and to recognize China is 
therefore the newest phase of their creative use of sovereignty. 
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Development and Foreign Policy: The Caribbean Context 
 
The History of Caribbean Foreign Policies 
The foreign policy story of the Caribbean is a story of great power 
involvement in the region and the search for strategies to promote economic 
development. The importance of great powers is depicted in the political system, 
the economic structure and the foreign policy objectives of Caribbean states. In 
order to understand the Caribbean’s relations with China it is therefore imperative 
that we briefly discuss both the Caribbean’s experience with other great powers in 
its history and the foreign policy strategies that have aimed at achieving economic 
development. 
 
The Caribbean’s foreign policy has been characterized by the influence of 
external states especially the US and Europe. Erisman argues that the Caribbean 
has historically been, 
a cockpit of great power conflict … foreign nations have fought and 
schemed to control the Caribbean from almost the very moment that 
Columbus first came ashore on San Salvadore Island in the present-day 
Bahamas.75  
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There have been other important regional players such as Venezuela and Cuba 
that have been influential, but the powers that dominate Caribbean considerations 
have been the US and Britain. 
 
The Caribbean states after discovery, were colonized by various European 
forces and the European influence on the Caribbean would remain an important 
part of Caribbean identity even after decolonization. Upon decolonization, the 
agreements signed by the British and other European states were “grandfathered” 
and the Caribbean states were obligated, upon the receipt of sovereignty, to 
adhere to all previous agreements.76 The structure of the economy seen in the 
1960s was also a European artifact and the Caribbean was intentionally set-up as 
a provider of raw material to Europe (specifically sugar). 
 
Table 5 below depicts the phases of Caribbean foreign policy since the 
start of the decolonization process in the 1960s. It is important to note that since 
attaining independence beginning in the 1960s these states have found it 
necessary to declare allegiance to a particular state or cause throughout their short 
history. This is related to the need to appease the reigning hegemon and to attract 
foreign aid and investment. This, however, changed after the end of the Cold War 
when political allegiances became seemingly obsolete. The fact is, however, that 
                                                 
76 One example of these agreement were the “land lease” agreements where Britain 
leased lands in the Caribbean to the US for 99 years in exchange for the US’ entry into 
WWII on the side of the allies. These leases are still valid as the leases expire around 
2040. 
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the notion that a more powerful benefactor state is necessary for the development 
of the Caribbean still figures prominently in Caribbean foreign policy 
considerations, but it should be noted that this runs contrary to the overtures of 
foreign policy officials. China is the new benefactor in the post-Cold War era and 
this indicates that very little has changed for these states. 
 
Table 5. Caribbean Alignment with External Powers 
PERIOD INTERNATIONAL ALIGNMENT 
1960s Alignment with the West 
1970s Alignment with the South, but We Need 
Aid from the Industrial Powers 
1980s Re-Alignment With the West 
1990s-present Alignment Doesn’t Matter? 
 
 
1960s: Alignment With the West 
The Caribbean states that gained independence in the 1960s were 
Barbados, Trinidad, Guyana, and Jamaica. At this time the Cold War was already 
underway and Cuba was already solidly in the Soviet camp. As a result, the 
Caribbean was already identified as a battleground in the ideological battle of the 
Cold War. The Cuban Missile Crisis (1961-62) occurred on the heels of the first 
round of Caribbean decolonization, making it even more imperative that these 
new states in the US’ backyard declare their ideological allegiance. 
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The decade of the 1960s was therefore characterized as ‘Alignment with 
the West.’ The slogan “We’re with the West” therefore epitomizes the need for an 
ideological declaration. Alexander Bustamante made this statement immediately 
upon Jamaica’s independence in 1962.77 This was similar to pronouncements 
made in Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados. These declarations point to the fact 
that external realities often dominate foreign policy considerations in the 
Caribbean. ‘We’re with the West’ must therefore be understood within the 
geopolitical framework of the 1960s. The Cold War had already started and both 
sides were vying for the support of states across the developing world. The 
declaration by Bustamante should therefore be seen as Jamaica and other 
Caribbean states being solidly behind Western powers, and the US in particular. 
 
At the start of the decolonization process in the Caribbean, Britain’s 
decline as the world superpower was already a fait a compli. The United States, 
which was geographically closer, had become the main force in the region. The 
1823 Monroe Doctrine which declared the Americas as the US’ sphere of 
influence and the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary which proclaimed the US right to 
intervene militarily in the affairs of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
highlight the US’ view of the region. The frequent interventions by the US in the 
affairs of Latin America really did not spill over to the English-speaking 
                                                 
77 Don Mills, "Jamaica's Foreign Policy," in Jamaica in Independence, ed. Rex Nettleford 
(Kingston: Heinemann Caribbean, 1989). 
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Caribbean until in the 1970s. In fact, up to the 1970s the Bahamas was the only 
Caribbean state that the US viewed as a vital consideration. It is only in the mid-
1970s that the English-speaking Caribbean really becomes a part of the US’ 
backyard as reflected in the attention directed towards the region as a part of 
general Cold War considerations. But despite the lack of attention on the US’ 
part, the Caribbean states were cognizant of the fact that the US was the leading 
power (at least in geographic proximity) and was the leading economic force. 
Even before decolonization, Caribbean economies were becoming aware of the 
economic potential of the US market. US firms dominated the mineral industries 
and the newly formed tourism sectors were heavily reliant on US nationals 
seeking tropical vacations.78 
 
1970s: Alignment with the South, but We Need Aid from the Industrial Powers 
The 1970s are an important period in Caribbean economic and foreign 
policy history. It is during this decade that most Caribbean states gained their 
independence and it is also in this period that we see an important contradiction in 
the Caribbean and its foreign policy—extolling the virtues of solidarity with 
developing countries and opposition to industrialized countries, while 
simultaneously seeking preferences from powerful countries especially Britain. 
 
                                                 
78 Damien King, "The Evolution of Structural Adjustment and Stabilisation Policy in 
Jamaica," Social and Economic Studies 50, no. 1 (2001). 
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The Lomé Convention was an example of this real contradiction. In the 
aftermath of World War II and the commencement of the decolonization process, 
the international community witnessed the emergence of several new states onto 
the international stage. These former colonies were eager to have their voices 
heard and almost immediately directed international attention to the 
disadvantaged position they inherited in relation to developed countries and the 
general ills of the international economic system. They consistently, and often 
quite convincingly, argued that they needed development assistance and increased 
access to the markets of developed countries on preferential terms. These efforts 
were met with varying degrees of success. One of the most promising 
development arrangements obtained by developing countries were the Lomé 
Convention concessions given to a subset of developing countries. Under this 
Convention, the European Community offered trade and development 
concessions to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)79 countries that seemed to 
encapsulate almost all of what the developing countries were demanding in the 
United Nations and in other international fora. 
 
The first Lomé Convention, signed in 1975, provided non-reciprocal duty-
free access to the EEC market. It also included significant amounts of 
                                                 
79 The ACP distinction does not encompass all states in Africa, the Caribbean or the 
Pacific. The ACP countries are those countries in the three regions that are former 
colonies of European Community members. In 1975 ACP membership was 47, but by 
2000 the membership had increased to 79. Cuba became the 79th member in 2000, but 
does not participate in EU-ACP agreements. 
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development aid through the European Development Fund (EDF). This Fund was 
aimed at facilitating the diversification of the ACP countries away from their 
dependence on agricultural production and towards the establishment of viable 
manufacturing sectors. The Lomé Convention was seemingly incontrovertible. It 
was just what the developing countries said was necessary to mitigate against 
their disadvantaged position in the international economic system and to facilitate 
their economic development. 
 
The Lomé Convention emanated from the accession of Britain into the 
European Community and the moral obligation it felt towards its former colonies. 
Prior to decolonization, exports of the British colonies had special access to the 
British markets. This relationship continued after decolonization and Britain was 
intent on maintaining this relationship even after it became a member of the 
European Community.80 The first Lomé Convention provided non-reciprocal 
trade benefits to ACP countries and also importantly a stabilization provision, 
commonly referred to as the Stabilization of Export Earnings (STABEX),81 which 
was aimed at guaranteeing a certain level of export earnings by compensating for 
fluctuations in the export earnings of ACP countries in relation to their exports 
into the European Community. Under Lomé I most agricultural goods would enter 
                                                 
80 Ismael Musha Montana, "The Lomé Convention from Inception to the Dynamics of the 
Post-Cold War, 1975-1990s," African and Asian Studies 2, no. 1 (2003). 
 
81 The ‘Stabilization of Export Earnings’ (STABEX) provisions are found in Title II of 
the Convention. 
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the European market duty free, but other goods that competed with European 
goods would receive preferential treatment in the form of lower tariff rates than 
those levied on goods from non-ACP countries. 
One important aspect of the Lomé Convention was the stabilization 
component of the agreement. Article 16 enshrined a commitment on the part of 
the European Community not only to guarantee a market for ACP products, but 
also to ensure stable earnings by these countries from exports of certain products 
to that market. The STABEX facility stated: 
With the aim of remedying the harmful effects of the instability of export 
earnings and of thereby enabling the ACP States to achieve the stability, 
profitability and sustained growth of their economies, the Community 
shall implement a system for guaranteeing the stabilization of earnings 
from exports by the ACP States to the Community of certain products on 
which their economies are dependent and which are affected by 
fluctuations in price and/or quantity. (Lomé Convention 1976) 
 
The products covered under the article 16 STABEX provision included 
iron, bananas, coffee, cocoa, coconut, tea and wood products. What more could 
the ACP countries ask for? Their most critical exports had a guaranteed market 
and in the event that export earnings fell below expectations due to any 
unforeseen event,82 ACP countries would be compensated for the shortfall in 
earnings. The Caribbean states accessed the STABEX funds on numerous 
                                                 
82 These unforeseen events included floods, droughts, and hurricanes and decreased 
prices in the European market. 
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occasions, especially in the aftermath of hurricanes. It is therefore easy to 
understand why the Lomé Convention could have been viewed as almost a 
panacea for ACP countries. This Convention is also one of the primary foreign 
policy successes of the Caribbean region as the main negotiators were Caribbean 
nationals. 
The original Lomé Convention was succeeded by three other Conventions. 
However, those successive Conventions made very few changes to the content 
and benefits conferred on ACP members. Therefore from 1975 to 2000 ACP 
countries continued to benefit from what seemed to be a perfect agreement. Lomé 
II was signed in 1979 and the only major change was the inclusion of a provision 
titled ‘System for Mineral Products’ (SYSMIN) which provided assistance to 
developing countries dependent on mineral extractions. SYSMIN worked similar 
to the STABEX provision for agricultural products. Lomé III was signed in 1984 
and it shifted some focus from industrial development to the development of 
industries that would prove to be self-sufficient and would not depend on the 
provisions of STABEX or SYSMIN for support. Lomé IV was the first 10-year 
agreement, running initially from 1990 to 1995, after which time there was a mid-
term review. After some minor adjustments the Agreement continued until 
2000.83 This agreement proved to be a lifeline for Caribbean states and it will be 
                                                 
83 Chapter 3 will provide a more detailed discuss of the Lomé Conventions and will 
discuss how the loss of the Lomé preferences have directly led to the need for economic 
adjustment in the Caribbean. 
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shown in Chapter 3 that the loss of these preferences had detrimental effects in 
several Caribbean states. 
 
The NAM and NIEO 
While negotiating for preferential agreements, the Caribbean states 
became a part of the wider Third World movement aimed at identifying the 
disadvantages of the international economic system during the 1970s. This was 
primarily demonstrated in the Caribbean’s active membership in the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) and their support of calls for a New International Economic 
Order (NIEO).84 In fact, the Lomé negotiation was a corollary to this activity. It 
was the first instance that they were successful in getting some measures that 
were seemingly aimed at countering the disadvantages of not only size, but also 
their lack of development.85 
 
                                                 
84 The Non-aligned movement (NAM) is a direct offshoot of Chinese Third World 
activism. The principles of peaceful coexistence that serve as the basis if the movement 
were in fact first articulated by China’s Zhou Enlai. NAM was formed in 1961 and aimed 
at promoting the principles of self-determination and sovereignty, among others. The 
NIEO movement was largely an outcome of NAM discussions. The aim of the NIEO was 
to make the international economic more equitable as Third World countries argued that 
the existing structure of the international system resulted in developed countries getting 
richer, while the poorer countries remained underdeveloped. 
 
85 See Vaughan A. Lewis, Size, Self-Determination and International Relations: The 
Caribbean (Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1976). 
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CARICOM: Another Antidote for Small Size 
The Caribbean states have also identified regional integration as an 
important antidote for small size.86 Recall that in Chapter 1 it was pointed out that 
Britain initially recommended that upon decolonization the Caribbean states 
establish a federation, but attempts at federation failed in 1961 when Jamaica in a 
referendum voted to stay out of any Caribbean federation stating primarily that 
the other Caribbean countries would stifle Jamaica’s own development. Trinidad 
also followed suit and their Prime Minister Eric Williams, already skeptical of the 
benefits of federation, made a famous statement that ‘ten minus one equals zero.’ 
The idea was that if Jamaica—the most developed state of the ten Caribbean 
states seeking federation—pulled out, then there was no way that a federation 
would succeed. 
 
The next attempt at some form of regionalism came in 1965 with the 
Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA). The establishment of a free trade area 
was essentially a ‘fall back’ position, as it was believed to be easier to accomplish 
because issues related to trade agreements are easier to negotiate than are issues 
related to political integration. The aim was to establish a free trade area between 
                                                 
86 One popular Caribbean text is titled “Surviving Small Size” and it focuses on the 
importance of regional integration to the Caribbean states. Integration is often argued to 
be the only hope for the survival of these small states. 
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the ten states that had attempted federation earlier. Tariffs were eliminated on 
imports from member countries and the immediate results were quite good. Intra-
Caribbean trade doubled and the manufacturing industries primarily in Jamaica 
and Trinidad flourished as a result of the increased access to other Caribbean 
markets.87 
 
In 1973 the Caribbean sought to deepen the attempt at integration as seen 
in CARIFTA. The main impetus for this deepening of the relationship stemmed 
from Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community (EEC). As noted 
before, Caribbean exports enjoyed duty-free access to the British market and they 
feared the loss of this access when Britain gained membership. The major 
problem stemmed from the common external tariff (CET) provision of the EEC. 
Britain could not unilaterally extend duty-free access to some countries without 
all of the other EEC members following suit. The Caribbean states therefore 
feared that Britain would end up being forced to eliminate its concessions to the 
Caribbean.88 
                                                 
87 See Kenneth Hall, ed., Integrate of Perish: Perspectives of Leaders of the Integration 
Movement (Georgetown, Guyana: UWI-CARICOM Project, 2000). 
 
88 The Caribbean states decided to work with other former colonies of Britain to lobby for 
the maintenance of existing preferences. There was, however, some precedent for this. 
When France joined the EEC it also had a preferential arrangement with its colonies and 
France was able to maintain these preferences even after signing on to the EEC. France 
hinged its membership to the Community on an agreement that would accommodate the 
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The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was therefore established in 
1973 primarily as a result of international realities. The Caribbean states realized 
that they had to negotiate and lobby Britain with one collective voice and that the 
preferences that they depended on were heavily threatened. The CARICOM 
Agreement identifies three goals: first, the establishment of a common market 
(similar to the European attempts); second, functional cooperation; and third, the 
coordination of their foreign policies.  
 
Functional cooperation involved collaboration on non-political issues. In 
the Caribbean case these included a common examination body for secondary 
schools (The Caribbean Examination Council), collaboration in running the 
University of the West Indies, and the establishment of the Caribbean News 
Agency. The rationale behind functional cooperation is quite simple; if countries 
have a history of cooperation on even non-combative issues, this can set the stage 
for further integration attempts such as an economic or political union. 
                                                                                                                                     
needs of its colonies. The subsequent Yaoundé Agreements were non-reciprocal trade 
and development concessions given to the African colonies and dependencies of 
Community members under the Treaty of Rome. This system was based on France’s 
perception that it had a moral and economic obligation to its overseas dependents and 
colonies (Montana 2003). The first Yaoundé Agreement was signed in 1963 and the 
second in 1969. The six members of the European Community established a system 
whereby the exports of their dependencies would gain preferential access to their 
European markets and the newly established European Development Fund would provide 
other development assistance to these states in relation to their infrastructural 
development. The Caribbean and the wider ACP grouping used this as the template for 
the Lomé Agreements. 
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1980s: Re-Alignment with the West 
Reagan’s election as president solidified the Caribbean perception that the 
region was now a part of the containment strategy of the US and highlights the 
importance of the US in foreign policy decision-making. During the 1970s, 
Jamaica and Grenada had socialist turns under Michael Manley and Maurice 
Bishop respectively.89 In 1980 Jamaica moved away from the socialist rhetoric of 
Manley with the election of Edward Seaga, but Grenada remained socialist. The 
intervention of the US in Grenada in 1983 signaled Reagan’s determination to halt 
the spread of communism in the US’ backyard.90 
 
During the 1980s the Caribbean states, cognizant of the importance of 
appeasing the US declared their allegiance with the US and stated their 
repudiation of communist movements in the region. In fact, the invasion of 
Grenada by the US was sanctioned by other Caribbean states including Barbados 
and Jamaica.91 Across the region conservative governments were elected and the 
region sought to increase its trade relations with North America primarily through 
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) also referred to as the 
CBI, which was signed into law by Reagan and was envisioned as the Caribbean 
                                                 
89 The case studies in subsequent chapters will deal with the socialist movements in the 
1970s in more detail. 
 
90 See Holger Henke, Between Self-Determination and Dependency: Jamaica's Foreign 
Relations 1972-1989 (Kingston: The University of the West Indies Press, 2000). 
 
91 Braveboy-Wagner, The Caribbean in World Affairs. 
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version of the Marshall Plan. The CBI provisions provided duty-free access for 
non-traditional Caribbean exports with the ultimate goal being a decrease in the 
economic motivations for an alignment with the Soviet Union. 
 
1990s: Alignment Doesn’t Matter? 
The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era for Caribbean states. Up to 
this point, they had become used to some superpower rivalry and concessions 
based on their perceived disadvantaged position in the international economic 
system. The end of the Cold War meant no superpower fighting for the 
Caribbean’s allegiance by providing economic aid and it also ushered in the era of 
reciprocity in international trade. The establishment of the WTO would also prove 
important to the economic prospects of the Caribbean states. As noted earlier, one 
of the major foreign policy successes of the Caribbean was the negotiation of the 
Lomé Convention. The WTO, however, ruled that the provisions vis-à-vis 
bananas were contrary to the rules of the GATT and as such the entire Lomé 
Agreement was called into question (see chapter 5 for more details). 
 
In view of the loss of the European trade preferences and the decline in 
importance to the main regional hegemon—the US, the Caribbean states sought to 
cultivate new friendships. The relationship with Cuba deepened as Cuba joined 
the Caribbean as a founding member of the Association of Caribbean states 
(ACS) and other educational and cultural linkages were established. The 
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Caribbean states also began to engage Latin American countries more as is seen 
in the close relationship between the Caribbean and Venezuela and Mexico as 
seen in the PetroCaribe Agreement and the San Jose Accords respectively which 
both provide Caribbean states access to concessionary loans.92 
 
The more globalized international economic system that was based on 
neoliberal norms proved to be a big problem for the majority of Caribbean states. 
It no longer mattered whom they declared their allegiance to—the only thing that 
seemingly mattered was where their comparative advantage lie. The identification 
of comparative advantages has proven to be one of the major problems facing 
Caribbean states.93 It is in this vein that the Caribbean has chosen to engage 
China. The US and Russia had ended their Cold War and were no longer willing 
to compensate Caribbean states for their “ideological” support, but China was 
willing to provide the aid that they were unable to access in the existing 
international political and economic climate. 
 
                                                 
92 The PetroCaribe Agreement was signed in 2005 and it affords Caribbean states access 
to Venezuelan oil at preferential rates. Payment for the oil accessed under the agreement 
can be deferred for 25 years at an interest rate of 1% per year. The San Jose Accord is 
between Mexico, Venezuela, and Jamaica. Under this agreement Jamaica has access to 
both Mexican and Venezuelan oil and access to loans for sports and cultural activities 
that will enhance cross-cultural understanding in the Caribbean basin. 
 
93 See contributions in Kenneth Hall and Dennis Benn, eds., Contending with Destiny: 
The Caribbean in the 21st Century (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2000). Also see, 
Dennis Benn and Kenneth Hall, eds., Globalisation: A Calculus of Inequality (Kingston: 
Ian Randle Publishers, 2000). 
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Current Economic Climate in the Caribbean 
The Caribbean states have increasingly struggled to find a prosperous 
place in the international economic system given its current configuration. With 
the exception of Trinidad that has sizeable oil reserves, the Caribbean states have 
all struggled with economic downturns in recent years (see Table 6 below). One 
major source of this downturn is the demise of their agricultural sectors that have 
historically been a cornerstone of these economies.  
 
Under British colonialism, the Caribbean states specialized in the 
production of sugar and bananas for export primarily to the European market. 
Even with the end of colonialism, these states remained heavily dependent on 
their agricultural sectors despite their lack of competitiveness vis-à-vis Central 
American agricultural producers and numerous attempts to diversify the 
economies. 
 
The decimation of the agricultural industry in the Caribbean was a result 
of the more aggressive free trade nature of the international economic system. On 
April 7, 1997, the WTO issued its ruling on the banana case between the US and 
the EU, where the US challenged the legality of European preferences under the 
Lomé Convention.94 The ruling in favor of the US and against the EU had 
                                                 
94 The details of the case will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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significant ramifications for their preferential arrangement with the Caribbean 
states and other ACP countries, but at more concrete level, it affected the 
economic survival of Caribbean states dependent on banana exports to the EU.  
 
Table 6 below highlights some key statistics relating to the Caribbean. 
What is important to note at this juncture is the high rate of unemployment across 
the region. Most of these states have double-digit unemployment rates and this 
indicates serious underlying problems in the economy. In addition, Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) has decreased significantly since 1990. For 
example in Dominica, ODA in 1990 was 11.8 percent of GDP, but by 2007 that 
figure had declined to 5.3 percent.95 As seen in Table 6 below, this decline in 
ODA is mirrored across the Caribbean.96 
 
 
Table 6. Unemployment and ODA Statistics for English-Speaking Caribbean 
Countries 
COUNTRY Unemployment 
Rate (2007) 
Official Development 
Assistance (%GDP) 
1990 
ODA (%GDP) 
2007 
Barbados 9.8 0.2 -2.1 
                                                 
95 The data contained in Table 6 will be discussed in more detail throughout the 
dissertation. 
 
96  The figure for Barbados represents a net outflow of development assistance. In 
Barbados’ case they in fact issue aid to other countries (mainly other Caribbean states). 
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COUNTRY Unemployment 
Rate (2007) 
Official Development 
Assistance (%GDP) 
1990 
ODA (%GDP) 
2007 
Bahamas 10.2 0.1 --- 
St. Kitts/Nevis 5.1 5.1 0.8 
Antigua/Barbuda --- 1.2 0.8 
Trinidad/Tobago 10.8 0.4 0 
Dominica 23 11.8 5.3 
St. Lucia 18.9 3.1 1.3 
Belize 12.0 7.3 1.2 
Grenada 23 6.2 9.5 
St. Vincent 12.5 7.8 1.1 
Guyana --- 42.4 17.4 
Jamaica 10.9 5.9 0.4 
Sources: UNDP statistics; IMF Country Reports 
 
The Caribbean’s decision to align with China can therefore be read as 
merely the defensive actions of governments that are facing domestic problems of 
unemployment stemming from the demise of the agricultural sector and the 
increasing reliance on a seasonal and volatile tourism sector. This explanation has 
prima facie appeal, but it ignores important political and prestige goals on the part 
of Caribbean states. 
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At a geopolitical level, Caribbean states have, consistent with Robert 
Jackson’s portrayal, been quite happy to tout their disadvantaged economic 
situation that essentially emanates from what Robert Jackson terms, their 
“negative sovereignty”.97 Jackson describes most decolonized states as possessing 
only negative sovereignty and not the traditional positive sovereignty. Building on 
libertarian theory (in particular the work of Isaiah Berlin), Jackson defines 
negative sovereignty as “a formal legal-condition” which simply means freedom 
from outside interference.98 Positive sovereignty, on the other hand, “Presupposes 
capabilities which enable governments to be their own masters,” and as such, it is 
more substantive in nature than simply a legal condition.99 
 
Negative sovereignty is therefore ‘freedom from’ whereas positive 
sovereignty is ‘freedom to.’ The sovereignty of developing states (quasi-states) is 
conferred on them without the possession of adequate political or economic 
development—a situation very different from for example the European states. 
Jackson points out that the doctrine of self-determination and the corollary 
process of decolonization, 
                                                 
97 Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third 
World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
 
98 Ibid., 27. 
 
99 Ibid., 29. 
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Justified the independence of every colony which desired it and thereby 
established a radically different basis of sovereign statehood on the ex-
colonial peripheries of the world. It was now possible to possess juridical 
statehood while as yet disclosing little evidence of empirical statehood. It 
was also possible –as it never had been in the past—to make demands on 
international society for assistance to become developed.100 
 
Jackson’s argument is that many of the decolonized countries were not 
really in a position to control their destiny, but instead were reliant on outside 
assistance. Jackson expands his argument to the activities of these states in the 
calls for a new international economic order and other calls for developmental 
assistance. He argues that the result of granting ill-equipped states legal 
sovereignty was the constant calls by these states for developmental assistance. 
 
Jackson’s argument is in fact borne out in the Caribbean context. 
Caribbean states have devoted much of their foreign policy attention to attaining 
some economic preferences and this signals some dependence on outside 
assistance. For example, the Caribbean states were quite active and vocal in 
attempts to forge a NIEO in the 1970s and in gaining preferences from Britain and 
the wider European Union. During the Cold War period, the Caribbean states also 
negotiated the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) with the US. The CBI was similar 
to the Lomé Agreement and provided Caribbean exports access to the US market 
at reduced tariff rates. In addition, the Caribbean states were the recipients of 
numerous aid flows from the US. But currently, in contrast to Jackson’s 
                                                 
100 Ibid., 25. 
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discussion, the international system is not as accommodating of the cries of these 
sovereign Caribbean states as these states are increasingly required to provide 
reciprocity in terms of trade agreements. In addition, aid flows are now the 
exception rather than the norm.101 
 
The economic situation is therefore quite precarious across the region and 
any attempt to understand the increasing attempts to lure Chinese aid and 
investments must take into account the current economic situation facing 
Caribbean states. This, however, does not mean that economic self-interest is the 
sole explanation as political motivations also play a role in explaining the 
increased relations between the Caribbean and China.  
 
The Caribbean Political System 
 
The Westminster political system in the Caribbean is very similar to that 
existing in Britain. In fact, the Parliamentary system existing in the Caribbean was 
patterned off the British system. Munroe provides two explanations for this 
patterning; first, it was the type of system that the leaders were accustomed to 
                                                 
101 The latest ACP-EU Convention, quite interestingly, was called the ACP-EU 
Partnership Agreement. This change in name from simply Agreement to Partnership 
Agreement is highly symbolic of the changing tide: Lomé-type or non-reciprocal 
arrangements are no longer fashionable in the international economic system. In return 
for the market access given by the EU under the Cotonou Agreement, Caribbean 
recipients had to agree to improve market access for European products and even to 
commit to pursuing ‘good governance’ as defined by the EU. 
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during the process of decolonization, and second, the British were only willing to 
grant independence if this was the type of political system adopted.102 Munroe 
notes that, “If there had been a proposal for an American type of government, the 
British would likely have been doubtful. There was no real consideration at the 
time of a presidential type of democracy.”103 Currently, the British-modeled 
parliamentary system is the prevailing political system used in all Caribbean 
countries, with the exception of Guyana. It should be noted that Guyana did 
initially adopt the British-model, but in 1980 decided to institute a US-style 
Presidential system. 
 
In the Westminster Parliamentary System there is no separation of powers 
between the Executive and Legislative branches of government. The Executive 
branch is dependent on the Legislative branch, as the Executive is directly 
selected from the Legislative branch. In the ‘first past the post’ system, the 
political party that captures the majority of the seats in the parliament will make 
up the Executive. The Prime Minister is essentially the person that commands the 
support of the majority of the members of the Parliament. This means, in essence, 
that the Prime Minister is the leader of the political party with the most seats in 
                                                 
102 Trevor Munroe, An Introduction to Politics: Lectures for First-Year Students 
(Kingston: Canoe Press, 2002). 
 
103 Ibid., 103. 
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the Parliament. The Executive is comprised of the Prime Minister and the 
Cabinet, and the Cabinet members are all members of the Legislature. 
 
The fusion of the Executive and the Legislature has been identified as a 
potential problem for countries adhering to this system. Munroe points out that 
this political system concentrates significant power in the hands of the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet.104 In fact, the Prime Minister controls the legislative 
agenda and can decide which laws are even considered. The opposition has no 
control over this and cannot introduce a law on its own. 
 
This concentration of power in the Executive and especially the Prime 
Minister can, and often does result in a lack of transparency. The government 
Ministries are led by members of the Legislature that are from the ruling Party 
and decisions made in these Ministries are not usually debated in Parliament. For 
example, there has been no debate about any agreement signed between any of the 
three Caribbean governments and China in the Parliament. The Cabinet makes 
decisions, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of Finance will sign 
the subsequent agreement. This means that in many instances, members of the 
opposition are not aware of the agreements that have been signed by the 
government. 
                                                 
104 Ibid. 
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Of equal concern is the fact that the citizens of the Caribbean states are 
also not made aware of the substance of agreements entered into by the 
government. They may see a press release stating that the Chinese government 
has agreed to build a stadium, but they are not aware of the conditionalities or 
terms attached to the building of the stadium.105 This is an important factor 
explaining why countries across the Caribbean have signed agreements that are 
not necessarily favorable to all the citizens and nevertheless remain unchallenged. 
 
 
Caribbean Motivations: Sovereignty for Sale? 
The motivations of the Caribbean states are best gauged via an analysis of 
their current economic situation, which stems from both the configuration of the 
international economic system and the domestic structure of their economies. The 
previous section laid the groundwork for this by showing how precarious the 
economic situation is in several of these states. The economic motivations on the 
side of the Caribbean states are simply Chinese investments and/or aid. For 
Dominica, an island whose banana industry has been decimated by the WTO 
banana ruling and frequent hurricanes, exploiting China’s need for recognition 
                                                 
105 In interviews conducted across the Caribbean, many influential members of the private 
sector were asking me whether or not I knew what were the terms of the agreements 
signed with China. It should also be noted that the Agreements signed are often 
classified, making it even harder to gain access to the exact conditions of these 
agreements. 
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was a plausible, and it could be argued, the best short-term fix for their economic 
woes.  
 
The other major option would be to go to the IMF or World Bank, but the 
Chinese loans are provided sans explicit conditionalities. It is therefore 
understandable that if given a choice, a state would choose China over the IMF, 
particularly given previous experiences with the IMF in relation to the loss of 
sovereignty and policy autonomy.106 In addition, as mentioned before, the chances 
of the Caribbean states successfully hosting the Cricket World Cup without the 
vital assistance of Chinese loans and grants would be slim. 
 
However tempting it is to lump all the motivations on the Caribbean side 
into the economic category, I will avoid doing so because the economic 
explanation elucidates a significant proportion of the motivations, but there are 
also other prestige goals on the Caribbean side that must be discussed. All states 
seek prestige to some extent or another. China’s interest in the region is welcomed 
not only because of the economic benefits it affords, but also because the 
Caribbean states can again play the geopolitical game and view themselves as 
important players to be wooed and courted as was the case in the Cold War era. 
                                                 
106 This may seem to be an oversimplification of the choice facing Dominica as the IMF 
conditionalities are so stringent that the loss of policy space and therefore loss of some 
sovereign rights is preferred to the costs in relation to China. Chapters 5 and 6 will, 
however, show that there are several implicit conditionalities attached to Chinese loans. 
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But there is also possibly more going on below the surface.107 The cartoon that 
opens this dissertation highlights a possible feeling in the Caribbean that 
‘alignment’ with China is important because of China’s rise. It may very well be 
the case that Caribbean states are bandwagoning with respect to China in the 
expectation that China’s rise will confer benefits on them if they align now. This 
also has implications for the relationship between the Caribbean and the reigning 
hegemon.108 
 
This view of the Caribbean motivations is consistent with Braveboy-
Wagner’s analysis of the foreign policies of English-speaking Caribbean states.109 
In her work, she identifies a tripartite motivation matrix—development, territorial 
and political security, and prestige (in that order). This analysis, however, 
deviates from Braveboy-Wagner in terms of omitting the territorial and political 
security dimensions. This omission is due primarily to the fact that I do not 
                                                 
107 I say below the surface, because from my previous work on Caribbean international 
relations issues, regional leaders often appear indifferent to the geopolitical ramifications 
of their actions or to have a clear idea of their goals. In speaking to one high-ranking 
Foreign Ministry official in Jamaica I asked what were the implications of Jamaica’s 
relations with China for the relationship with the US. His response was a matter-of-fact 
“We haven’t thought about that.” The question therefore becomes, are small states only 
able to have reactive short-run strategies? It could be the case that given their lack of 
material capabilities and susceptibility to international forces that long-term strategic 
positioning is in most instances impossible. The small state literature is silent on this 
point, but it is a point that will be explored in some detail in subsequent chapters. 
 
108 The implications for the relationship with the US will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 
7. 
 
109 Braveboy-Wagner, "The English-Speaking Caribbean States: A Triad of Foreign 
Policies." 
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believe that this is an important driver as these states are relatively secure in their 
sovereignty especially in relation to territorial integrity. One recent volume on 
small states pointed to the fact that for small states, “in most cases their physical 
security is ensured”.110 Jeanne Hey also argues that, “the turn of the century is 
probably the safest moment in history for small states”.111 In a similar vein, one 
recent volume on Caribbean security issues focused on the issues of migration and 
the drug trade as the primary security considerations.112 Omitting the security 
variable in this discussion is therefore consistent with other works on small states. 
 
Sovereignty for Lease? 
As noted before, the argument to be made in this dissertation is that the 
creative use of sovereignty is relatively more important as a strategy for 
weaker/small states as they traditionally have had fewer natural resources and 
suffer from other negative results of their lack of size and power. The use of the 
concept ‘sovereignty for sale’ is not a true representation of reality. Caribbean 
states are not selling their sovereign rights, but are instead using some of the 
rights accorded by their sovereign designation to improve their economic 
                                                 
110 Hey, "Introducing Small State Foreign Policy." 
 
111 Ibid. 
 
112 See Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph Espach, eds., Security in the Caribbean Basin: The 
Challenge of Regional Cooperation (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000). This line 
of thinking is mirrored in Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, ed., Caribbean Security in the Age of 
Terror: Challenges and Change (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004). 
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prospects and to confer prestige upon themselves. This is not unique to Caribbean 
states or small states. In fact, many states do it.  
 
A more accurate description of the situation is therefore sovereign rights 
for lease. Caribbean states are not selling their sovereignty. They are merely using 
some of their sovereign rights for economic gain. They have therefore not given 
their sovereignty permanently to China. They have simply afforded China votes 
and recognition and at any time they can choose not to support China. This 
decision would not be cost free especially in the short-run. Chapter 4 highlights 
some of the costs involved in this diplomatic game as was played out in the 
Grenada situation. In addition, these sovereign rights can be regarded as 
renewable resources in the sense that they do not run out and states can employ 
them over and over again. 
 
The framework for this discussion of sovereignty as an economic variable 
gets its inspiration from Ronen Palan’s work on the increasing phenomenon of 
offshore financial centers and tax havens.113 Palan argues that the rise of tax 
havens is fundamentally linked to structural problems in the global economic 
system and represents a unique and vital developmental innovation for many 
                                                 
113 Palan first discusses his ‘commercialization of sovereignty’ thesis in his 1996 book 
detailing the economic strategies that states have employed since Word War II. The 
commercialization ideas are, however, most developed in Ronen Palan, The Offshore 
World: Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places, and Nomad Millionaires (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003). 
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microstates. This fits neatly into the arguments already espoused that the rationale 
behind several Caribbean states intensifying their relations with China is linked to 
their position in the international economic system as well as the economic and 
developmental problems currently facing these Caribbean states.  
 
But Palan’s analysis is most useful in addressing the question of what the 
Caribbean has to give China in return for its aid and investments. This dissertation 
will extend Palan’s discussion of the sale of sovereignty in relation to the 
establishment of tax havens as the current relations between Caribbean states and 
China can be seen as the employment of a development strategy that utilizes one 
of their most treasured resources—their sovereignty. 
 
For Palan, the “commercialization of sovereignty” is a viable and 
understandable strategy. His study focuses on tax havens, which as an economic 
strategy, entails the use of a state’s sovereign rights for economic gain. Quite 
interestingly, several Caribbean states have employed this tax haven strategy and 
these notable Caribbean states include Barbados, the Bahamas, the Cayman 
Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Antigua, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, 
Montserrat, Puerto Rico and St. Kitts and Nevis. Two of these states (Dominica 
and Grenada) will be the subject of case studies in this dissertation. The 
phenomenon of the commercialization and parcelization of sovereign rights is not 
restricted to the use of tax havens, but also included in Palan’s analysis are export 
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processing zones (EPZs) and flags of convenience, and here again Caribbean 
states feature prominently.114 In relation to flags of convenience, Palan identifies 
28 states in 2000 that are flags of convenience registries. Of the 28, 9 are in the 
Caribbean.115 
 
My own view is that the ‘commercialization of sovereignty’ does not 
accurately describe the current relations between the Caribbean and China. These 
states are not making sovereignty into a product to be traded. What is being traded 
is in fact aspects of the rights accorded by sovereignty.116 It is therefore not the 
ability to vote in international bodies that is being sold. Instead, the vote itself is 
being sold (in this case voting in China’s interest) is the ‘commodity’ being 
traded. I have therefore amended Palan’s analysis for use in this dissertation. 
 
                                                 
114 Ibid. 
 
115 Ibid. 
 
116 This may seem to be a subtle distinction of no real consequence, but it is actually quite 
important; see George DeMartino, “Global Economic Liberalism and the Fate of the 
State,” ISS Research Series (2003). In the political economy literature is a common 
conflation of autonomy, capacity and sovereignty. These three concepts are however very 
distinct. For example, the argument is often made that globalization or the free movement 
of capital constrains state sovereignty. I, however credit George DeMartino for pointing 
out that what is in fact being constrained is not sovereignty (the right), but it is state 
autonomy that is being constrained. By definition, sovereignty is the “right” to control 
activities within a defined territorial space. The decision to go to the IMF and be 
subjected to their conditionalities does not indicate that a state has lost its sovereignty. 
The state actually exercised its right of sovereignty in going to the IMF and agreeing to 
the conditionalities. What the conditionalities do result in is a curtailment of state 
autonomy in the sense that it is forced to make policies that it would otherwise not have 
chosen. 
 
 94 
In relation to the recent decision by Dominica and Grenada to recognize 
China in return for significant amounts of aid, The Economist argues that, “trading 
on their sovereignty is a well-established way for small states to make fast 
cash.”117 Palan’s arguments can therefore be extended to a discussion of the 
Caribbean states providing China—in exchange for investments and aid—votes in 
international bodies and recognition of it as a sovereign state (and by extension 
the denial of Taiwan of sovereign status). This selling of votes is no different 
from the selling of flags of convenience and the establishment of EPZs as 
discussed by Palan. 
 
Caribbean states have employed numerous strategies and have achieved 
inconsistent results. The first international economic strategy was their lobbying 
efforts to obtain preferential trade arrangements with the EU and to work with 
other developing states in the call for a NIEO. Geopolitical exploitation refers to 
the strategy during the Cold War to seek aid from the US in return for the 
alignment of Caribbean states with the West. Export processing zones and tax 
havens (which can both be depicted as strategies that utilize sovereign rights in 
innovative ways) are a feature of the 1980s and 1990s and all the English-
speaking Caribbean states have pursued either one or both of these strategies.  
 
                                                 
117 The Economist, "Easy Money: The Caribbean and Taiwan," April 10 2004. 
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In the 1990s several Caribbean states, namely Jamaica and Guyana, 
undertook neoliberal reforms as a result of conditionalities attached to IMF and 
World Bank loans. Given the precarious economic position that many Caribbean 
states currently find themselves, it is obvious that these strategies have not been as 
successful as these states would have hoped.118 The trading of resources with 
China—both natural and sovereign—is simply the latest development strategy to 
be employed by Caribbean states. 
 
The subsequent chapters will discuss the issue of adjustment in Caribbean 
states and the fact that China is undoubtedly a node of their current adjustment 
strategy. Across the Caribbean, leaders are lining up to gain as much financing 
from China as they can obtain. Leaders overwhelmingly argue that China is the 
most influential power outside of the US in the region and this power is largely 
derived from China’s provision of aid and foreign investment.  
 
The next chapter shifts gears a bit and focuses on the Chinese motivations 
in the Caribbean. The Caribbean wants aid and China has been providing this aid 
and investment. In order to gauge the price of Chinese economic assistance it is 
important to look at China’s wider economic engagement with the developing 
                                                 
118 The failure of the structural adjustment programs will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 
4. 
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world and China’s political and economic goals embedded in the push towards 
great power status. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Chinese Motivations in the Caribbean: Economics, Recognition, 
and Great Power Influence 
 
Up to this point the discussion has focused on the Caribbean. This is 
primarily due to the fact that the Caribbean is the primary subject of analysis, but 
an examination of Caribbean-China relations would be incomplete without a 
discussion of the motivations underpinning China’s interest in the region. China’s 
engagement in the Caribbean region is consistent with China’s wider Third World 
policy, with the exception being the relatively reduced importance of natural 
resource extraction as a motivation on China’s side. This chapter identifies and 
discusses the three key motivations driving China’s foreign policy in the 
Caribbean (namely economics, recognition and prestige) and will show that these 
are consistent with China’s foreign policy in other parts of the developing world. 
 
China is increasingly becoming an important player in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. Trade between Latin America and China in 2005 stood at US$40 
billion, up from US$200 million in 1975.119 China has committed to $100 billion 
of investments in the Latin America and Caribbean region over the next ten years, 
                                                 
119 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the 
World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). 
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but most of this figure is related to resource extraction and will be allocated to the 
Latin American economies and not the Caribbean.120 In February 2005 the China-
Caribbean Trade and Economic Forum held in Jamaica gained much attention and 
publicity and stimulated debate about China’s role in the region and the extent to 
which China was now openly challenging the US’ hegemony in the region.  
 
Much of the discourse on China in the region relates to China’s search for 
natural resources in Latin America, and the Caribbean is included as an 
afterthought in many of these analyses.121 This conflation of Latin America and 
the Caribbean serves to ostensibly indicate that China’s interests in both areas are 
the same. China, in fact, has somewhat different motivations in the Caribbean 
region, as the search for natural resources is not a major driving force for Chinese 
actions in the Caribbean as most of these smaller states lack traditional mineral 
resources that are of interest to China. 
 
                                                 
120 When Hu made the speech that there would be $100 million in investments, he did not 
specify the amount that would accrue to the Caribbean specifically. What the speech did 
note was that the investments were geared towards extraction and given the Caribbean’s 
lack of extractive industries, it therefore stands to reason that the majority of these funds 
would go to Latin American industries. 
 
121 See Guillermo Delamer et al., "Chinese Interests in Latin America," in Latin American 
Security Challenges, ed. Paul T. Taylor (Newport: Naval War College, 2004), Jorge I. 
Dominguez, China's Relations with Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes 
(Inter-American Dialogue, 2006) , June Teufel Dreyer, "From China with Love: P.R.C. 
Overtures in Latin America," Brown Journal of World Affairs 12, no. 2 (2006), Robert 
Devlin, Antoni Estevadeordal, and Andres Rodriguez-Clare, eds., The Emergence of 
China: Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington, 
D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2006). 
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Chapter Outline 
The arguments in this chapter are organized into five sections. The first 
section argues that China’s Caribbean policy is consistent with China’s wider 
Third World policy that uses soft power to advance China’s economic and 
political rise. This section will also highlight the major difference between the 
Latin American and Caribbean regions as they pertain to Chinese foreign policy.  
 
The next three sections will discuss the three different (though mutually 
reinforcing) motivations of Chinese foreign policy in the Caribbean—economics, 
recognition, and influence. This thesis argues that China has a tripartite 
motivation for its presence in the Caribbean—economics, recognition and 
influence. The economics motivation is related to the search for natural resources 
and markets. China is interested in the minerals found in Jamaica, and the oil and 
natural gas in Trinidad and Tobago. But more importantly, Chinese interests at the 
economic level relate to accessing the Caribbean markets as a destination for 
Chinese exports. Recognition, for the purposes of this discussion, is defined as 
support for China in its “One China Policy,” and it will be shown that this policy 
is one of the primary drivers of China’s relations with the Caribbean. The third 
motivation, and one of the leading determinants of Chinese Third World policy, 
relates to Chinese influence. I will show that this variable is a two-fold goal that 
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encompasses both the signaling of China’s rise, and the garnering of support for 
the Chinese agenda in multilateral forums. 
 
Each section will treat one motivation and will incorporate a discussion of 
the specific strategies employed to advance it by China in the Caribbean. The 
concluding section aims to show that China is in fact a pragmatic power and its 
role in the Caribbean is solidly rooted in its calculations of its national interest. 
China is therefore trying to obtain the best deal that it can get and the limited net 
benefits that accrue to Caribbean states from this relationship must be understood 
within this framework. 
 
China in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Part of China’s Grand 
Strategy in the Third World 
 
China’s Evolving Third World Policy 
China’s relations with the Third World have been an important component 
of the foreign policy of China since the forming of the PRC in 1949.122 China’s 
                                                 
122 One may question my use of the word Third World given the loss of currency in the 
post-Cold War era. Given the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unipolarity 
characteristic of the existing international system, one could argue that the concept has 
lost its political meaning (see Van Ness 1998 for a more detailed discussion of the 
problems associated with the continued use of this term). My decision to use this term 
instead of ‘developing countries’ is highly symbolic in nature, and is related to China’s 
seminal place in the coining and use of the Third World concept. Given this, I am aware 
that this term includes so many countries that it is hard to make generalizations across the 
board, but I still maintain the usefulness of the concept as it highlights China’s continued 
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relations with the Third World is quite multifaceted, ranging from support for 
liberation movements in Asia and Africa during the Cold War, to seeking the 
support of these countries in gaining its UN seat in the early 1970s. China’s 
embrace of the Third World was also evident in the post-Tiananmen period when 
China faced censure and sanctions in many international bodies. Today it is seen 
in China’s diplomacy aimed at garnering support for the isolation of Taiwan in 
international organizations. 
 
The schizophrenic nature of Chinese foreign policy vis-à-vis the Third 
World is seen in the difference between the rhetoric of solidarity with the Third 
World on one hand, and its reluctance to join two of the most important Third 
World international organizations—the G77 and the Nonaligned Movement 
(NAM), on the other hand.123 This duality is linked to China’s sometimes 
conflicting view of itself. It is economically still largely underdeveloped,124 but 
                                                                                                                                     
view of itself as in some way aligned with the nebulous conception of a Third World. 
Third World is therefore used in the traditional Maoist sense of countries in Africa, Asia 
(excluding Japan) and Latin America and the Caribbean that were not advanced 
economies or a member of the Soviet bloc. 
 
123 China does participate in each of these organizations but not as an official member. It 
is an observer in the NAM as well as in the G77. It is quite interesting to note that China 
preferred to attach its name to the G77 instead of becoming a full member of the group. 
The G77 is now referred to as the ‘G77 and China.’ 
 
124 IMF figures indicate that in terms of nominal GDP China ranks fourth in the world , 
but in terms of GDP per capita China ranks a mere 107th in the world. This is actually 
well below many Caribbean states. 
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given its military power, economic advancement, and permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council, it views itself also as a major power.  
 
This contradiction is identified by Wu as “the dual-identity syndrome” in 
Chinese foreign policy.125 China aspires to be a great power and to have influence 
in the international system, but this quest for great power status is constrained by 
its material capabilities. The final section of this chapter will argue that this 
duality is reconciled in China by the pragmatic pursuit of its foreign policy. China 
consistently espouses Third World solidarity, but its actions can be read in both 
directions—solidarity with and against Third World interests. 
 
China’s rhetoric regarding its place in the Third World, as argued by 
Samuel Kim, is based on three points: first, China is a socialist country that 
belongs to the Third World; second, Chinese support and solidarity with the Third 
World is an important foreign policy goal; and third, even if China enters the 
ranks of great power, it will still identify itself as such.126 As with many countries, 
Chinese rhetoric is not always consistent with the actual foreign policies pursued. 
                                                 
125 Xinbao Wu, "Four Contradictions in China's Foreign Policy Behavior," in Chinese 
Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior, ed. Suisheng Zhao (New York: M. 
E. Sharpe, 2004). 
 
126 Samuel Kim, The Third World in Chinese Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Centre of 
International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public Affairs, Princeton University, 
1989). 
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It is therefore imperative that attention be directed beyond official communist 
party rhetoric towards an examination of actual governmental actions. 
 
China’s Third World policy in the post-Cold War era is to a large extent 
predicated on improving its international status. When China embarked on its 
economic reforms in 1978, the Third World was neglected as China abandoned 
the anti-establishment rhetoric of the NIEO and sought membership in the IMF 
and World Bank, two institutions that China had vociferously opposed as inimical 
to Third World development prior to 1978.127 It joined the IMF and World Bank 
in the 1980s and the WTO IN 2001.128 In addition, China moved away from 
challenging the international economic system as it had done under the aegis of 
the NIEO and instead sought to integrate increasingly into the international 
economy. China’s espoused solidarity with the Third World in terms of both 
rhetoric and actual engagement therefore declined during the first decade of 
reforms. 
 
China’s increasing re-engagement with the Third World beginning in the 
early 1990s is inextricably linked (at the political level) to the Tiananmen incident 
                                                 
127 Peter Van Ness, "China and the Third World: Patterns of Engagement and 
Indifference," in China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New 
Millennium, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998).  
 
128 Ramesh Adhikari, "What Will WTO Membership Mean for China and Its Trading 
Partners?," Finance and Development 39, no. 3 (2002). 
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in 1989 where the Chinese government violently suppressed student protests 
aimed at propelling democratic principles in the communist state. China suffered 
ostracism from many developed countries and in an attempt to regain some 
legitimacy, sought to cultivate to a larger extent their relations with Third World 
countries. Zhao argues that the reaction of the West to the Tiananmen incident 
resulted in “a major foreign policy adjustment.”129 
 
The US-EU arms embargo levied on China after the Tiananmen Incident 
meant that sales of weapons to the PRC were banned. In addition, China feared 
the threat of economic sanctions by the US and Western European states that 
would have had the potential to seriously thwart the economic gains that China 
had made up to that point. The intervention of Third World countries, especially 
Asian investors in the newly-industrialized countries, aided immensely in China’s 
ability to weather the storm as they expanded their investments in China despite 
the sanctions and negative reports emanating in Western states. 
 
It is after the Tiananmen affair that we see China moving at a faster pace 
to solidify its relations with the Third World. This can be attributed to the threat 
that China felt in international fora such as the United Nations as it increasingly 
came under scrutiny for its human rights record. The increased interaction with 
                                                 
129 Suisheng Zhao, "Beijing's Perception of the International System and Foreign Policy 
Adjustment after the Tiananmen Incident," in Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and 
Strategic Behavior, ed. Suisheng Zhao (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 145. 
 105 
the Third World at this point is also due to China’s continued economic growth. 
As China increasingly integrated into the international economic system it needed 
allies as there was a lingering distrust of the US and Western European states, and 
the Third World provided a large pool of potential supporters. In addition, as 
China’s economy improved, China was better positioned to employ a Third World 
diplomatic policy.  
 
One of the greatest needs of many Third World countries is economic aid, 
and China was increasingly able to provide these concessions. It is therefore in the 
aftermath of Tiananmen that we see the take-off of China’s ‘yuan diplomacy’ 
across the Third World.130 It should however be noted that this diplomacy 
witnessed across the Third World is inextricably linked to China’s economic 
expansion and the attendant expansion in the demand for natural resources. 
 
China’s Third World policy is therefore based on economics and politics. 
Economically, China needs natural resources and markets and this rationale is 
present especially in its relations with Africa, the Middle East and Latin 
                                                 
130 The term ‘yuan diplomacy’ refers to the Chinese version of ‘dollar diplomacy.’ The 
aim of ‘yuan diplomacy’ is to provide aid in the form of grants and loans at a 
concessionary rate to Third World countries as a part of China’s efforts to win allies. It is 
interesting to note that the loans provided by China are not only provided at a relatively 
low interest rate, but also lack many of the explicit conditionalities attached to loans 
provided to developing countries by multilateral institutions and other developed 
countries. This seeming lack of conditionalities will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
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America.131 Politically, China is very intent on cultivating allies and its aid and 
diplomatic endeavors around the globe are indicative of this fact. 
 
China’s Use of Soft Power 
China’s engagement with the Third World is reminiscent of the US’ use of 
soft power across the globe. This was especially seen in the importance placed on 
the use of public diplomacy during the Cold War. Joseph Nye coined the word 
soft power back in 1990.132 Building on the work of Robert Cox and the concept 
of great power legitimacy, Nye draws a stark distinction between traditional hard 
power and the mere co-optive soft power. 
 
The soft power concept deviates significantly from the hard power often 
discussed in the international politics literature. Hard power is simply military and 
economic might and is manifested in either the use of inducements (carrots) or 
threats (sticks). Defining power in such a tangible manner, however, misses the 
important fact that, “power resources are not as fungible as money.” In fact, a 
                                                 
131 China’s economy has grown at about 9 percent per annum since the start of reforms. 
China is now the second largest economy and one of the leading purchasers of resources 
internationally. China’s search for energy and minerals to sustain this growth trajectory 
are therefore important components of Chinese foreign policy in general. In this thesis I 
will not be dealing with this search in detail excepting in the Jamaican context vis-à-vis 
bauxite. There are many sources relating to China’s energy needs and its strategy to gain 
it internationally. For a good discussion, see Zweig and Bi, "China's Global Hunt for 
Energy." 
 
132 Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: 
Basic Books, 1990). 
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state may be able to get others to do what it wants without as tangible a means as 
carrots or sticks. According to Nye, this indirect and seemingly ideational way to 
get others to do what you want, 
has sometimes been called the ‘second face of power.’ A country may 
obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries—
admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of 
prosperity and openness—want to follow it.133 
 
Nye’s description of soft power is therefore very different from traditional notions 
of power. The inclusion of the idea of admiration—the emulation of Chinese 
values and economic success—is key in the Chinese context, especially in its 
interaction with developing countries. Its use of yuan diplomacy is relatively 
minute, but the Chinese economic miracle is admired by developing countries 
around the world. It is this admiration that gives China some of the economic 
influence that it has in the developing world. 
 
Table 7 below recreates Nye’s diagram depicting the three types of power. 
Military and economic power are the traditional types of power that employ 
threats, the use of force, payments and sanctions.  
 
 
 
                                                 
133 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2004). 
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Table 7. Nye’s Three Types of Power 
 Behaviors Primary 
Resources 
Government Policies 
Military power Coercion 
Deterrence 
Protection 
Threats 
Force 
Coercive diplomacy 
War 
Alliance 
Economic power Inducement 
Coercion 
Payments 
Sanctions 
Aid 
Bribes 
Sanctions 
Soft power Attraction 
Agenda setting 
Values 
Cultures 
Policies 
Institutions 
Public diplomacy 
Bilateral and 
Multilateral diplomacy 
Source: Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. 
(New York: Basic Books, 1990). 
 
 
Soft power, on the other hand, involves getting others to want what you 
want without using “sticks” such as military might or economic inducements, but 
instead co-opts people rather than coerces them. Soft power is about the ability to 
attract, and it uses public diplomacy to achieve influence. This soft power concept 
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sounds somewhat similar to the notion of attractive power discussed in chapter 1. 
The major difference, however, is that attractive power is something that weaker 
states possess, while in Nye’s analysis soft power is employed by powerful 
countries as a means of interacting with weaker powers. 
 
China’s meteoric economic rise is seen as an image of the possibilities 
available to other developing countries. Admiration of China runs very high 
across the developing world. In fact, Nye argues that the US—a long user of soft 
power—has declined in importance as it has stopped employing this dimension of 
power. Kurlantzick, extends this line of thinking and argues that as the US’ power 
wanes China has picked up the mantle of soft power to enormous success.134 He 
points out that in polls conducted across the globe, citizens in Africa and Latin 
America have more positive views of China than of the US.135 
 
Kurlantzick defines Chinese soft power as things outside of the military 
and security realms including the use of aid and investment and cultural and 
public diplomacy.136 This use of soft power as described by Kurlantzick is quite 
similar to that described by Nye in the US context. The public diplomacy and 
engagement in multilateral fora is precisely what is depicted in Table 5 above. In 
                                                 
134 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World. 
 
135 Ibid. 
 
136 Ibid. 
 
 110 
a similar vein, Sanusha Naidu describes China’s soft power strategies in Africa as 
one that, 
entwines the use of political non-interference and economic incentives 
coupled with the rhetoric of non-alignment and comforting words like 
historical friendship, equality, common development, mutual support and 
mutually beneficial co-operation that has endeared Beijing to a majority of 
Africa’s leaders.137 
 
The rhetoric of solidarity with the Third World is therefore another important 
component of Chinese soft power strategies. In addition to the rhetoric of 
solidarity and the use of public diplomacy, Chidaushe argues that China 
intentionally portrays itself as the opposite of the US by avoiding the intrusive 
political governance conditionalities associated with Western aid.138 China 
therefore describes itself as protecting the principle of non-interference by 
omitting the conditionalities that have been disliked across the Third World and 
that have been associated with Western multilateral institutions. 
 
In their speeches Chinese officials often place emphasis on some key 
themes. These include, mutually beneficial cooperation, friendly relations, 
                                                 
137 Sanusha Naidu, "China-African Relations in the 21st Century: A 'Win-Win' 
Relationship," in China in Africa, ed. Henning Melber, Current African Issues (Uppsala: 
Nordiska Afikainstituet, 2007). 
 
138 Moreblessings Chidaushe, "China's Grand Re-Entrance into Africa--Mirage or 
Oasis?," in African Perspectives on China in Africa, ed. Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks 
(Nairobi: Fahamu, 2007). 
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sincerity, equality, mutual support, and common prosperity.139 This is in contrast 
to the perceived exploitation of Western countries and institutions. 
 
Kurlantzick also points out that soft power can be directed towards the 
elites in a country (high soft power) or can be directed at the wider public (low 
soft power).140 China employs both high and low soft power. In addition, the use 
of cultural tools (public diplomacy in particular) is an important dimension of 
China’s low soft power strategy. In the Caribbean, this cultural exchange has 
included the provision of Chinese language teachers across the Caribbean, tours 
of Chinese cultural groups (for example acrobatic shows). One very interesting 
dimension of this public diplomacy is the provision of documentaries on aspects 
of Chinese culture to Caribbean television stations. These documentaries are 
routinely included in the television schedules across the Caribbean. 
 
It should, however, be noted that the Chinese use of soft power is not a 
new phenomenon. Naidu argues that from as early as the Silk Road trade China’s 
foreign policy was in fact aimed at encouraging influence rather than the use of 
military conflict or colonization.141 
 
                                                 
139 Ibid., 109. 
 
140 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World. 
 
141 Naidu, "China-African Relations in the 21st Century: A 'Win-Win' Relationship." 
 
 112 
Kurlantzick correctly cautions that China’s use of soft power tools, “has 
developed significant influence, though it is still in a honeymoon period in which 
many nations have not recognized the downsides of Beijing’s new power.”142 The 
fact is, however, that several academics around the world are beginning to 
investigate the actions of China in its use of soft power especially in relation to its 
donations of aid in Africa. Chapter 7 will deal with this issue in relation to the 
Caribbean. 
 
 
 
China’s Motivations in the Caribbean 
The discussion will now move into highlighting the three motivations 
underpinning China’s interest in the Caribbean—economics, recognition and 
prestige. It should be noted that these motivations are consistent with China’s 
wider Third World policy, but the issue of recognition is more pronounced in the 
Caribbean context. 
 
Distinguishing Between Latin America and the Caribbean 
The motivations for China’s role in Latin America and the Caribbean are 
consistent with China’s wider grand strategy as it pertains to the Third World. 
Economics is important as is seen in China’s quest to acquire natural resources in 
                                                 
142 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World. 
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especially the resource-rich Latin American countries. In addition, half of the 29 
countries currently recognizing Taiwan are located in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. 
 
There are, however, major differences between Latin America and the 
Caribbean. The Latin American economies are more natural resource-rich and are 
there therefore more important in China’s quest for energy. The Caribbean, on the 
other hand, has fewer natural resources than Latin America, with the exception of 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The natural resource-quest is therefore not as 
important in China’s foreign policy in the Caribbean region, but economics 
remains a motivation, as the Caribbean is the source of markets for Chinese goods 
and this is witnessed in the burgeoning volume of Chinese exports to the region. 
 
Politically, China is interested in gaining allies across the Third World. 
This is also the case in Latin America and the Caribbean. In addition to the 
Taiwan issue, China’s aims are the harvesting of support in multilateral forums 
and status recognition. The region comprises many states that translate into many 
voices and votes to support China in many international bodies. Despite some 
similarities in China’s motivations in Latin America and the Caribbean, it is not 
very useful at an analytical level, to group the two together as we would miss 
some of the subtle differences in China’s strategies in the two areas. 
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China’s First Motivation: Economics 
 
China’s national interest is inextricably linked to its domestic economic 
realities. Economic growth is a key interest of the Chinese Communist Party and 
it is the most important component of its foreign policy direction. China’s rise is 
predicated on its increasing integration into the international economic system and 
the capturing and exploiting of its comparative advantage. 
 
Apart from the aim of every country to advance economically, the 
economic component of Chinese foreign policy is predicated on two important 
rationales—reversal of the “century of humiliation” and the survival of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).143 The intention to reverse the “century of 
humiliation” is an underlying motivation of much of China’s domestic and 
foreign policies. During that infamous century, China saw a diminution of its 
position in the international system and vis-à-vis its neighbors which were 
traditionally seen as merely “barbarian” and tributary states. During that century 
                                                 
143 The Century of Humiliation from 1839 to 1949 began with the first Opium War in 
1839 between China and Britain due to China’s decision to suppress aspects of the British 
East India Company’s trading rights in China. Prior to this, China essentially viewed 
itself as the center of the universe and their contact with the West proved fatal to the 
Chinese economy, and even more importantly to the Chinese psyche. The Treaty of 
Nanjing (1842) signed after the British overwhelming victory resulted in China losing 
control of Hong Kong and being forced to open up some ports to British traders and to 
pay reparations for the war. In 1844 the United States and France also signed similar 
treaties with China. 
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China fell further and further behind some of its tributary neighbors and even 
more behind the world’s powers, losing its distinction as the great Middle 
Kingdom. China’s embrace of economic reforms and their subsequent success 
have done much to improve China’s image and sense of importance. Economic 
performance leads to wealth, power and influence—all of which China lost in its 
humiliation period. 
 
The second important facet of economics in Chinese foreign policy relates 
to the maintenance of the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Wealth is 
one key driver of communist party policies because of their need to maintain the 
respect and admiration of the wider Chinese population. In the view of Chinese 
government officials, their legitimacy is inextricably related to their ability to 
facilitate the improved economic prospects of the population. As one of the few 
remaining communist states, the communist party is especially concerned with 
legitimacy and in view of this, the continued growth of the Chinese economy is 
vital to the survival of the communist party.144 
 
China’s foreign policy is in fact highly economically motivated. At the 
economic level, there is an increasing body of work relating to the increasing 
membership and involvement of China in international economic institutions such 
                                                 
144 Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese 
Foreign Policy (Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005). 
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as the WTO and IMF. But of critical importance, in addition to its involvement in 
these institutions, are two very important components—the search for markets 
and the simultaneous search for resources. These two motivations are important in 
this discussion of China’s activities in the Caribbean region.145 
 
Resources 
The traditional discussion of China’s engagement with the Third World 
places much emphasis on China’s search for resources. This is, however, not an 
important source of motivation for China in the Caribbean region. The Caribbean 
lacks many of the resources that China seeks. Only one country has minerals 
(Jamaica),146 and only one (Trinidad and Tobago) has oil and natural gas. Jamaica 
has large bauxite reserves and government estimates indicate that the existing 1.5 
billion tones of bauxite reserves could last for another 150 years. Jamaica is the 
8th largest producer of bauxite and the 7th largest exporter of the commodity in the 
                                                 
145 China’s increasing membership and activity in international economic organizations is 
also linked to its strategies in the Caribbean region as it needs states to support its 
initiatives in these bodies. This aspect of China’s economic motivations is discussed in 
the section on influence. 
 
146 Cuba has the world’s third largest reserves of nickel and its export is the major 
revenue earner for Cuba. Cuba exports the majority of its nickel to China but China wants 
even more as nickel, like bauxite, is an important mineral for China’s industrialization as 
it is used in the production of a wide range of metal products, from automobiles and 
trains, to cans and windows. In November 2004 Chinese President, Hu Jintao visited 
Cuba and primary on the list of discussions was Cuba’s nickel. China wants to invest 
more directly in Cuban nickel extraction and is interested in acquiring a Soviet nickel 
mine that is unfinished. Hu Jintao, in that visit, also pledged to invest $500 million into 
the Cuban nickel industry. See "China, Cuba Seek Closer Ties," BBC News, November 
23 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4034149.stm. 
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world.147 The amount of oil off the coast of Trinidad is not known, but estimates 
indicate that in 2005 there was 34.86 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of oil, but estimates 
in 2006 put that figure at 30.88 tcf.148 It should, however, be noted that despite 
Trinidad’s possession of oil, China is currently not a player in the market as 
Trinidad’s reserves are relatively small and Trinidad already has agreements to 
supply oil to the US and other Latin American and Caribbean states and there is 
no excess production to export to China. 
 
Where there are resources, China is actively working to exploit these 
resources. In Jamaica, for example, the Chinese are increasingly interested in the 
bauxite industry. Bauxite is the chief ore of aluminum and is an important mineral 
sought by the Chinese to facilitate the expansion of the industrial sector. In 2001, 
the Alumina Partners Company (ALPART) signed an agreement pledging to 
supply China with almost 450,000 tons of alumina to China’s Ming Metal 
Company over three years.149 This figure represented 30 percent of the production 
of ALPART. In 2005, while the Jamaican Prime Minister was on an official visit 
to China, a more important agreement was signed between the Bauxite Institute 
and the Jamaica Bauxite Mining Limited and China Min Metals Corporation to 
                                                 
147 These bauxite figures were obtained from the United States Geological Survey. 
 
148 Linda Hutchinson-Jafar, "T&T's Oil Reserves Declining," Jamaica Gleaner 2007. 
 
149 "Alpart Signs Deal with China," Jamaica Gleaner, March 26 2001. 
http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20010326/business/business1.html. 
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establish both a bauxite extraction facility and alumina refining facility aimed at 
expanding the capacity of the bauxite industry.150 
 
Markets 
China’s economic growth necessitates markets for its exports. As China 
continues its rapid production pace it increasingly needs access to greater 
numbers of markets. The Caribbean states provide another market for Chinese 
products. There is, however, some underlying conflict. China has a trade surplus 
with every Caribbean country. The volume of trade between China and the 
Caribbean is increasing and China’s trade surplus with the region is also growing. 
The Caribbean represents a small portion of the Chinese market, but it is a market 
nonetheless.  
 
In 2006, Guyana imported products worth approximately EC$40.2 million 
of Chinese products, while exporting only EC$36 million worth of goods to 
China. This picture is echoed across the region with Barbados importing over 
EC$129 million worth of goods from China in 2006 while exporting only EC$3.5 
million. The disparity is even greater in the smaller Caribbean states. Grenada and 
Dominica exported no goods to China, but they imported a significant amount of 
Chinese exports. 
                                                 
150 "Jamaica Signs New Bi-Lateral Agreements with China," Caribbean Net News, June 
23 2005. http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/2005/06/23/signs.shtml 
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Table 8. CARICOM Trade Deficit/Surplus with China 2006 
Country Value of Exports 
to China (EC$) 
Value of Imports 
from China (EC$) 
Deficit/Surplus 
with China (EC$) 
Antigua& Barbuda n/a n/a n/a 
Bahamas n/a n/a n/a 
Barbados 3,547,445 129,811,314 -126,263,869 
Dominica 0 17,561,259 -17,561,259 
Grenada 0 42,362,714 -42,362,714 
Guyana 36,042,574 40,240,533 -4,197,959 
Jamaica 811,190,910 557,974,545 +253,216,365 
St. Lucia 0 27,678,311 -27,678,311 
Trinidad &Tobago 18,712,188 664,264,900 -645,552,712 
Source: CARICOM Secretariat Database 
The situation is however different in Jamaica. The gap between Chinese 
exports and imports in the Caribbean region is increasing in most Caribbean 
states, but it is narrowing and since 2003, Jamaica has recorded a trade surplus 
with China. This difference in trade performance is due to the reality that Jamaica 
as it is the only state with minerals (that is, bauxite) that China wants and is best 
placed to capture some of the benefits accruing to China-Caribbean trade. Chapter 
5 will discuss Jamaica’s trade figures in more detail. 
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Many countries are eager to access Chinese markets, but Caribbean 
countries have little to gain from trading with China. The traditional exports of 
Caribbean countries include agricultural products and apparel. In fact, the 
Caribbean states traditionally engaged in apparel production have lost significant 
market share to China.151 China has therefore in its diplomacy tried to make the 
surplus less a problem through the provision of aid and loans. All the countries in 
the Caribbean that currently recognize China have been rewarded with numerous 
aid and loan packages.152 But, as will be shown in chapters 4 and 5, these aid 
packages do not compensate for the widening surplus. Why then do Caribbean 
states still seek closer ties to China, given the potentially low net benefits? This 
very important question will be taken up in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
 
China’s Second Motivation: Recognition 
 
China’s broad foreign policy is importantly centered on the Taiwan issue 
and the “One China policy” is an important foundation of China’s general 
international relations. This focus on Taiwan has been a feature of China’s foreign 
policy goals and objectives since the forming of the PRC in 1949. China’s foreign 
                                                 
151 Mexico has spoken to many of these issues, arguing that its apparel industry is 
negatively affected by China’s ability to supply the market with cheaper products due to 
their lower labor costs. See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of the competition 
between China and Mexico. 
 
152 The large number of aid and low-interest loans are an important facet of Chinese 
engagement in the region and will be discussed in more detail in the section on Influence. 
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policy in relation to Taiwan has waxed and waned since 1949, with the emphasis 
shifting from the threat of military force to the international isolation of Taiwan. 
As it became increasingly clear that China would not be able to retake Taiwan 
militarily, China began to incorporate the Taiwan issue into its general Third 
World policy. China used its relationship with the Third World to advance its 
agenda in the UN, which was in many instances aimed at the isolation of Taiwan. 
 
As noted before, half of the countries in the world that continue to 
recognize Taiwan are located in Latin America and the Caribbean. And seven of 
those are in the Caribbean region under study. Given China’s increasing emphasis 
on isolating Taiwan internationally, China’s engagement with countries still 
recognizing Taiwan has become an important component of that strategy. Li 
points out that with respect to South America, despite strong economic 
motivations for China’s interest, the Taiwan issue is a strong motivation in 
China’s engagement in the region.153 
 
At the beginning of 2003, the countries in the Caribbean not recognizing 
China included Belize, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. China’s engagement strategy has 
borne fruit in the region as the Bahamas and St. Lucia switched recognition from 
                                                 
153 He Li, Sino-Latin American Economic Relations (New York: Praeger Press, 1991). 
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Taiwan to China in May 1997 and September 1997, respectively. And two of the 
states that recognized Taiwan at the start of 2003—Dominica and Grenada—
adopted China’s “One China Policy” and switched recognition by 2005. This 
switch in recognition policy will be explored below. 
 
 
Dominica and Grenada Switch Recognition154 
Upon independence in 1983, the small island of Dominica with a 
population of 70,000 in an attempt to gain economic benefits, chose to recognize 
Taiwan instead of China. In return, Taiwan provided numerous grants of aid and 
other technical assistance. As China became more economically advanced and 
had more money to spend on diplomatic issues it shifted its attention to “yuan 
diplomacy” especially as it pertains to gaining the respect and support of poor 
countries. This strategy was especially adopted with respect to countries 
maintaining their recognition of Taiwan. It proved successful because as The 
Economist points out, for poor developing countries, “trading on their sovereignty 
is a well-established way for small states to make fast cash.”155  
 
                                                 
154 Please note that the specifics of the decision to switch recognition to China will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4. 
 
155 The Economist, "Easy Money: The Caribbean and Taiwan." 
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In return for recognizing China and supporting the “One China” principle, 
Dominica was rewarded in March 2004 with the promise of $122 million in aid 
packages. This figure represents over one third of the Dominican government’s 
revenue over 5 years. This aid package included money to build a new stadium, 
roads, schools and hospitals. 
 
Upon decolonization in 1974, Grenada decided to recognize China, but in 
1989 China severed diplomatic relations with Grenada when Grenada decided to 
withdraw its recognition of China and to recognize Taiwan instead.156 
 
In December 2004, the Prime Minister of Grenada, Keith Mitchell, made 
an official trip to China. At that time Grenada still officially recognized Taiwan. 
Taiwan offered to give Grenada $47 million in aid and to rebuild their national 
stadium but Mitchell hoped for more, following the example of Dominica.157 
 
Diplomatic relations between China and Grenada resumed in January 
2005 after Grenada publicly ended its relationship with Taiwan and recognized 
China. In return for this switch China provided Grenada with monetary assistance 
to expand the national stadium for the Cricket World Cup in 2007 and the 
                                                 
156 Chapter 4 will discuss the specifics of this policy change in greater detail. 
 
157 "MOFA Has Pessimistic Outlook on Ties with Grenada," Taipei Times, December 22 
2004. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/12/22/2003216209 
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construction of 2000 housing units. In addition, China offered a $6 million grant 
to Grenada to compensate for the loss of support from Taiwan and a $1 million 
scholarship fund and a financial grant to the government worth $2.5 million.158 
 
In all their official statements with China, Caribbean leaders emphasize 
their commitment to the “One China Policy” and the Chinese officials in turn 
continually highlight their gratitude for the Caribbean’s support vis-à-vis the “One 
China policy”. The Jamaican Prime Minister’s speech at the opening ceremony of 
the “China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Forum” highlighted the fact that more 
and more Caribbean countries are committed to the “One China Policy,” and he 
reiterated Jamaica’s commitment. This line of speaking was a feature of all the 
speeches delivered at the opening ceremony by Caribbean government officials. 
The rhetoric of Caribbean and Chinese officials is an important indication of the 
importance of recognition as primary driver for China’s relation in the Caribbean. 
 
China’s Third Motivation: Influence 
 
As a rising power, China is cognizant of its place in the international 
system and the need to cultivate allies. As one of the last vestiges of communism, 
China is eager to cultivate friendships and to solidify its stature as a leading 
                                                 
158 "Whiteman Heading for Beijing," Grenada Today, April 2, 2005. 
http://www.belgrafix.com/gtoday/2005news/Apr/Apr02/Whiteman%20heading%20for%
20Beijing.htm 
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power. Given its new foray into multilateral fora, China is in uncharted territory. 
It prefers bilateral relations to multilateral relations,159 but China has increasingly 
joined international organizations that are economically, militarily and politically 
based.160 Not only is China joining an increasing number of multilateral 
institutions both regionally and internationally, but it is also becoming more 
active in institutions that it holds membership. As a result, China’s foreign policy 
is highly based on cultivating more friendly relations with states so as to get 
support in international bodies. As it pertains to the Third World, China is 
increasingly championing ‘Third World causes’ and pushing South-South 
Cooperation as an attempt to get developing countries on its side in important 
international institutions. 
 
In addition to the need to cultivate friendships so as to get support in 
international bodies, China’s goals are prestige related. As a rising power, it wants 
to be perceived as such and this is also behind China positioning itself as the 
champion of Third World issues. There is therefore an important prestige 
component to China’s relations in the Caribbean region.161  
                                                 
159 This preference for bilateral relations over multilateral relations is due to the fact that 
in bilateral settings China would have more leverage. 
 
160 For a discussion of China’s reluctance to participate in multilateral forums see, Wu, 
"Four Contradictions in China's Foreign Policy Behavior." 
 
161 I will not be focusing on the US dynamic in this thesis, but it is worth noting that 
China’s embarking in the region is possibly also predicated on gaining a foothold in the 
US’ backyard so as to implicitly challenge the US’ dominance. The growing military ties 
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Deng points out that in understanding Chinese foreign policy behavior, 
emphasis must be placed on the concept of international status.162 He argues that 
in many instances, international status is cited as one of the most important values 
in China. This is somewhat of a deviation from (but not a rejection of) the 
traditional realist conceptions of hard power, which are merely economic and 
militarily based. The concept of legitimacy is also important in Chinese minds. 
This concept of legitimacy is also nevertheless linked to the concept of the 
national interest because China equates status with an ability to act in the 
international system in an influential manner.  
 
Deng does not extend his analysis of the role of international status in 
Chinese interactions to the developing world, but it is an easy extension to make. 
As noted earlier, China is keen to have its issues raised in multilateral forums. 
One key issue relates to the issue of non-interference in the domestic affairs of 
other countries. China sees this as very important especially given that it is one of 
the last bastions of communism and it feels threatened by criticism of its human 
                                                                                                                                     
are important in this respect. Prestige is therefore limited to a discussion of ability to have 
the respect of countries in the region and to garner support on important international 
issues. Chapter 6 will, however, briefly discuss this issue in the context of Caribbean 
states. 
 
162 Yong Deng, "Better Than Power: International Status in Chinese Foreign Policy," in 
China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, ed. Yong Deng and Fei-
Ling Wang (Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005). 
 
 127 
rights record by developed countries. This focus on non-interference is seen in its 
veto of most UN measures aimed at sanctioning ‘rogue’ states. 
 
In view of this, it is imperative that it has as much support as possible in 
these multilateral bodies. The majority of states in the international system are 
developing states and China hopes that its policy of aid towards these countries 
will translate into votes that are ultimately necessary for the country to attain 
international prestige. It is therefore evident that China’s quest for international 
prestige hinges on the support of developing countries around the globe. 
 
China’s donations of aid, loans and private FDI are therefore a part of their 
attempt to gain international influence—whether by way of votes in international 
bodies or the simple recognition by the international community of China as an 
important world power.163 In view of this, China has been very keen to use soft 
power strategies to attain this influence. 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, the Caribbean states have had a hard 
time in recent years adjusting to international economic integration. Most of the 
economies are heavily agricultural-based and labor costs are higher in the region 
                                                 
163 It should be noted that there are no available statistics detailing the amount of aid 
provided by China around the world. Attempts were made to ascertain the actual value of 
these loans and other aid, but no official in the Caribbean states studied were able to 
provide this data. What is known is that Chinese aid is expanding, but I cannot provide an 
estimate of the magnitude of this expansion. 
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than in Central and South America, for example. In addition, there is an erosion of 
traditional preferential markets as the international economic system has moved 
away from preferences to necessitating equal access to markets. The banana 
dispute in the WTO speaks volume to this phenomenon for Caribbean economies. 
As a result of the WTO’s ruling, Caribbean traditional agricultural exports have 
been on the decline with the loss of access to the European market. In addition, 
the end of the Cold War signaled the diminution of the Caribbean’s geopolitical 
importance vis-à-vis the US, and we therefore see a sharp decline in aid from the 
US. China is cognizant of these problems in the region and has positioned itself to 
take advantage of the Caribbean’s current situation. It has given the Caribbean 
countries precisely what they want to gain their support.  
 
For example, the Caribbean states were very proud of the region’s 
selection to host the Cricket World Cup in 2007. One major component of hosting 
the Games relates to improving the cricket facilities in the region. All the 
Caribbean states that hosted games and recognize China have received grants or 
loans to build new cricket facilities or to renovate existing ones.164  
 
Tourism is increasingly the driver of economies in the region given the 
decline of the agricultural sector across the Caribbean. Tourist expenditure as a 
                                                 
164 It is quite interesting that China is investing so much of its diplomatic resources in the 
region in a game that they know very little about, but China is quite aware of the 
significance of hosting the Cricket World Cup for the Caribbean and China’s funding for 
cricket should be seen in this respect. 
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percentage of GDP in 2006 was 35.8% in the Bahamas, 26.6% in Dominica, 44% 
in Grenada, and 18% in Jamaica.165 These countries all have large tourism 
industries with the exception of Haiti and Guyana. China has, in return for their 
recognition and support, provided these countries with Approved Destination 
Status (ADS). This means that Chinese tour groups can travel in the region 
without prior approval from the government. Countries not recognizing China 
have been kept out of this deal. China is an emerging market for tourists and it 
currently ranks in the top ten source countries for international tourists. The 
Caribbean islands, as highlighted in the economics section above, for the most 
part do not produce products that China wants and so have an expanding trade 
deficit with China. They all are however reliant on tourism and this export is one 
of the few avenues that Caribbean states can exploit. It will, however, be shown 
that the expected influx of Chinese tourists has not materialized. In fact, the 
number of Chinese visitors is so negligible that they are lumped into a category 
referred to as ‘visitors from the rest of the world’ that represents less than 5 % of 
visitors to all Caribbean countries. 
 
Congressman Dan Burton of the US is quick to point out that “there is a 
cost to pay for Chinese assistance and that cost is diplomatic and economic.”166 
                                                 
165 These statistics were obtained from the Caribbean Tourism Authority’s Database 
which can be accessed at, http://www.onecaribbean.org 
 
166 Dan Burton, Chairman of the House Committee on the Western Hemisphere, in 
“China’s Influence in the Western Hemisphere,” Hearing Before The Subcommittee on 
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He points out that China’s aim is to get support in the United Nations and other 
international bodies especially on the Taiwan issue. These attempts have provided 
some results in for example the commitment of all the Caribbean countries 
recognizing China in blocking Japan from the Security Council and more 
recently, the blocking of Taiwan’s attempt to gain observer status in the World 
Health Assembly.167 
 
In terms of China’s increasing influence on the international scene, 
China’s decision to send 155 police as a part of the peacekeeping effort in Haiti is 
indicative of its expanding foreign policy goal of joining the ranks of great 
powers. The Haiti mission was the first one in the Western hemisphere by China. 
In fact, China is currently the leading source of UN peacekeepers, having the 
most troops actively participating in UN peacekeeping missions of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council.168 This is one of the more glaring 
examples of China’s move from its traditional disdain for multilateral fora and 
into an area that it traditionally was opposed to as peacekeeping efforts often 
entailed the subversion of the sovereignty of countries. The mission in Haiti is 
bearing some fruit. In fact, it is rumored that Haiti may switch from recognizing 
                                                                                                                                     
the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives, April 6, 2005. 
 
167 This information was obtained by the author from a review of documents highlighting 
the proceedings of meetings between Jamaica’s Prime Minister PJ Patterson and Chinese 
officials on his state visit to China in June 2005. 
 
168 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World. 
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China and this gives China more of an international presence that it so desires in 
its rise. 
 
China’s presence in the Caribbean is therefore a function of China’s 
search for markets, natural resources, recognition, and international status. The 
next section will discuss the role of pragmatism in China’s foreign policy strategy 
in the Caribbean. 
 
 
 
China’s Pragmatic Rise 
China’s foreign policy is predicated on the pragmatic pursuit of its 
national interest. It has increasingly demoted ideology as a central motivation of 
its foreign policy.169 Communist ideology can less and less be employed as an 
explanatory variable in explaining communist party behavior both domestically 
and internationally. It is therefore more accurate to describe China’s foreign 
policy as being rooted in pragmatism and not ideology. 
 
                                                 
169 The extent to which ideology has been an important consideration in Chinese foreign 
policy is increasingly being challenged. Lau points out that even in the early foreign 
policy decisions by China to enter the Korean War (see Scobell 2004) and not to pursue 
the reclaiming of Hong Kong from the British (see Lau 2004) were very pragmatic 
decisions. 
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This Chinese pragmatism, according to Van Ness, is also seen in China’s 
interaction with the developing world. Van Ness argues that, “despite Beijing’s 
rhetoric to the contrary, China is truly a ‘fair weather friend’ of the Third 
World.”170 I would probably refrain from this kind of analysis preferring to point 
to the pragmatic pursuance of China’s foreign policy. Zhao argues that Chinese 
pragmatic strategic behavior is “ideologically agnostic, having nothing, or very 
little, to do with either communist ideology or liberal ideals. It is a firmly goal-
fulfilling and national-interest driven strategic behavior.”171   
 
By pragmatic I am therefore following the Zhao framework in pointing to 
the pursuit of strict national interest such as economic gains and political power. 
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, China has a dual perception vis-à-vis its 
interaction with the Third World. On one hand it espouses solidarity with the 
grouping, but on the other hand it sees itself as an emerging power and often has 
interests that contradict those of the wider Third World grouping. I would argue 
that in situations where principle and interest come into conflict, national interest 
will eventually win as this is an important element of China’s foreign policy 
pragmatism. This therefore indicates that the Chinese pragmatic approach to 
                                                 
170 Van Ness, "China and the Third World: Patterns of Engagement and Indifference.", 
164. 
 
171 Suisheng Zhao, "Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior," in 
Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior, ed. Suisheng Zhao (New 
York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004)., 4. 
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foreign policy is very realist in its orientation. It also follows that the Chinese 
commitment to Third World solidarity is espoused and pursued to the extent that 
they fit China’s national interest. 
 
China’s aid and loan policies are aimed at harnessing allies and supporters 
in international bodies and support for the “One China Policy.” China chooses to 
align with the Third World when such actions serve to further their national 
interests. As such, no policy on China’s part is purely benign or altruistic. This is 
consistent with Dan Burton’s claim that, “there is a cost to pay for Chinese 
assistance, and that cost is diplomatic and economic.”172 This view is also echoed 
in Van Ness’ analysis of China’s wider Third World Policy. He argues that given 
the focus on national interest, China’s Third World policy is subject to large and 
frequent fluctuations and this is due to Beijing’s focus on achieving wealth and 
power.173 
 
Ian Taylor in his study of China’s relations with Africa concludes that the 
African experience highlights the fact that, “Chinese foreign policy in Africa and 
elsewhere is, like all other countries’ foreign policies, self-serving and based on 
                                                 
172 Dan Burton, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere Hearing. 
 
173 Van Ness, "China and the Third World: Patterns of Engagement and Indifference." 
Also see Kim, The Third World in Chinese Foreign Policy. 
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economic and strategic considerations.”174 The relationship with China as 
described thus far and that will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5 will confirm 
Taylor’s argument. 
 
China’s foreign policy in the Caribbean is therefore a part of China’s 
wider pragmatic foreign policy and the motivations are both economic and 
political. China in pursuing its interests in the region employs a mixture of ‘yuan 
diplomacy’ and pledges of solidarity with the region. Given the interesting 
dynamics of the countries in the Caribbean region, China has carefully adapted its 
policies so that it can pursue its wider foreign policy goals in the region. 
 
 The chapter so far has shown that there are three motivations for China in 
the Caribbean—economics, recognition, and influence. China’s engagement with 
the Caribbean is consistent with its wider Third World policy of resource 
extraction, trade expansion, the identification of new allies, and the isolation of 
China. The specific policy in the Caribbean is different from other regions, but the 
underlying foundation is the same across regions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
174 Ian Taylor, "Unpacking China's Resource Diplomacy in Africa," in China in Africa, 
ed. Henning Melber, Current African Issues (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007). 
 135 
 
Motivations Matrix: Two-Way Trade between China and the Caribbean 
 
Having discussed both the Caribbean economic and political situation and 
the Chinese motivations it is now useful to tie the two sets of motivations 
together. The relationship between Caribbean states and China is best 
conceptualized as a two-way trade. The Caribbean states are currently on the 
international market with a kind of shopping list that has the attraction of aid and 
investments at the very top. Caribbean states have throughout their brief 
independent history tried several strategies to attract economic aid and 
investments and are again seeking a new avenue for attracting these economic 
goals.175  
 
Table 9 below is a diagrammatic representation of this motivations matrix. 
China’s motivations are markets, natural resources, prestige and influence, while 
the Caribbean motivations are aid and investment flows. The interaction between 
the Caribbean and China is in fact a two-way trade. China is cognizant of the 
needs of the Caribbean states and is simply providing the items on the Caribbean 
shopping list in exchange for the Caribbean providing China with the things on 
China’s shopping list. 
                                                 
175 The various strategies that have been employed by Caribbean states to attracting 
investments will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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Table 9. Motivation for Relations between the Caribbean and China 
CARIBBEAN 
MOTIVATIONS 
PRICE PAID BY 
THE 
CARIBBEAN 
CHINESE 
MOTIVATIONS 
PRICE PAID BY CHINA 
• Aid and 
Foreign 
investment 
• Infrastructure 
Development 
• Prestige 
• Tourism 
Revenue 
• Votes in 
international 
fora 
• Trade 
opening to 
Chins 
• Recognition 
of ‘One China 
Policy’ 
• Markets  
• Natural 
Resources 
• Recognition 
• Great power 
influence 
• Aid, FDI, Preferential 
loans 
• Engagement/Identification 
with the Third World 
 
 
 
Where no natural resources exist, Caribbean states are trading another 
important, yet often overlooked resource—their sovereignty. As sovereign states, 
Caribbean states have as a right the ability to recognize other sovereigns and to 
vote in international bodies in which they hold membership. These happen to be 
two rights that China is very interested in and that China is willing to pay for. 
There is therefore a market value for the rights conferred by sovereignty. 
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China is simultaneously engaged in a much discussed drive for natural 
resources—especially oil and minerals, but less discussed items on its shopping 
list are recognition as a rising and important power and support for its policy of 
isolating Taiwan internationally.176 In view of this, the Caribbean states that have 
minerals and oil—namely, Cuba, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago—are trading 
them for Chinese investments into their natural resource sectors along with 
receipts from the sale of these natural resources to China. They are also receiving 
aid, technical assistance and other investments. 
 
The next chapter will move into the more detailed case studies of 
Dominica and Grenada. It will be shown that the rationale for closer relations with 
China relates to the loss of preferential access to European markets, the absence 
of natural resources that China is interested in, and the need to adjust to current 
globalization pressures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
176 For a brief discussion of the prevailing view that a significant component of China’s 
relations with developing countries is related to its search for energy and minerals, see 
Zweig and Bi, "China's Global Hunt for Energy." 
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CHAPTER 4 
Dominica and Grenada: Economic Adjustment and the Trade of ‘Sovereign 
Resources’ in Countries without Natural Resources 
 
Dominica and Grenada are two microstates in the Caribbean. Both have 
populations significantly fewer than one million—Dominica 67,000 and Grenada 
106,000—and both are members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS).177 As highlighted in Chapter 1, Dominica and Grenada rank 71st and 82nd 
respectively on the UNDP’s Human Development Index out of almost 200 
countries, with number 1 being the highest level of human development, and both 
countries have very similar economies. Both countries in 2004 and 2005 switched 
recognition from Taiwan to China and both did this after suffering from 
exogenous economic shocks, namely hurricanes and the loss of preferential access 
to the European market for their agricultural products following the WTO’s 1999 
banana decision. Even more important for the purposes of this dissertation, both 
states lack any natural resources that are of strategic interest to China. 
 
                                                 
177 The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) was formed in 1981 and its 
members are Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the British Virgin Islands, Dominica, 
Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The OECS 
is a monetary union and it also provides for the harmonization of the foreign policies of 
its members. The discussion of the Caribbean engagement with China highlights the fact 
that the foreign policy coordination mandate of the OECS is not pursued as Dominica and 
Grenada decided to switch recognition to China independent of each other and St. Kitts 
and Nevis still recognize China. 
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Since the mid-1990s both Dominica and Grenada suffered a number of 
economic setbacks. They lost their preferential access to the EU market, saw 
significant declines in their tourism sectors as a result of the September 11 attacks 
in the US,178 were blacklisted by the OECD due to money laundering concerns in 
their nascent offshore financial sectors, and were adversely affected by numerous 
hurricanes. In an attempt to reduce and counter their vulnerability to external 
shocks, both countries embarked upon diversification programs aimed at reducing 
their dependence on only one industry. The ultimate aim was economic 
adjustment based on reducing the economic vulnerability associated with their 
small size. This chapter will show that their engagement with China is an 
important component of their adjustment strategy. 
 
Chapter Outline 
This chapter explores in detail the decisions to switch recognition from 
Taiwan to China in 2004 and 2005. Both Dominica and Grenada cited economic 
downturns and the need to source alternative funding as the rationale for their 
engagement with China. This chapter will therefore explain the rationale behind 
the identification of China as an important component of Dominica and Grenada’s 
economic adjustment strategy. 
 
                                                 
178 For example, CARICOM statistical database shows that visitor arrivals to Dominica 
fell by 33.6 percent between 2000 and 2002. In Grenada, tourist arrivals also fell by 13.5 
percent over the same period. 
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The use of sovereignty for economic gain will also be examined in this 
chapter. Both Dominica and Grenada are lacking in natural resources that are of 
strategic importance to China. The main export of Dominica is bananas and the 
main export for Grenada is spices. These are goods for which there are many 
producers in the global economy. Given that China’s economic ambitions do not 
hinge on access to bananas or spices, I will show that China’s interest is instead 
related to recognition in international fora and votes in support of these interests 
in international fora. It will also be shown that given their lack of natural 
resources, Dominica and Grenada are trading aspects of their sovereignty (which 
can be described as another resource), for Chinese aid and investments. 
 
Another important question that will be explored in this chapter is, why do 
Dominica and Grenada seek increasing relations with China when doing so does 
not yield unambiguous benefits? For example, the trade deficit with China is 
widening and it is exacerbating their existing negative international trade balance. 
As China has been given increased market access there has been no corollary 
access to Chinese markets as neither country produces any products demanded by 
China. In addition to the widening trade deficit, the loans and aid provided by 
China come with implicit conditionalities such as the use of Chinese contractors 
and the importation of Chinese laborers. These negative points are largely ignored 
by the governments and it will be shown that this is largely due to the existing 
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political system that limits opposition and general public knowledge of 
agreements signed with China. 
 
DOMINICA 
 
Dominica’s Loss of Preferences 
Dominica is heavily reliant on foreign assistance. Between 1979 and 1984, 
aid flows to Dominica represented 30 percent of government revenue each 
year.179 This was largely a result of geopolitical considerations and was consistent 
with general Cold War activity in the Caribbean. The Caribbean states were the 
recipients of significant amounts of aid, which was aimed at preventing them 
from embracing communism. This reliance on aid, however, began to erode as the 
Cold War came to an end and the Caribbean states were no longer attractive to 
external aid donors (especially the US) as was highlighted in Chapter 2.  
 
Table 6 (provided in chapter 2) indicates that in 1990, at the end of the 
Cold War era, Dominica received official development assistance (ODA) totaling 
11.3 percent of GDP. By 2005, ODA receipts were only equal to 5.3 percent of 
GDP. The decline in aid had a negative effect on the economy as the Dominican 
government was accustomed to using aid provisions to supplement their official 
                                                 
179 St. Aimee, "Foreign Policy Dimensions of Very Small States in Their Quest for 
Economic Development". 
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tax receipts. In addition to the loss of ODA, Dominica was the Caribbean state 
most affected by the loss of preferences under the Lomé Agreements. 
 
 
Lomé’s Banana Protocol 
The Dominican economy was built around the production and export of 
bananas, which were termed “green gold.”180 In fact, it was Britain that 
encouraged Dominica to enter into banana production. Prior to 1973, Dominica’s 
banana industry benefited from preferential access to the British market as a 
colony of Britain. As noted in chapter 2, in 1973 when Britain acceded to the EC 
a new agreement—the Lomé Convention—was negotiated. 
 
The original Banana Protocol signed in 1975 allowed for the duty-free 
importation of bananas from the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries 
into the European Community (EC). The rules governing the importation of 
bananas from other non-ACP countries, however, varied from state to state. 
During negotiations for the Single European Market it, however, became 
necessary to institute a uniform regime for the importation of bananas into the 
EU. In addition, there were numerous indications that Latin American banana 
exporting countries were unhappy with the European banana policy as it 
                                                 
180 See Robert Thomson, Green Gold: Bananas and Dependency in the Eastern 
Caribbean (London: Research and Action, 1987). 
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discriminated against their exports and were contemplating challenging the 
Agreement when the WTO began operating in 1995. 
 
In 1993, in anticipation of challenges from Latin American banana 
producers, the EU announced its ‘New Banana Regime.’ This regime mandated 
that bananas from Latin America (also referred to as ‘dollar bananas’) would be 
assessed a common external tariff of 20 percent;181 ACP bananas remained duty 
free. This rate was seen as a compromise as the rate for all other imports from 
Latin America was 170 percent. Several Central American countries did not see 
this compromise as going far enough, but decided to support it nevertheless. In 
1994 at the Summit of the Americas, the US also assured Caribbean leaders that 
they would not challenge the EU’s new banana regime in the WTO.182 
 
The WTO Ruling 
On June 7, 1996, however, despite indications to the contrary, the 
governments of the US, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico requested 
that the Dispute Settlement Board of the WTO set up a panel to assess whether or 
not the EU’s banana regime was contrary to GATT rules mandating non-
discrimination in trade. One interesting point to be noted is that the complaining 
                                                 
181 Michaeline Crichlow, "Neoliberalism, States, and Bananas in the Windward Islands," 
Latin American Perspectives 30, no. 3 (2003). 
 
182 Dennis Pantin, Wayne Sandiford, and Michael Henry, "Cake, Mama Coca Or?: 
Alternatives Facing the Caribbean Banana Industry," in The Caribbean Economy: A 
Reader, ed. Dennis Pantin (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2005). 
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parties (the US and other Latin American countries) and the EU were invited to 
tender written submissions to the Panel. The Caribbean was not designated as an 
interested party because the WTO’s criteria for interest was that a country 
accounted for 10 percent of the EU’s imports of bananas. None of the Caribbean 
states produced that many bananas. The Caribbean states therefore had to initiate 
other legal proceedings in order for them to be considered a legitimate third party 
to the dispute.  The WTO eventually reversed its initial ruling and allowed the 
Caribbean to be defined as a third party. 
 
After the decision to define the Caribbean as a third party and therefore 
allowing the region to submit a submission, the WTO then ruled that the law firm 
hired by the Caribbean to represent it before the WTO was contrary to WTO 
rules. The WTO’s argument was that the legal counsel hired by the Caribbean 
group were not full-time employees of any of the Caribbean states. Again, the 
Caribbean legal team had to initiate legal proceedings challenging this view, 
pointing to the fact that the Caribbean states did not have the requisite legal 
counsel in their very small countries. The Caribbean was subsequently allowed to 
use the services of a legal team of their choosing. I should note here that the 
problems associated with funding missions to the WTO and the unavailability of 
technocrats with the requisite knowledge and training in trade law and other areas 
is another important concern facing small states especially in relation to their 
participation in international bodies. 
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The lobbying of American multinationals that wanted greater access to the 
EU market precipitated the WTO action on the US side. The US does not produce 
bananas for export to the EU, but United Brands (Chiquita), Standard Fruit (Dole) 
and Del Monte are American multinationals operating in Latin America that 
export bananas produced by Central American growers. The WTO is comprised 
of states; the US was not disadvantaged by the EU banana regime, but Dole, 
Chiquita and Del Monte (American firms) were disadvantaged. These 
multinationals could not bring a case against the EU in the WTO, and as such, 
their only redress was to lobby the US government to initiate a case. 
 
 Carl Lindner, the Chairman of American Financial Group (the company 
that controls Chiquita Brands), lobbied actively against the banana regime of the 
EU. Sutton points out that Lindner paid about US$430,000 to the Republican 
Party, US$525,000 to the Democratic Party, and US$55,000 to Newt Gingrich’s 
GOPAC. He also recruited US Senator Bob Dole to support their cause in the 
Senate.183 In September 1994 Chiquita and Hawaii Banana Association filed an 
application under Section 301 of the US Trade Act claiming that the EU’s banana 
regime was contrary to WTO rules and placed them at an unfair disadvantage. It 
is this action that eventually led to the official filing of a dispute in the WTO. 
                                                 
183 Paul Sutton, "The Banana Regime of the European Union, the Caribbean, and Latin 
America," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 39, no. 2 (1997). 
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The WTO ruled that the European banana regime did violate GATT rules 
and the European states would be required to bring their regime in line with the 
principles of the GATT. Charles Savarin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trade 
and Labor in Dominica, stated that the WTO ruling, 
Raises serious questions as to whether small countries can continue to 
compete and trade under the WTO system. It seems we have no place in 
the multilateral trading system, which is confining and consigning small, 
vulnerable developing countries to the dustbin, forcing them to be 
dependent on alms and handouts, rather than embracing them and enabling 
them to forge their own path to development.184 
 
Table 10 below shows that the decline in Dominica’s banana production 
began prior to the WTO’s ruling as the country struggled to competitively 
produce bananas especially given its small land area and relatively high wages in 
the sector.185 Between 1992 and 1997 banana production fell from 59,000 tons to 
35,000 tons, a decrease of more than 20 percent. By 2001, only one out of every 
five growers in 1992 was still cultivating bananas. Banana revenues—critical to 
the Dominican economy—plummeted. 
 
                                                 
184 Caribbean Regional News Negotiating Machinery, WTO Rules against Banana Tariff, 
Europe Must Negotiate Fair Resolution, News Release No. 22/2005 (October 2005). 
185 Bananas are produced at a much higher cost in the Caribbean than in Central America. 
There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, the small land area means that banana 
producers in the Caribbean are not able to benefit from economies of scale. Secondly, the 
banana industry in the Caribbean is not mechanized, and thirdly, labor costs are higher in 
the Caribbean as banana workers tend to be unionized. The only reason why Caribbean 
producers remained in the industry was the preferential access available to the European 
market. 
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Table 10. Dominica’s Banana Production Before and After the WTO Ruling of 
1999 
Year 1992/3 1997 1999 2001 
Production (tons) 59,000 35,000 28,000 18,000 
Active Growers (#) 5,800 4,800 2900 1300 
Real Exports (Eastern 
Caribbean $) 
96 million 45 million 35 million 17million 
Source: Payne 2007. 
 
Subsequent to the WTO ruling, “the EU and the USA struck a deal over 
the heads of Caribbean leaders whereby a measure of protection would run on 
until 1 January 2006, after which time there would be no quotas, only a flat-rate 
tariff.”186 The Caribbean states were again left out of the meetings that ironed out 
this compromise. 
 
Payne argues that despite the fact that it was technically the EU that lost 
the case, the Caribbean states were the real losers—not the European countries.187 
It was indeed the Caribbean states that were most adversely affected because it 
was their exports that were threatened by the ruling, and Dominica would 
represent the Caribbean state that was most affected. The WTO ruling can be 
                                                 
186 Anthony Payne, "After Bananas: The IMF and the Politics of Stabilisation and 
Diversification in Dominica," in International Studies Association Annual Convention 
(Chicago: 2007). 
 
187 Ibid. 
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described as an external shock to the Dominican economy and as will be shown 
below, this loss of preferences would be a major impetus for Dominica’s 
increased engagement with China. 
 
Adjustment in Dominica 
“Dominica faces big problems.”188 According to Anthony Payne, a look at 
the dramatic downturn in the Dominican economy is indicative of “the way in 
which small and vulnerable countries like Dominica experience the contemporary 
reality of neoliberal globalization.”189 Dominica’s experience with the loss of 
preferences due to the US challenge in the WTO precipitated a decline in the 
banana industry that was the lifeline of the Dominican economy. Payne argues 
that for Dominica and other small states: 
The challenge is not about riding for a little longer the ebb and flow of a 
global political economy on which it has long been understood that the 
country experiences a high degree of dependence. It is in effect to find a 
new niche, or, more realistically and safely, a series of new niches, within 
the global economic order.190 
 
But where does this niche lie? Many Caribbean states rely on the tourism 
sector, but in the Dominican case, the potential of the tourism sector is 
constrained as the country lacks major hotels and the white sandy beaches that are 
                                                 
188 Ibid. 
 
189 Ibid. 
 
190 Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery, "WTO Rules against Banana Tariff, 
Europe Must Negotiate Fair Resolution," CRNM News Release, 28 October 2005. 
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the usual hallmarks of Caribbean tourist destination. In addition, Dominica lacks 
an international airport. There are two small airports on the island, but neither is 
equipped to deal with night flights and neither can accommodate jet landings.191 
 
The Sale of Economic Citizenship 
Chapter 2 discussed the idea of a creative use of sovereignty, whereby 
sovereign rights are used for economic gain. Dominica provides a compelling 
example of this use of sovereignty. One of the rights relating to sovereignty is the 
conferring of citizenship to both individuals and corporations. Dominica in the 
past used this provision to its economic advantage. 
 
 Beginning in the early 1990s, the Dominica government tabled legislation 
that would offer “economic citizenship” to nationals of Taiwan and Hong Kong in 
exchange for cash.192 Economic citizenship is simply where the government 
grants citizenship to individuals who have invested in the country. Many citizens 
saw this as the government essentially selling passports, but the government 
argued that there was precedence for this action and the move would allow the 
                                                 
191 In recent years the Dominican government has tried to market Dominica as a nature 
island because of its lack of beaches and the relative lack of commercial development. 
One of the major successes with respect to this re-branding was the selection of Dominica 
for the filming of the movie “Pirates of the Caribbean.” The Dominican government is 
moving ahead with plans to market Dominica to other movie producers. 
 
192 Lennox Honychurch, The Dominican Story: A History of the Island (Malaysia: 
MacMillan Caribbean, 1995). 
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government to garner necessary investment flows. Honychurch in the sole 
published history of Dominica explains how economic citizenship works, 
Dominican passports would be granted to those persons and their families 
who deposited US$35,000 in an escrow account that would be considered 
to be an ‘investment’ in Dominica, thus classing the ‘economic citizen’ as 
an ‘investor.’ The vast majority of these economic citizens had no interest 
in Dominica but desired a passport which enabled them to travel more 
easily than a Dominican one.193 
 
This attempt to gain investment was somewhat successful. By June 1993 
approximately 466 Taiwanese and their dependents had successfully acquired 
Dominican citizenship,194 and by 2000 there were 570 economic citizens.195 It 
should, however, be noted that Dominica is not the only country involved in the 
sale of economic citizenship. In the Caribbean, Belize and St. Kitts/Nevis have 
also employed this strategy as well as other African countries, such as Ghana, 
Nigeria and South Africa. 
 
 The popularity of this sale of citizenship relates to the need to have second 
passports or to take advantage of lower tax rates. Dominica is a member of the 
British Commonwealth and as such, Dominican citizens and holders of 
Dominican passports can travel to any Commonwealth country without a visa. In 
                                                 
193 Ibid., 302. 
 
194 Ibid., 204. 
 
195 Esther Suss, Oral Wiliams, and Chandima Mendis, "Caribbean Offshore Financial 
Centres: Past, Present and Possibilities for the Future," in The Caribbean Economy: A 
Reader, ed. Dennis Pantin (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2005). 
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addition, these Dominican passports can be used to travel to the US where visas 
are routinely required. A second passport also provides a safety-net against 
potential social or political unrest in the original country of citizenship. As will be 
shown below, the sale of economic citizenship was seen as an important corollary 
to the development of Dominica as an offshore financial center. Offshore 
financial centers are known for their reduced tax rates and this feature would also 
serve as another factor rendering economic citizenship useful. 
 
Offshore Financial Centre 
The development of Dominica in 1996 as an offshore financial center was 
a direct corollary of the sale of economic citizenship. The services provided in the 
Dominican offshore sector included international business companies, offshore 
banks, international insurance, international trusts, economic citizenship, ship 
registration, and internet gaming companies.196 By 2000 the sector comprised 
6596 international business corporations (IBCs), 7 offshore banks and 20 internet 
gaming companies.197 The sector seemed well on its way to providing Dominica 
with a new economic development strategy after the decline of the banana 
industry. The potential of the offshore sector was thwarted when Dominica was 
                                                 
196 Nand C. Bardouille, "The Offshore Services Industry in the Caribbean: A Conceptual 
and Sub-Regional Analysis," International Journal of Islamic Financial Services 2, no. 3 
(2000). 
 
197 Suss, Wiliams, and Mendis, "Caribbean Offshore Financial Centres: Past, Present and 
Possibilities for the Future." 
 
 152 
blacklisted by the OECD for having an inadequate regulatory framework in their 
financial sector 
 
The Financial Action Task Force in its initial report in June 2000 named 
Dominica as one of the 15 offshore financial centers declared noncooperative. 
This declaration did not carry with it any explicit sanctions, but the financial 
sectors that were designated “non-cooperative” were under immense international 
pressure and they risked banks and other financial entities in other countries not 
doing business with them. The major reason for this distinction was the secrecy 
provisions in the laws governing offshore financial institutions. After reviews, the 
Bahamas and the Cayman Islands were removed from the Financial Action Task 
Force noncooperative list, but Dominica remained on the list because of continued 
problems relating to record keeping, information sharing and customer 
identification.198 
 
The offshore banking sector prior to the OECD action seemed to be 
exactly what Dominica needed. The economic decline halted briefly and the 
country had ostensibly found the solution to their economic woes. The major 
feature of the offshore banking industry, as with most other offshore financial 
centers, was secrecy. After the blacklisting of Dominica by the OECD in 2000 the 
                                                 
198 Ibid. 
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Dominican government agreed to change its confidentiality laws to appease the 
OECD, but that action served to eliminate the initial attraction of Dominica and 
the value of offshore investments contribution to GDP declined by 5.3 percent 
between 2001 and 2002.199 
 
 After losing its preferential access to the European market and the decline 
of the much-heralded offshore finance initiative, the Dominican government was 
unsure about what their next step should be. This situation was, however, 
exacerbated by the 9/11 attacks. The government would eventually decide that the 
only avenue available to them was to access IMF funds. 
 
IMF Intervention in Dominica 
The decision to go to the IMF was primarily as a result of a severe decline 
of the economy after the 1999 WTO banana ruling. In 2000 the government faced 
a fiscal deficit of almost 11 percent of GDP. In August 2002 the IMF approved a 
one-year Stand-by credit for Dominica of SDR 3.28 million (US$ 4.3 million). 
The IMF confirmed that the two external factors that led to this economic decline 
were the loss of banana preferences and the global economic slowdown after the 
9/11 attacks that led to a decline in export earnings.200 
                                                 
199 This statistic was obtained from the CARICOM Statistical Database and was also 
endorsed by a Dominican financial official. 
 
200 International Monetary Fund, IMF Approves US$4.3m. Stand-by Credit for Dominica, 
Press Release No, 03/228 (August 28, 2002). 
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In return for the IMF facility and a World Bank Partial Risk Guarantee 
(PRG) provision, the Dominican government had to agree to enact several 
structural reforms. These reforms included fiscal tightening and an extensive 
privatization program. This privatization program involved the divestment of the 
Dominica Marketing Corporation, two state-owned banks, and the government 
shares in Cable and Wireless (the monopoly telecommunications company). 
Additionally, the government pledged to remove all existing price controls. 
 
Payne correctly notes that after two years of IMF intervention, “the 
economy was doing no more than muddling along: it was not developing in any 
particular direction, and could not realistically be expected to do so just because 
the IMF had put the public finances in order.”201 Dominica therefore desperately 
needed another solution.202 China would become the new answer to Dominica’s 
economic woes. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
 
201 Payne, "After Bananas: The IMF and the Politics of Stabilisation and Diversification 
in Dominica." 
 
202 It is interesting to note that in Dominica there was no hostility to IMF conditionalities. 
The government argued that the IMF was in fact helping Dominica to get its finances 
right. The loss of policy autonomy was not subject to much discussion. 
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China as the Source of Adjustment 
Almost immediately after gaining independence, the Dominican 
government chose to recognize Taiwan instead of China. The decision was based 
solely on Taiwan’s promise of aid.203 Between 1980 and 2004, Taiwan issued 
numerous loans and funded several infrastructural projects including the building 
of a hospital and road construction. 
 
The decision to switch recognition from Taiwan to China was announced 
in a nationally televised address to the nation by Prime Minister Skerrit on March 
29, 2004. In his comprehensive address he outlined the reasons for the diplomatic 
maneuvering. This speech is one of the best-articulated presentations of the 
importance of foreign policy for the development of small Caribbean states.  
 
Skerrit very early in his address argues that there must be some 
congruence between domestic economic policy and foreign policy. Foreign 
policies must therefore, according to him, be geared towards the attainment of 
domestic economic goals. Skerrit notes that in the past this congruence was 
ignored, but he would work to realign Dominica’s foreign policy, which had 
become, “ineffective and often pursued in a manner that was irrelevant to the 
                                                 
203 Honychurch, The Dominican Story: A History of the Island. 
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needs of our country.”204 Skerrit in his public address notes that this would entail 
an analysis and re-evaluation of all existing relationships in view of the nature of 
the current global environment. 
 
This overhaul would begin with China, and Skerrit points out that this 
decision would bring “a new realism to our foreign policy . . . which puts our 
national interest, especially the developmental aspects of those interests, at its 
centre.”205 In view of this, Dominica’s engagement with China was seen an 
important component of attaining Dominica’s national interest. 
 
Skerrit’s justification of his decision to recognize China was linked to 
Dominica’s need to adjust to international realities. He specifically highlights the 
fact that the banana industry was in decline due to the actions of the United States 
and the WTO ruling. Another factor necessitating development assistance was the 
OECD action against Dominica. The country was placed on the OECD blacklist 
because the country was seen as a potential haven for money launderers. The 
nascent offshore banking sector established to help the country recover from the 
                                                 
204 Skerrit, Roosevelt, Address to the Nation by the Hon. Roosevelt Skerrit, Prime 
Minister and Minister of Finance, on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between 
the Commonwealth of Dominica and the People’s Republic of China, March 29, 2004. 
 
205 It should be noted, however, that in numerous interviews with Dominican officials the 
foreign policy re-evaluation was more of a one-man evaluation, as the major stakeholders 
in the country were not consulted. 
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banana ruling and to find new industries that it was competitive in, was adversely 
affected by the OECD action. 
 
In view of Dominica’s precarious economic position, Skerrit argues that it 
was absolutely necessary that Dominica realign itself. Traditionally, the major 
foreign influences were Britain and the United States, but the banana ruling 
served to displace Britain’s influence and importance, and the US action in 
initiating the WTO case indicated that the US was not a country that Dominica 
could rely on to support its economic development. It is in this vein that Skerrit 
states that,   
Our friendship with the People’s Republic of China is valuable. 
They understand the reality of what Dominica is going through. They have 
a history of concern for and sensitivity towards the plight of small, 
developing states. They caught our vision, having lived our dream.206 
 
The “Memorandum of Understanding between the Commonwealth of 
Dominica and the Government of the People’s Republic of China” had four 
pillars. The first dimension of the agreement related to the rehabilitation of the 
Windsor Park Sporting, Cultural and Recreational Stadium. This stadium was in 
need of numerous upgrades to make it ready for the 2007 Cricket World Cup. The 
Chinese government agreed to start the project within 90 days of the signing of 
the Memorandum and the Chinese government would also provide the technical 
                                                 
206 Skerrit, Roosevelt, Address to the Nation by the Hon. Roosevelt Skerrit, Prime 
Minister and Minister of Finance, on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between 
the Commonwealth of Dominica and the People’s Republic of China, March 29, 2004. 
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team that would lead the rebuilding process. The stadium would cost US$17 
million which represents about 3.6% of Dominica’s GDP in 2007. 
 
The second pillar of the Memorandum of Understanding was an economic 
cooperation agreement. Under this agreement the major road from Roseau (the 
capital city) to Portsmouth would be upgraded and resurfaced. This would be a 
positive development as the road is important for international trade and 
commerce. Prime Minister Skerrit pointed out that, this project was envisioned 
from the 1970s, but there were never any government funds available to 
undertake the project. The Chinese government would facilitate this necessary 
and quite overdue infrastructural upgrade. 
 
The third pillar related to the upgrading of the island’s major hospital. The 
Chinese government agreed to conduct a comprehensive upgrading of the 
Princess Margaret Hospital with new state of the art medical equipment. This 
upgrading would allow more persons to have access to the facility and would 
improve health care provision on the island. 
 
The fourth pillar hinged on educational development. The Chinese 
government pledged to construct a new secondary school in Roseau. The school 
would be modern and equipped with cutting edge technology. In addition to the 
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construction of the school, China would furnish thirty full scholarships for 
Dominican students to study in Chinese universities. 
 
In addition to the four pillars as described by Skerrit, the Dominican 
government would be given various grants. There would be an initial grant of 
US$6 million in cash, which represents 1.3% of GDP. Of this sum, US$4 million 
was deposited in a government account prior to the announcement to establish 
diplomatic relations with China and it was agreed that the Dominican government 
would receive US$1 million per year between 2005 and 2009. The Prime Minister 
stated that these projects and other initiatives pledged by China, “would not cost 
the taxpayers of Dominica one cent … not now nor in the future.” 
 
 China is therefore an important component of Dominica’s adjustment 
strategy. It should, however, be noted that China is not the only country that 
Dominica has targeted. Payne points out that Dominica has obtained aid from 
several countries. These include, inter alia, Japan (fisheries and harbor 
reconstruction), the EU (airport reconstruction) USA (private sector support), 
Libya (school building), Venezuela (concessionary oil), and Cuba (health sector 
assistance).207 This more active foreign policy on Dominica’s part serves to 
                                                 
207 Payne, "After Bananas: The IMF and the Politics of Stabilisation and Diversification 
in Dominica." 
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further explain the importance of China as a component of their adjustment 
policy. 
 
Private Sector and Citizens Views 
Members of the opposition Dominican Freedom Party vehemently 
opposed the switch from Taiwan to China, but the nature of the political system 
meant that their cries would not be taken into account. As seen in Figure 5 below, 
the Prime Minister made a secret visit to China on March 16, 2004. Two 
confidential government officials that were interviewed pointed out that the visit 
was indeed secret as neither the opposition nor the general public was aware of 
the discussions with China. The decision to switch recognition was only known to 
those very close to the Prime Minister. 
 
 
Table 11. Key Dates in Dominica’s Relationship with China 
DATE EVENTS 
o November 3, 1978 
 
o 1978 
 
o 1983 
 
o 1988 
 
Dominica gains independence 
 
Dominica recognizes Taiwan 
 
Dominican troops participate in the invasion of Grenada 
 
Dominican government states its intention to develop an 
offshore financial center 
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DATE EVENTS 
 
o 2002 
 
o March 16, 2004 
 
o March 21, 2004 
 
o March 29, 2004 
 
o March 29, 2004 
 
 
One year Stand-by Agreement signed with the IMF 
 
Prime Minister Roosevelt Skerrit makes secret visit to 
China 
 
MOU signed between Dominica and China 
 
Dominica switches recognition from Taiwan to China 
 
Dominican public made aware of the switch in a 
televised address by Skerrit 
 
 
After being informed of the diplomatic switch, there was no consensus in 
the private sector as to the efficacy of this move. There were many members of 
the private sector who were friends of Taiwanese diplomats or who had 
previously worked on Taiwan-financed projects. Many of these individuals were 
not happy about the decision, but there were no channels available to object to the 
move or to block the move.208 It should, however, be noted that there were some 
in the private sector that argued that this switch could be something good for 
Dominica, and especially given China’s vast markets. Most of those in favor of 
                                                 
208 This point was made by two high-level private sector leaders in the interviews 
conducted in Dominica and this was also highlighted by one journalist. 
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the decision argued that China would provide the necessary aid that Dominica 
needed in their time of adjustment. As such, it was argued that it was in 
Dominica’s interest to align with China as soon as possible. This view was, 
however, a minority one as my confidential interviews and press accounts of the 
period demonstrate. 
 
The general public echoed the ambivalence on the part of private sector 
members to the decision to switch recognition. There were both supporters and 
detractors, and in many instances this fell along political party lines. Those 
supporting the opposition party did not support the decision, while those 
supporting the ruling party were in support of the switch.209 
 
One frustrated Dominican in a letter to the editor signed ‘A disappointed 
and perturbed citizen of Dominica’ states, 
The obvious question that arises is why the secrecy. The Labor 
Party promised openness in government. It now appears that the Prime 
Minister and the Permanent Representative to the United Nations are the 
only ones involve[d] in the comprehensive review of Dominica’s foreign 
policy that the Prime Minister boasts of doing. The Cabinet appears to be 
virtually unaware or involved.210 
 
                                                 
209 Interview with a Dominican journalist. 
 
210 The Dominican, "Prime Minister Skerrit's Disturbing Approach to Dominica's Foreign 
Policy," The Dominican, August 14 2006. 
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The decision to switch recognition from one state to another is an 
important one and this case shows that the decision was a closely guarded secret. 
There were no debates in the Parliament relating to the efficacy of such a move 
and there was no dialogue with the public prior to the decision being announced. 
This supports the general premise that the nature of the Westminster political 
system seen in the Caribbean states, grants enormous powers to the Prime 
Minister and his cabinet and limits the voice of other interest groups in the 
society.  
 
Because of limits to debating this issue, decisions are sometimes made 
without all the facts being on the table. For example, the text of the agreements 
were not made public and opposition members, private sector officials, and the 
general public are still not aware of the terms of agreements signed with China.211 
It is because of this ignorance and lack of any serious debate that we see the 
implementation of agreements that do not necessarily benefit the general 
population. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
211 Most of the members of the private sector interviewed were still not sure about the 
details of the agreements signed with China. They are aware of the general initiatives to 
be funded by China, but they are not really aware of any conditions (explicit or implicit) 
that may be attached to these agreements. 
 164 
The Net Benefits of Dominica’s Relationship With China: The Trade and Labor 
Data 
One obvious negative aspect of the intensified relations between Dominica 
and China relates to the balance of trade. Since 2001, Dominica has had a trade 
deficit with China and this deficit is widening. This point should be viewed with 
the understanding that the general international trade deficit is widening in 
Dominica. Table 12 below provides the value of Dominican imports from China 
between 2001 and 2006. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
China in 2005, Dominica saw an almost 100 percent increase in the value of 
imports in just one year. There is no column for exports to China precisely 
because Dominica does not export any goods to China. As noted earlier, 
Dominica’s main commodity exports are agricultural products (in particular 
bananas) and China does not import bananas that are Dominica’s leading export 
product. It is unlikely that this situation will change in the near future, as 
Dominica does not produce anything that China is willing to import. 
 
Table 12. Dominica’s Import of Chinese Goods (in Eastern Caribbean $) 
Year Value of Total Imports from 
China 
Chinese Imports as a 
Percentage of Total Imports 
2001 2,762,757 8.0% 
2002 2,223,102 7.0% 
2003 3,382,067 10.0% 
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Year Value of Total Imports from 
China 
Chinese Imports as a 
Percentage of Total Imports 
2004 5,006,292 13.0% 
2005 9,654,155 19.0% 
2006 17,561,259 29.0% 
Source: CARICOM Secretariat Database 
 
The Importation of Chinese Laborers in Dominica 
In Dominica, the stadium provided by China was to facilitate their hosting 
of the Cricket World Cup and this project was very important to the Dominican 
government and the Dominican people. This admiration for the Chinese was, 
however, strained when the Dominican populace witnessed the arrival of 
numerous Chinese workers for the sole purpose of constructing the stadium.212 
The Dominican workers were therefore not the beneficiaries of much needed 
construction work,213 especially given the high unemployment rate in Dominica. 
This inflow of Chinese labor served to reduce the potential benefits to the 
Dominican economy accruing from the construction of the stadium. 
 
                                                 
212 Payne, "After Bananas: The IMF and the Politics of Stabilisation and Diversification 
in Dominica." 
 
213 Interview with Dominican journalist. 
 166 
The Dominican example highlights the fact that the lack of natural 
resources means that the only thing attracting China to the tiny island is their 
sovereignty. Their small natural resource base also means that with increased 
trade between Dominica and China, there is no real advantage to expanding trade, 
as the only thing that will result is a widening of the trade deficit. In addition, the 
trend of Chinese firms importing Chinese laborers is a major concern as it thwarts 
the potential economic benefits accruing from the investments. These glaring 
disadvantages associated with closer engagement with China are, however, 
largely ignored and underemphasized as the political system suppresses 
opposition to decisions made by the Prime Minister given the lack of debate 
relating to the decisions made by the government. In addition, the secrecy 
involved in the decision-making process precludes any worthwhile discussion of 
the terms of agreements and the potential advantages and disadvantages 
associated with these agreements. 
 
 
GRENADA 
 
Grenada’s Resource Base 
The Grenada story is very similar to the one just discussed in relation to 
Dominica. Grenada’s economy is currently structured around tourism and the 
offshore financial sector. Grenada, as a member of the ACP, was also provided 
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with duty-free access to the European market for exports under the Lomé 
Agreements. Grenada’s primary exports are spices—giving it the name of the 
Spice Island. Grenada produces 20 percent of the world’s nutmeg and also exports 
spices including, inter alia, allspice, cinnamon, ginger, and cloves. The 
government was, however, interested in diversifying the economy and decided 
that given the lack of other natural resources, they would embark on an initiative 
to develop Grenada as a potential offshore financial center. 
 
 
Offshore Financial Sector 
The government of Grenada set up the country as an offshore financial 
center in 1997 via the passing of several Acts between 1996 and 1997. Offshore 
services offered in Grenada include international business companies, offshore 
banks, international insurance, international trusts, economic citizenship, 
international betting, and companies management.214 
 
By 2004, registered companies totaled 3400 IBCs, 44 offshore banks and 
11 trust companies.215 In late 2001 Grenada, like Dominica, was added to the non-
cooperative list of the Financial Action Task Force. This action was partially due 
                                                 
214 Bardouille, "The Offshore Services Industry in the Caribbean: A Conceptual and Sub-
Regional Analysis." 
 
215 Suss, Wiliams, and Mendis, "Caribbean Offshore Financial Centres: Past, Present and 
Possibilities for the Future." 
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to problems in the financial sector in 2000 when the First International Bank of 
Grenada (an offshore bank) collapsed. In recent years supervision has expanded 
and the Grenada Financial Services Authority withdrew the licenses of 17 
banks,216 but the economic fallout from this blacklisting would adversely affect 
the economy and would be the first factor leading to Grenada’s eventual decision 
to switch recognition from Taiwan to China. 
 
Grenada’s Decision to Switch Recognition to China in 2005 
The economic meltdown in Grenada began with the OECD blacklisting in 
2001. The economic downturn got even worse after Grenada was directly hit by 
Hurricane Ivan (a category 4 hurricane) in September 2004. The hurricane 
resulted in the deaths of 39 persons and 90 percent of Grenadian residential 
homes were seriously damaged. There was also widespread damage to schools, 
government buildings and hospitals. In the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, 
the Grenada government approached Taiwan for assistance. 217 
 
One major concern was the destruction of the cricket stadium that was 
originally built from proceeds from a Taiwanese concessionary loan of US$6 
million in 1997. The damage to the stadium was a major concern because it came 
only a year and a half before the start of the Cricket World Cup and some cricket 
                                                 
216 Ibid. 
 
217 This information was received from both a Grenadian journalist and a Grenadian 
politician. 
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matches were scheduled in that stadium. If the stadium were not rebuilt, Grenada 
would have to surrender its co-hosting duties and would lose its share of the 
expected influx of tourists to the region. Figure 6 below provides some of the key 
dates relating to Grenada’s relations with China and Taiwan. 
 
 
Table 13. Important Dates in Grenada’s Relationship with China 
DATES EVENTS 
o February 7, 1974 
o 1974 
o October 1, 1985 
o July 19, 1989 
o August 7, 1989 
o 2001 
o September 7, 2004 
o December 12-16, 2004 
 
o January 20, 2005 
 
o December 2006 
 
Grenada gains independence 
Grenada recognizes Taiwan 
Grenada recognizes China 
Diplomatic relations with Taiwan established 
China severs diplomatic relations 
Grenada added to the OECD’s noncooperative list 
Hurricane Ivan makes a direct hit 
Prime Minister Keith Mitchell and Foreign Minister 
Melvin Nimrod visit China 
Diplomatic relations established with China 
 
Taiwan sues the Grenadian government for US$59 
million 
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The decision to recognize Taiwan was made in 1989. The political party in 
power at that time was the National Democratic Congress. The political party and 
the wider Grenadian populace benefited immensely from the relationship and 
close ties were forged between the two governments. In fact, the Taiwanese 
modus operandi in relation to developing countries that recognize it is similar to 
that discussed in chapter 2 with respect to China. The Taiwanese government 
wined and dined the government officials of these states and routinely invited 
them to Taiwan on official visits. At the same time, high-ranking Taiwanese 
officials routinely visited countries that recognized Taiwan. 
 
Given the strong ties between members of the National Democratic 
Congress and the Taiwanese government, it was imperative that China establish a 
relationship with the opposition New National Party. China therefore embarked 
on a “charm offensive” aimed at the leadership of the opposition party. 
 
The issue of political funding is very important in the Caribbean. This 
concern really emanates from the actions of Taiwan and China in financing 
election campaigns across the region. Both countries establish ties with rival 
political parties and finance their respective campaigns. The party that wins the 
election will inevitably choose to recognize the government that helped finance its 
election victory. 
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For example, this played out in Barbados in 2007. In the recent election 
campaign in Barbados, the Prime Minister Owen Arthur accused Taiwan of trying 
to influence the elections by funding the election campaign of the Democratic 
Labor Party, which is the main opposition.218 It should be noted, however, that 
Barbados has been consistent in its recognition of mainland China since May 
1977.  
 
Third Country Contact 
 Both Taiwan and China use third party supporting countries to court 
opposition parties to their side. In the Barbados case, the Prime Minister accused 
the opposition party of making contact with Taiwanese diplomats through the 
island of St. Kitts where Taiwan is recognized. This was similar in the case of St. 
Lucia. St. Lucia is another country in the Caribbean that lacks strategic natural 
resources and is very similar to Dominica and Grenada. 
 
 St. Lucia gained independence in February 1979 and under the leadership 
of the United Workers Party and Prime Minister John Compton made the decision 
to recognize to Taiwan. The United Workers Party lost power to the St. Lucia 
Labor Party in 1997 and switched recognition to China later that year. The next 
                                                 
218 "Taiwan Meddling in Bajan Polls - Arthur," Jamaica Gleaner, January 7, 2007. 
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10 years ushered in some stability, but things began to unravel with the 2006 
elections. 
 
During the 2006 election campaign the opposition United Workers Party 
was accused of secretly meeting with the Taiwanese government. The United 
Workers Party while in government had recognized Taiwan and maintained very 
close relations with Taiwanese officials. Very soon after winning the election and 
moving from opposition to ruling party, John Compton (the Prime Minister) 
declared, “A foreign policy must look at the interest of the country. A country has 
no friends—particularly small countries, you have to look at where your interest 
lies.”219  
 
Only four months after winning the election, the United Workers Party 
government invited the Taiwanese foreign minister to St. Lucia—a move that 
angered the Chinese. The government did not sever the country’s relationship 
with China. Instead on April 30, 2007 it announced its decision to resume 
relations with Taiwan while indicating that it wanted to remain friends with 
China. China was therefore left with the task of actually severing diplomatic 
relations citing its non-acceptance of “double recognition.”220 
                                                 
219 Peter Ischyrion, Is It China or Taiwan? (Inter Press News Agency,  2007 [cited 
January 12 2008]); available from http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=37161. 
 
220 Interview with Chinese officials across the Caribbean. Also see, "St. Lucia - China 
Cuts All Diplomatic Ties," Jamaica Gleaner, May 7, 2007. 
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This frequent switching of recognition has become such a concern that 
Kenny Anthony, the former Prime Minister of St. Lucia, added the issue of 
campaign financing to the agenda of the CARICOM Heads of Government 
Summit in 2006.221 To date there has been no CARICOM-wide action relating to 
reforms of campaign financing, but individual governments are considering 
implementing legislative changes. 
 
 
Taiwan Fights Back 
On December 1, 2006 Taiwan retaliated against the Grenadian decision to 
switch recognition to China. The Taiwanese Export-Import Bank filed a lawsuit 
against the Grenadian government (The Export Import Bank of the Republic of 
China (ROC) on Taiwan v. Grenada) seeking the repayment of US$ 21.6 million 
plus interest given to the Mitchell government. The lawsuit was filed in the 
United States District Court, Southern New York District and was aimed at the 
repayment of four loans provided to the Grenadian government while they still 
recognized Taiwan.222 These loans were issued for the construction of the 
                                                                                                                                     
 
221 Vernon Daley, "Election Financing and Caricom," Jamaica Gleaner, October 10, 
2006. 
 
222 The decision to file the lawsuit in New York was in fact consistent with the loan 
agreements. All four agreements included a clause that established the choice of law and 
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Queen’s Park stadium, development of the agricultural industry, road construction 
and a ministerial complex at the Botanical Gardens. 
 
The loans were issued to Grenada between 1990 and 2000. The loan 
agreements specified the rate of interest to be charged (between 2 and 4.5 percent) 
and the payment schedules. The government of Grenada failed to make payments 
on numerous occasions,223 but the government was only sued after the decision on 
January 20, 2005, to switch recognition to China, and after the Grenadian 
government failed to repay the loans in full immediately. On June 15, 2005, four 
months after Grenada’s diplomatic switch, the Taiwanese EX-IM bank issued a 
written notification of default in relation to all four loans. The initial defaults 
occurred in early 2004. 
 
In January 2007, the high court judge that heard the case ruled that the 
Grenada government did in fact owe the Taiwanese government almost US$21 
million. A well-respected law firm represented the Taiwanese government, 
whereas the Grenadian government defense was led by the Foreign Minister’s 
wife, Donzell Tucker (a lawyer with limited international legal experience). The 
Grenadian defense was quite simple. Their failure to repay the debt was due to the 
economic downturn caused by Hurricanes Ivan (2004) and Emily (2005). 
                                                                                                                                     
forum. This clause explicitly stated that the loan agreements were subject to the laws of 
the State of New York. See Grenada Today for more details of the lawsuit. 
 
223 Interview conducted with a member of the Dominica Labor Party. 
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Needless to say, this explanation was not well received by the judge, as there was 
no clause in the agreements allowing for the suspension of payments in the event 
of a hurricane. Grenada was subsequently ordered to repay the loans in full. They 
are in the process of arranging repayment. 
 
 
The Net Benefits of Grenada’s Relationship With China: The Trade and Labor 
Data 
  
As discussed in the Dominica case, the disadvantages associated with the 
intensification of relations between Grenada and China relate to both the 
widening of the trade deficit and the tendency of Chinese contractors to import 
Chinese laborers. Table 14 below shows that between 2001 and 2006, the value of 
Chinese imports is consistently increasing in Grenada.  As was the case with 
Dominica, no column for exports to China is included precisely because Grenada 
does not export any products to China. In 2002, according to both CARICOM and 
Grenada statistics, Grenada did export a mere US$ 344 worth of fruits and 
vegetables to China. The records show that there have been no other exports to 
China between 2001 and 2006. 
 
 
 
 176 
 
Table 14. Grenada’s Import of Chinese Goods 
YEAR Value of Imports 
from China (EC$) 
Chinese Imports as 
a Percentage of 
Total Imports 
2001 4,185,218 7.0% 
2002 6,233,022 11.6% 
2003 8,790,958 12.8% 
2004 11,258,274 16.5% 
2005 29,271,407 22.5% 
2006 42,362,714 31.5% 
Source: CARICOM Secretariat Database 
 
 In terms of the actual decomposition of these imports of Chinese products, 
in 2006, the majority of products imported from China by Grenada were textiles 
and apparel and light manufacturing items. This was almost identical to that seen 
in the Dominican case. There was relatively little food imports, but there were 
large imports of plastic, rubber, iron and steel, and furniture products. 
 
The Importation of Chinese Laborers 
 The labor concerns seen in the Dominican case are also evident in 
Grenada. The Chinese-financed stadium was built with the help of 500 imported 
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Chinese workers. The Chinese contractors argued that is was important to import 
foreign laborers because the project had to be completed in a short period of time 
and the Grenadian labor market could not provide the requisite laborers. 
 
 When the plans to build this stadium were announced there was no initial 
discussion of the need to import workers. This issue was again not discussed in 
Parliament and the public was not made aware of this aspect of the agreement. 
The importation of the 500 Chinese laborers only became public after they 
entered the country and began working on the stadium and Grenadians started to 
voice their displeasure with this development.224 
 
 It should be noted that unions tend to be strong in the Caribbean, but 
construction workers tend not to be unionized. They simply work on projects as 
they become available. There is therefore no coordinated union voice lobbying on 
behalf of these construction workers as one would see in the sugar industry, for 
example. As such, there is no coordinated union lobbying against the influx of 
Chinese of Chinese laborers. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
224 Interview conducted with one Grenadian journalist. 
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What Have We Learnt from these Two Cases? 
The Grenada and Dominica cases elucidate the theoretical arguments 
made in chapters 1 and 2. The relationship with China and the creative use of their 
sovereign rights is an important component of their adjustment strategies. In 
recent years the economic and political environments facing both countries have 
changed significantly as both countries suffered significant economic decline as a 
result. Both states have struggled to find the correct adjustment strategy, but what 
is clear is that both states, in addition to domestic economic restructuring, have 
used their foreign policy as an avenue for stemming their economic decline. 
China has been viewed by both states as the key foreign entity that can provide 
necessary economic assistance. 
 
Dominica’s experience with the EU demonstrates that small states are 
especially sensitive to changes in policies in states that they are dependent upon. 
The loss of EU preferences served to decimate the Dominican economy and the 
Dominican people have been struggling to place their economy on a more solid 
footing since that time.  
 
The experience of Grenada points to the fact that this diplomatic game is a 
very delicate one. The case filed against the Grenada government by the 
Taiwanese reflects the major pitfall of changing allegiance for economic gains 
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and also the reliance on external entities. This case shows that there is indeed a 
cost related to playing the game of diplomatic recognition. 
 
Returning to the original motivations matrix in Table 9 (originally 
provided in chapter 3 and modified here) we see that in both Dominica and 
Grenada, their motivation is aid and investments. Because neither country has any 
natural resources that China is particularly interested in, they are only able to pay 
for this aid and investment with votes and recognition. Table 15 below depicts 
this scenario. 
 
Table 15. Modified Motivations Matrix for Dominica and Grenada 
 MOTIVATIONS OF 
DOMINICA AND GRENADA 
VIS-À-VIS CHINA 
PRICE PAID BY DOMINICA 
AND GRENADA 
√   Aid and Foreign investment 
√   Infrastructure Development 
o Prestige 
o Tourism Revenue 
√   Votes in international for a 
√   Trade opening 
√  Recognition of ‘One China 
Policy’ 
o Sale of Natural Resources to 
China 
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The Dominican and Grenadian cases show that their somewhat limited 
interaction with China is due to their lack of strategic natural resources. China’s 
provisions of aid and investment is linked to their sovereign resources which 
allow them to vote with China on international issues and to recognize China and 
not Taiwan. In addition, these two cases show that this use of sovereignty is not a 
new development in either country as they have both employed strategies related 
to offshore financial centers, flags of convenience and the sale of economic 
citizenship. The sale of votes and recognition to China are therefore the newest 
phase of the creative use of sovereignty. 
 
The Dominican and Grenadian cases also highlight the importance of 
economic considerations on their foreign policy agendas. The major aim of their 
foreign policies is the attainment of economic growth. In addition, both have 
identified this economic growth as being to some extent dependent on the 
benevolence of external powers. In the past, this was Europe and the US. As they 
lost preferential access to the European market and they lost aid flows from the 
US, both countries sought another power that that would compensate for these 
losses. China therefore represents the newest great power providing aid and 
investment to these two states. 
 
The next chapter will discuss the Jamaican case in some detail. One major 
difference between the Jamaican case and these two cases is the fact that Jamaica 
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does have a natural resource that China is interested in accessing. In addition, 
there is much more academic literature available on the foreign policy tradition in 
Jamaica. Jamaica has had a relatively active foreign policy and this is to some 
extent a result of the leaders and their access to more funds available for 
diplomatic endeavors.  
 
The succeeding chapter will build on the existing literature to show that 
Jamaica with a wider resource base has been less dependent on the use of 
sovereignty in attracting aid and investment. There are, however, important 
similarities with Dominica and Grenada as the political system is the same and the 
problems associated with a lack of transparency are also evident in the Jamaican 
case. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Jamaica: Trading Natural and ‘Sovereign’ Resources for Development and 
Prestige 
 
China is currently Jamaica’s fifth largest trading partner,225 and Jamaica is 
China’s largest trading partner in the English-speaking Caribbean.226 Only ten 
years ago there were no official statistics on trade between Jamaica and China, but 
since that time the relationship has intensified and statistics are now available.  
 
The relationship between China and Jamaica is, however, not new. In fact, 
Jamaica’s first contact with China came in the 1800s when slavery was abolished 
in the British Empire. As additional African slaves became unavailable due to the 
outlawing of the slave trade, the British planters in the Caribbean needed 
additional workers. This labor shortage was corrected by the importation of 
indentured laborers from China and India.227 In Jamaica, the majority of 
indentured laborers were Chinese and these laborers largely chose to remain in the 
                                                 
225 Al Edwards, "China Is Jamaica's Fifth Largest Trading Partner," Jamaica Observer, 
July 21 2006. 
 
226 "China's Ties with Jamaica Growing," Jamaica Gleaner, September 28 2005. 
 
227 See Philip Sherlock and Hazel Bennett, The Story of the Jamaican People (Kingston: 
Ian Randle Publishers, 1998). For a good discussion of the history of the Chinese in 
Jamaica see, Walton Look Lai, The Chinese in the West Indies 1806-1995 (Kingston: 
University of the West Indies Press, 1998). 
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country even after their term of service was completed. These Chinese indentured 
laborers eventually became an important group in Jamaican society. 
 
Jamaica was decolonized in 1962 and, as discussed in chapter 2, the 
Bustamante government of the 1960s, consistent with other Caribbean states, 
declared Jamaica’s allegiance with the West upon gaining independence. The US 
recognized the government of Taiwan as the legitimate government for China and 
as such, the Caribbean governments in Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad 
and Tobago all recognized the Chiang Kai-shek government in Taiwan as the 
legitimate Chinese government. This decision was aimed at showing solidarity 
with the US’ position on the Taiwan-China issue. The Caribbean’s solidarity with 
the US’ positions began to wane in the 1970s beginning in Guyana and Jamaica. 
Both Guyana and Jamaica elected socialist governments and based on ideological 
grounds, chose to rescind their recognition of Taiwan and to enter into diplomatic 
relations with mainland China. 
 
Jamaica’s modern relationship with China dates back to 1972 with the 
election of socialist Michael Manley as Prime Minister. The relationship between 
China and Jamaica has evolved significantly since 1972. But, unlike the cases of 
Dominica and Grenada, Jamaica’s position vis-à-vis Chinese recognition has been 
consistent. The relationship in the Jamaican case is less about creatively using 
sovereignty and more about economic adjustment and the trade of a traditional 
 184 
natural resource—bauxite. As such, the explanation for Jamaica’s intensified 
relationship with China is slightly different from that espoused in the previous 
chapter. Hence, using the matrix presented in chapter 3, the Jamaican case is one 
wherein both natural and sovereign resources are being traded. 
 
 
Chapter Outline 
This chapter will trace the development of the relationship between 
Jamaica and China, highlighting the consistency with China’s general Third 
World relations and locating the current relationship between Jamaica and China 
in Jamaica’s political and economic history. It makes the argument that in the 
Jamaican case, China does represent a source of economic adjustment, but 
another motivation behind the intensification of the relationship is the Jamaican 
government’s goal of enhancing the country’s international prestige. 
 
The chapter begins with a brief overview of Jamaica’s foreign policy since 
1962. This overview will show that Jamaica’s foreign policy stance has evolved 
over time, but that it has always been motivated by economic goals. The 
discussion will then show that the foreign policy goals in any period correlate 
with the specific economic development strategy being pursued by Jamaica at that 
time. 
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The discussion will then trace the development of the relationship with 
China. Since 1972 Jamaica has consistently recognized China and it will be 
shown that it is only in recent years that China has become an important trading 
partner. Prior to the 1990s, China was not a real source of aid for Jamaica and the 
decision to recognize China was solely based on the grounds of Third World 
solidarity in the 1970s and political expediency in the 1980s. In the mind of 
Jamaica’s governments since 1972, it made no sense to switch recognition to 
Taiwan as the international community had for the most part established that 
recognition should be given to China and not Taiwan. 
 
The chapter will show that since the 1990s the relationship with China has 
intensified and Jamaica is benefiting from Chinese investments in the bauxite 
sector and the sale of bauxite to China. The argument to be made is that the 
possession of a strategic natural resource that is of interest to China means that 
Jamaica has nothing to gain from switching recognition between China and 
Taiwan for economic gain. In fact, as will be shown, the creative use of 
sovereignty has not been employed in Jamaica, as they have not seen a need to 
employ this strategy. 
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Overview of Jamaica’s Foreign Policy Since 1962 
 
Jamaica gained independence in 1962 and the Bustamante government 
sought to re-align Jamaica’s foreign policy with the  “shift of center of economic 
gravity and military power from Great Britain to the United States.”228 The 
governing economic and political ideology in Jamaica between 1962 and 1972 
was therefore consistent with that seen across the Caribbean of alignment with the 
West. Jamaica joined the IMF and World Bank in 1962 and focused its foreign 
policy activities on attracting foreign investments to Jamaica. 
 
Persaud notes that this re-alignment was based in concrete trade and 
investment statistics. Trade with Great Britain dropped from 55 percent in 1953 to 
39 percent in 1962, whereas the percentage of imports from the United States 
increased from 33 percent in 1953 to 42 percent in 1962. The percentage of 
exports to Great Britain dropped from 62 percent to 30 percent and grew in the 
dollar area from 31 percent to 58 percent, over the same time period of 1953-
1962.229 
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During the 1960s the voice of the Third World began to be heard in 
multilateral settings. By the late 1960s most of the African, Asian and Caribbean 
countries had been decolonized and the balance between advanced and 
developing countries began to move in favor of developing countries at the UN 
and as part of calls for a new international economic order in the 1970s. But the 
voices of these developing states were largely absent from the academic literature. 
This silence began to erode with the development of dependency theory.230 This 
change signaled the beginning of what I termed in chapter 2 the ‘Alignment with 
the South’ thinking. 
 
Smaller and weaker states were of the opinion that the best way to be 
heard was through strength in numbers. As such, alliance formation was a key 
component of this thrust for change and the elevation of development as a key 
international concern. This would undoubtedly necessitate challenging the 
existing international political and economic order.  
 
Politicians and academics in Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad, were the main 
advocates of the dependency framework in the Caribbean.231 Political leaders in 
these three countries, as well as in Grenada, made attempts to concretize and 
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apply to economic and foreign policy the principles articulated by the dependency 
school. This involved, inter alia, these Third World countries adopting a more 
vocal and assertive stance in the international arena, and Jamaica and Guyana 
featured prominently here. Collective action also became an important feature of 
this more vocal foreign policy, as was seen in the calls for a new international 
economic order. 
 
After gaining power in 1972, Michael Manley and his People’s National 
Party administration situated the issue of collective action along with the aim of 
altering the international system as the centerpiece of Jamaica’s foreign policy. 
Manley saw this collective strategy as not merely a Jamaican strategy, but a 
“Third World strategy.”232  
 
Throughout the 1970s the Jamaican government operated under an 
expressed ideology of “Democratic Socialism,” which was similar to that seen in 
Western Europe. This Democratic Socialism had both domestic and international 
dimensions and both dimensions were seen as inextricably linked. Persaud argues 
that Manley’s view was that “Jamaican foreign policy must be aimed at changing 
the world, for it is only thus that real changes can be accomplished at the domestic 
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level.”233 In short, it can be said that the aim of democratic socialism or the vision 
behind the ideology was the creation of a more economically and politically 
equitable country and indeed, world;234 and an important facet of this vision was 
opposing the existing international order. 
 
By pinning the country’s foreign policy to the ideology of democratic 
socialism the newly elected government purposefully distanced itself from the 
close relations that had been established with the West and opened itself to new 
alliances with countries of the Third World. It is therefore in this light that 
Jamaica established relations with China in 1972, as will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
 
The PNP government adopted a high profile approach to participation in 
multilateral organizations, in many cases assuming a leadership role. For 
example, the country’s representative to the UN was selected by the Secretary-
General in 1975 to serve as a member of a group of experts charged with the 
restructuring of the economic and social sectors of the organization. Along similar 
lines, the Jamaican representative to the UN Economic and Social Council 
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(ECOSOC) was elected president of that council in 1978.235 In relation to talks 
relation to the Law of the Sea Convention, Kenneth Rattray, a Jamaican, was 
appointed rapporteur for the UN conference held on this issue and Jamaica was 
eventually selected as the location of the International Seabed Authority. 
 
In keeping with the government’s pursuit of Third World “solidarism,”236 
emphasis was placed on working with other “Southern” countries. For example, 
Ambassador Don Mills, a high-level foreign policy official and academic, relates 
that Jamaica was one of a small number of developing countries invited to attend 
the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, held in Paris between 
1976 and 1977, and a year later Prime Minister Manley presided over a meeting 
in Jamaica which was attended by a number of heads of state to discuss the 
situation regarding the New International Economic Order (NIEO) – this was in 
fact, “the very first North-South Summit”.237  
 
The Manley foreign policy approach also included participation in the 
Non-Aligned Movement, with Jamaica holding a seat on the Coordinating Bureau 
of the Non-Aligned Movement. Jamaica played an important role in the G77’s 
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negotiations in UNCTAD and served as the chair or chief negotiator for the G77 
countries.238 
 
The Manley government’s activism in international fora was met with 
some ambivalence. Mills notes that: 
In many quarters outside of the country it brought, for the most part, very 
positive and favorable reactions. But at home the government was 
severely criticized by the JLP for some of its activities and policies and for 
its alleged neglect of domestic issues”.239 
 
This criticism of the government was widespread and the PNP ultimately 
lost the election in 1980, ushering in a new era in Jamaica’s foreign policy.  
 
Anthony Payne argues that Edward Seaga was the first Prime Minister to 
explicitly acknowledge the importance of the United States in the Caribbean. As 
such, Seaga clearly saw the United States as the focal point of Jamaica’s foreign 
policy.240 Seaga’s “special relationship” with Reagan was so key that he was 
referred to as “Reagan’s man in the Caribbean” and “America’s man in the 
Caribbean”.241 In fact, Seaga was the first head of state to be invited to the White 
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House by President Regan.242 Seaga was Harvard educated and Washington 
believed that he would embrace the neo-liberal approach to attaining economic 
growth and development and would therefore be a champion of structural 
adjustment programs prescribed by the key multilateral institutions.243  
 
The 1980s may have tempered Jamaica’s calls for a new international 
order, but the foreign policy perception was still one predicated on the idea that 
Jamaica was a leading voice in the Third World and in the Caribbean in 
particular. During the 1980s, after establishing a close relationship with Reagan, 
Seaga sought to lobby for a Caribbean-type Marshall Plan. The Reagan 
government agreed with the premise of Seaga’s call and enacted the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative (CBI). It did not go as far as Seaga wanted, but it did signal the 
fact that Jamaica was still a leading voice in the Caribbean and the Third World. 
Jamaica’s continued regional leadership was also witnessed in Seaga’s integral 
role in the Grenada invasion. He was one of the most vocal advocates of US 
action and sought to convince other Caribbean states to support the US invasion. 
 
The re-election of the PNP in 1989 saw a return of Michael Manley, but 
his Third World solidarity had changed as the international economic system had 
changed. Manley and later Patterson embraced the ideas of free trade and general 
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economic liberalization, and they both continued along the general policy 
direction of the Seaga-led government of the 1980s especially in relation to the 
acknowledgement of the importance of the United States and an acceptance of the 
prevailing neo-liberal economic regime.244  
 
Despite Jamaica’s efforts to adhere to the discipline of the neoliberal free 
trade regime, Jamaica has, however, continued to make the case that small 
developing countries need to be accorded ‘special and differential treatment.’ As 
noted in chapters 1 and 2 before, Jamaica—and the Caribbean in general—have 
consistently argued that small states exhibit more vulnerability and this argument 
underpins the foreign policy goals of these states. The period from 1989 to the 
present is an important one for Jamaica as it has witnessed the elimination of 
many of the preferential agreements that it had relied on. 
 
Economic Development as the Foundation of Jamaica’s Foreign Policy 
 
In chapter 1, it was noted that small states tend to have a foreign policy 
geared towards attaining economic development. The brief outline of Jamaica’s 
foreign policy history suggests that this bias is also evident in the Jamaican case. 
The foreign policies used to attain this goal of economic development have varied 
over time, but it has always been the underlying goal of the government. 
                                                 
244 Payne and Sutton, Modern Caribbean Politics, 203. 
 194 
  
Table 16 below incorporates the development stance of the various 
government administrations with the foreign policies pursued. This table therefore 
serves as a summary of Jamaica’s foreign policy history as it pertains to economic 
development. 
 
 
Table 16. Jamaica’s Development-Foreign Policy Nexus 
PERIOD DEVELOPMENT POLICY FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 
(VIS-À-VIS ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT) 
1962-1972 FDI facilitation • Alignment with the West 
• FDI attraction 
1972-1980 Self-reliance and Distributive 
Justice 
• Attempts to challenge the 
existing international 
economic order 
• Enhancement of relations 
with non-Western states (for 
example, Cuba and China) 
1980-1989 State-directed Development • Realignment with the West 
• Negotiation of the CBI 
1989-present Neoliberal Reforms • Lobbying to prevent the loss 
of preferences 
• Engaging with new States 
o China 
o Venezuela 
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PERIOD DEVELOPMENT POLICY FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 
(VIS-À-VIS ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT) 
o Brazil 
 
Adapted from Diana Thorburn and Dana Morris, “Jamaica’s Foreign Policy: 
Making the Economic Development Link,” CaPRI Working Paper (2007). 
 
As noted in chapter 2, across the Caribbean the economic development 
framework in the 1960s was one of FDI facilitation, which was aimed at 
diversifying the economies away from the agricultural sector. In Barbados, 
Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago plans were made to establish 
manufacturing industries that would facilitate this diversification. Because of the 
shortage of domestic capital, an important aspect of achieving diversification was 
through the attraction of FDI. As depicted in Table 16, the domestic goal of 
diversification of local economies was directly linked to the foreign policy goals 
of attracting foreign investors. The ‘We’re with the West’ declaration also 
indicated that potential investors need not worry about their investments in 
Jamaica, as the leaders were declaring their support for capitalism. 
 
 The 1972-1980 period as noted earlier, was a period of social change 
wherein the Manley government embarked on a program of self-reliance and 
distributive justice that was consistent with the ideals of democratic socialism.  
The broad economic objectives were an expansion in social programs and 
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ultimately a decline in the existing income inequality. The foreign policy direction 
of this period was therefore understandably one of closer relations with other 
Southern countries such as Cuba, and participation in the NIEO movement. All 
these actions resulted in a decrease in investor confidence as the government 
sought to reject some of the tenets of capitalism. 
 
The 1980s saw a less explicit socialist policy, but social transformation 
remained at the heart of the Seaga administration. Seaga’s main goal was the 
restoration of investor confidence and as such, he worked to realign the country 
with the US and Western Europe. This realignment was seen in his leading the 
negotiations for the Caribbean Basin Initiative. 
 
Since 1989, the Jamaican government has embarked on a program of 
neoliberal reforms primarily as a result of the conditions of loans from the IMF, 
World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). These included the 
privatization of state entities and the decline of social programs. It is also during 
this period that Jamaica, like Dominic and Grenada, saw the decline of 
preferential access to the European markets. Jamaica exports mainly sugar and 
bananas under the Lomé Agreement and given the loss of these markets the 
foreign policy stance has been geared towards finding new markets, and this 
process to a large extent entails establishing relationships with new state actors. 
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The intensification of the relationship with China is in large part due to the 
changing nature of the international economic order where Jamaica cannot rely on 
preferential treatment. The official unemployment rate in Jamaica is 10.9 percent 
(see Table 6) and economic growth has been stagnant over the past 15 years. 
Given the need to identify new markets and to get out of the economic slump, 
Jamaica has embarked on a foreign policy that is aimed at attracting new investors 
to the country through increased contact with the governments such as China and 
Venezuela. Jamaica, like Dominica and Grenada, is also in a process of economic 
adjustment, and is using its deepened relationship with China to assist in attaining 
adjustment. The next section will examine the relationship between Jamaica and 
China in more detail. 
 
 
A Brief Overview of Jamaica’s Modern Relations with China 
 
1970s and 1980s 
On November 21, 1972 Jamaica established diplomatic relations with 
China. This move had little to do with the rapprochement between the United 
States and China as seen in the Nixon visit to China, or with the fact that China 
was socialist. It was simply the decision of Michael Manley, who argued that it 
was imperative that he independently determine Jamaica’s international partners, 
and the decision was therefore a part of the general challenge of the West as seen 
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in his government’s active role in the NAM. Recall that in chapter 1 it was noted 
that 1972 is the date selected because it is really the time that China gains its seat 
in the UN and the Caribbean states start defining their own independent foreign 
policies away from those prescribed prior to decolonization. Table 17 below 
highlights some of the important agreements signed between the Jamaican and 
Chinese governments. 
 
 
Table 17. Jamaica’s Relations with China, 1972-present 
DATE EVENTS 
November 21, 1972 Jamaica recognizes China 
September 1976 First official Jamaican visit to China 
1990 Construction of the Cotton Polyester 
Mill  
1991 Michael Manley visits China 
October 1999 Agreement signed between Jamaica and 
China re the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation 
February 2004 China agrees to build the Trelawny 
Cricket Stadium 
February 2005 China contracts to rehabilitate the water 
system in Jamaica 
 199 
DATE EVENTS 
February 2005 Jamaica granted Approved Destination 
Status 
June 2005 China commits to assisting Jamaica in 
the rehabilitation of the railway system 
December 2005 China agrees to build the Sligoville 
Stadium 
 
 
The first official delegation to China was sent in September 1976. The 
major outcome of the visit was the Chinese government’s donation of 5,000 tons 
of rice. Jamaica was not experiencing a shortage of rice at that time, but this was 
the only form of aid that China could afford at that time. Despite, Jamaica’s Third 
World activism during the period, there were only a few other official visits 
during this decade. This is consistent with the discussion of China’s Third World 
policy presented in chapter 3. In the 1970s, not only was China limited in terms of 
the lack of diplomatic resources available to use in its Third World diplomacy, but 
also China was also more concerned about its own domestic economic 
development. 
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1980s 
Contacts between Jamaica and China during the 1980s were also limited 
with only Hugh Shearer (former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs) 
leading a delegation to China in 1985. As noted earlier, Edward Seaga, a 
seemingly neoliberal who was quite close to Ronald Reagan was elected Prime 
minister in 1980 and campaigned on a platform declaring an end to the misguided 
socialist policies of Manley and a move to more sound liberal principles. Seaga 
did not, however, switch recognition from China to Taiwan as by that time China 
had solidified its international standing and there was nothing to be gained from 
switching back to Taiwan. 
 
1990s and Beyond 
It is not until the 1990s that government-to-government contacts between 
Jamaica and China become significant. During the 1990s the first joint venture 
between China and Jamaica was the launching of the Polyester Cotton Mill in 
1990. In 1991 Michael Manley (who had been re-elected Prime Minister in 1989) 
became the first Prime Minister to visit China. During this visit the Chinese 
government provided a donation of general goods to the Jamaican people. There 
were also numerous other high-level visits with even Edward Seaga (the leader of 
the opposition party at that time) visiting in 1996. In 1998 the Vice-Premier of 
China visited Jamaica and signed an agreement for the first grant from the 
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Chinese government to Jamaica and in that same year PJ Patterson visited China 
and signed a preferential loan agreement.245 
 
It is in the new century that Jamaica’s relations with China mushrooms. 
China’s economic growth allowed China the opportunity to significantly increase 
its offering of loans, foreign direct investment, and other aid. Since the year 2000, 
China has granted numerous loans to the Jamaican government. These include 
loans for importing container cranes, expansion of Jamaica’s bauxite mining 
capacity, rehabilitating the railway system, building two new stadiums, the 
provision of audiovisual equipment to the National Archives, and the construction 
of a parking complex at the University of the West Indies, among others. 
 
One of the more controversial aspects of the relationship with China was 
the decision of the Jamaican government to open an embassy in Beijing. The 
Chinese government opened its embassy in Jamaica in 1973, but the Jamaican 
government, lacking diplomatic resources, chose not to open an independent 
embassy at that time, opting instead to have the Ambassador to Japan act as its 
diplomatic representative in China. As China’s international role expanded and 
China’s interest in the Caribbean became obvious it was deemed necessary to 
open an embassy in China. However, the same problem of a lack of resources 
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obtained and the government decided that it would eventually open an embassy, 
but not immediately.  
 
This conundrum was solved by China, with the Chinese government 
offering to provide a building for the Jamaican embassy to be set up in China at 
no cost to the Jamaican government. In addition, the government would not need 
to pay any utility bills and the Chinese government would also provide some of 
the necessary staff. The only thing that the Jamaican government had to provide 
was an Ambassador. On July 18, 2005 Jamaica opened its Chinese-financed 
embassy with Wayne McCook as the Ambassador. 
 
The opposition Jamaica Labor Party objected to this three year rent free 
embassy, as they viewed it as representing some loss of Jamaican sovereignty as 
the government was essentially transferring some of its international diplomatic 
responsibility to China. In fact, Bruce Golding (the leader of the opposition party 
at that time) declared the arrangement to be “an unacceptable national 
embarrassment.”246 This view also outraged many other citizens, but the 
government insisted that it was the economically expedient thing to do. In fact, 
the government pointed out that China had established similar arrangements with 
other countries including South Africa. 
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This brief discussion of Jamaica’s relationship with China is consistent 
with that presented in chapter 3. China’s use of its “soft power” and yuan 
diplomacy really only start in the late 1990s. The intensified relationship is 
motivated on the Jamaican side by the need for economic restructuring, 
developmental assistance and the search for new markets. As noted earlier, 
Jamaica is the only Caribbean state that has a trade surplus with China and this 
has been consistently the case since 2003. The next section will briefly examine 
the importance of a natural resource in the Caribbean’s relations with China. 
 
The Bauxite Trade 
As noted earlier, Jamaica represents one of the few resource-rich countries 
in the Caribbean. Chapter 3 pointed out that Jamaica is the 8th largest producer of 
bauxite and the 7th largest exporter of the commodity in the world, and China is 
especially interested in accessing Jamaica’s bauxite. Jamaica has been exporting 
bauxite to China since the 1990s, but the level of exports has increased 
significantly since 2000. On June 20, 2005 an agreement was signed between the 
Chinese government, Jamaica Bauxite Institute, Jamaica Bauxite Mining Limited 
and China Minmetals Corporation aimed at the establishment of a bauxite refinery 
in Jamaica that is projected to produce 1.4 million tons of bauxite per year. 
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Given that Jamaica does have a resource that is of interest to China, it is 
expected that the trade statistics would be much better than those seen in 
Dominica and Grenada. Recall that Dominica did not export anything to China 
and between 2001 and 2006 Grenada exported only US$344 worth of fruits and 
vegetables to China in 2002. Jamaica on the other hand, has a trade surplus with 
China. As shown in Table 18 below, this surplus has been expanding since 2003. 
The major export to China is bauxite, but Jamaica also exports coffee and tobacco 
to China. 
 
Table 18. Jamaica’s Trade with China 
Year Value of Imports from 
China (EC$) 
Value of Exports to China 
(EC$) 
2001 167,975,515 94,158,658 
2002 163,322,004 117,014,450 
2003 224,642,205 260,519,913 
2004 311,606,490 448,659,180 
2005 382,735,277 289,996,490 
2006 557,974,545 811,190,131 
Source: CARICOM Statistical Database 
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Like Dominica and Grenada, the main imports from China to Jamaica are 
manufactured products, textile and fabrics, iron and steel, apparel and clothing 
accessories, and footwear.  
 
It should be noted at this point that there does exist a local clothing 
industry, but members of the industry argue that the influx of cheap Chinese 
products has undermined the development of the industry.247 The products 
imported from China are much cheaper than those produced in Jamaica, primarily 
due to the reality that labor costs in China are significantly lower than those in 
Jamaica. As will be shown below, these considerations are not debated prior to 
embarking on a closer trading relationship with China and form the foundation of 
the disadvantages seen in Jamaica’s closer relations with China. 
 
 
The Net Benefits Accruing from Jamaica’s Relationship with China 
 
Whenever China provides a loan for use on a particular project it 
invariably results in the contracting of a Chinese and the contractor often imports 
Chinese laborers to the Caribbean. Chapter 6 will discuss the implicit conditions 
of Chinese loans in more detail, but it is worth noting at this point that there have 
been some expressions of dissatisfaction with the importation of Chinese laborers.  
                                                 
247 Interview conducted with a clothing manufacturer in Jamaica. 
 206 
 
Jamaica, like Dominica and Grenada, obtained a loan from China for the 
construction of a cricket stadium for the World Cup. Jamaica already had a cricket 
stadium in Kingston, but the government decided to build another stadium in 
Trelawny (referred to as the Greenfield Stadium) to host both the opening 
ceremony of the Cricket World Cup and some practice matches.  
 
While the Greenfield Stadium was under construction in Jamaica, there 
was actually one demonstration that was orchestrated by Jamaican workers on the 
construction site. The Jamaican workers were protesting what they perceived to 
be an influx of too many Chinese workers.248 Several Chinese laborers were seen 
working on the project without any notice given to the local workers or any 
indications given to the wider public that they were short of the requisite number 
of construction workers. The project manager, however, argued that the workers 
were only brought in when work fell behind schedule.249 The workers eventually 
returned to work and there were no further protests, but this situation again points 
to the reality that Chinese laborers are often imported to work on Chinese-
financed projects. The building of the Sligoville Stadium in Jamaica would again 
uncover other problems associated with Chinese loans. 
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The Role of Political Considerations in the Building of the Sligoville Stadium 
In 2003 the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, K. D. Knight, 
approached the Chinese with the idea to build a stadium in Sligoville, Jamaica. 
Sligoville is a rural area that is largely underdeveloped. The Minister argued that a 
multi-sport facility would boost employment in the area and would provide a 
livelihood for the residents. The only problem was that Sligoville was a part of the 
Minister’s constituency and it could easily have been read as political 
maneuvering. Recall that the Chinese government had just provided a loan to 
Jamaica for the construction of the Greenfield Cricket Stadium in Trelawny. This 
stadium was built solely for the purposes of the Cricket World Cup and since its 
use in the event it has stood idle. In addition, there was already a National 
Stadium facility in Kingston and smaller sporting facilities dispersed across the 
island. The building of another stadium was therefore not a pressing 
developmental priority. 
 
 In addition to the dubious developmental potential of building another 
stadium was the fact that this project was not debated in the Parliament. The 
building of the stadium did proceed and was completed in June 2007, but nine 
months after completion Chinese officials publicly expressed dismay at the fact 
that the stadium had not been used. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, when 
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asked about whether or not the project was a white elephant, responded, “You 
can’t move it. It is there, and that milk is spilt if you think so.”250 
 
 This issue again highlights the fact that the existing political system 
thwarts transparency and debate of agreements prior to their implementation. The 
Sligoville stadium was built in a remote, hilly area that is not easily accessed. In 
fact, there were many other more populous areas where a stadium could be more 
useful. In fact, one resident of Sligoville argued that the money would have been 
better spent on a skills-training centre.251 
 
Both the Sligoville stadium and the Trelawny stadiums were financed with 
Chinese loans with interest rates of 3 percent. This interest rate is quite 
reasonable,252 but the questions raised by the opposition relating to the efficacy of 
building stadiums that would not be used is valid and these questions are never 
raised or answered prior to the start of building because of the lack of 
transparency fostered by the existing Westminster political model. 
 
The rise of China as an important economic partner provides a window 
into the political economy of small states such as Jamaica. The Chinese loans and 
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16.9 percent on treasury bills issued. 
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aid are seen as crucial for the continued development of Jamaica. One high-level 
official at the Ministry of Finance noted that the only real foreign government 
investors in Jamaica are China and Venezuela. In numerous interviews across 
various sectors (namely the manufacturing and construction sectors) of the 
country there is admiration for the Chinese investments and there is very little 
discussion of the potential pitfalls or conditionalities attached to Chinese loans. 
 
The Jamaican relationship with China, in addition to being much longer in 
duration than Dominica and Grenada, points to the fact that where natural 
resources exist China will have a more intensive policy of engagement. China has 
expressed its interest in Jamaican bauxite and is working to exploit these 
resources, but China is also investing in numerous areas such as irrigation 
systems, the railway system and other construction projects.  
 
While Jamaica does engage in a policy of voting with China in 
international bodies, it is less dependent on this aspect of the relationship. The 
sale of bauxite to China is much more important than the sale of votes or 
recognition. It is also important to note that Jamaica has a consistent policy of 
recognizing China, and its decision to recognize China in 1972 has not changed 
since that time. This consistency can be partially explained by the lack of a 
reliance on the trade of sovereign resources as Jamaica has a more diversified 
resource base than Dominica and Grenada.  
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Jamaica’s foreign policy is not solely based on economic gains. As 
highlighted in the decision to recognize China in 1972, Jamaica’s foreign policy is 
also prestige and ideologically based. Government officials routinely argue that 
the relationship is not solely about economic gains, but it is also about principle, 
and Jamaica is unwilling to engage in the policy of switching recognition between 
Taiwan and China simply for economic gains.253 
 
This chapter has demonstrated, however, that despite the underlying 
prestige and ideological foundations of Jamaica’s foreign policy, the primary 
motivation has always been an economic one. In the 1970s, as Jamaica pursued 
the most ideologically-based foreign policy seen in its history, the economic 
motivation was still the most dominant motivator for the country’s foreign policy. 
This is also true for Jamaica’s relationship with China. The goal of the Jamaican 
government is to export as much bauxite to China while facilitating Chinese 
investments into the country. 
 
Returning to the motivations matrix presented in chapter 3, Jamaica has 
the most complex relationship with China. Table 19 below depicts a modified 
motivations matrix for Jamaica. In addition to the goals of aid and foreign 
investment and infrastructure development, Jamaica’s relations with China are 
                                                 
253 Interviews conducted with government officials in the Foreign and Finance Ministries. 
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also guided by a search for prestige especially in relation to it being regarded as 
an important player and voice in the Third World and in multilateral bodies. In 
terms of the price of this relationship, Jamaica in addition to opening up trade and 
voting with China in international bodies, also sells its bauxite to China. This 
relationship is therefore more elaborate than that seen in Dominica and Grenada. 
 
Table 19. Modified Motivations Matrix for Jamaica 
 MOTIVATIONS OF 
JAMAICA VIS-À-VIS CHINA 
PRICE 
√   Aid and Foreign investment 
√   Infrastructure Development 
√    Prestige 
o Tourism Revenue 
√   Votes in international for a 
√   Trade opening 
√ Recognition of ‘One China 
Policy’ 
√   Sale of Natural Resources to 
China 
 
 
The next chapter will use the case studies presented to examine the 
research questions and hypotheses posed in chapter 1. The theoretical 
implications of the three case studies will also be discussed in detail. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CARIBBEAN’S 
RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA FOR THE STUDY OF SMALL STATE 
FOREIGN POLICIES 
 
The discussions of Dominica, Grenada and Jamaica yielded some useful 
information about not only their relationship with China, but also the nature of 
small state behavior. This chapter will return to the four research questions posed 
in chapter 1: 
a. Why is there variation in the strategies employed by different Caribbean states 
vis-à-vis China?  
b. What motives China’s interest in the Caribbean? 
c. Why do Caribbean states engage with China when doing so does not yield 
unambiguous economic benefits? 
d. What are the implications of the Caribbean’s strategy towards China for the 
study of small states in international relations?  
 
This chapter will be organized around answering these four research 
questions based on the information garnered from the three case studies. The three 
hypotheses presented in chapter 1 will also be examined. These were: 
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1. If a state has natural resources that are of strategic importance to China, then it 
will have a consistent foreign policy vis-à-vis China; 
2. If a state has no natural resources that are of strategic importance to China, then 
their foreign policy vis-à-vis China will be inconsistent; and 
3. If a state has no natural resources that are of strategic importance to China, then 
they will creatively sell rights accorded by sovereignty. 
 
Chapter Outline 
The chapter will begin with the first research question: Why is there 
variation in the strategies employed by different Caribbean states vis-à-vis China? 
The discussion will show that the case studies demonstrate that resource 
endowment is the key variable explaining this variation in policy towards China. 
in view of this, it will therefore be argued that the three cases studies presented do 
in fact accept the main hypotheses presented at the start of the study. 
 
The discussion will then move to the second research question: What 
motives China’s interest in the Caribbean? It will again be demonstrated that there 
are three motivations driving China’s interest in the region. These are economics, 
recognition, and prestige. It will also be argued that China’s actions in the 
Caribbean are consistent with their general policy towards the Third World. 
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Why do Caribbean states engage with China when doing so does not yield 
unambiguous economic benefits? This chapter will pull from the evidence 
presented in the case studies and will again show that the answer to this third 
research question is primarily the nature of the Westminster political systems in 
the Caribbean. This is, however, not the sole reason for signing these less than 
positive agreements. The chapter will also discuss other factors such as the fact 
that China often does not follow through on its promises and as such Caribbean 
states expected to receive more aid than they in fact obtained. Another reason for 
signing these agreements with China relate to the time inconsistency problem 
wherein politicians are more concerned with the short term goal of attracting aid 
and capital flows and are less interested in the long run consequences of their 
decisions. 
 
The fourth research question will dominate the rest of the chapter. What 
are the implications of the Caribbean’s strategy towards China for the study of 
small states in international relations? This dissertation had one primary thing in 
this area, and that was to show that small state foreign policy behavior cannot be 
solely understood by focusing on system level explanations. This dissertation has 
shown that in the three case studies the domestic and individual levels were more 
important determinants of the foreign policy direction of these Caribbean states. 
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The chapter closes with a brief analysis of alternative explanations for the 
Caribbean’s foreign policy towards China. It will be shown that explanations of 
balancing and bandwagoning do not really fit this analysis. In addition, analyses 
that focus on the attainment of economic power are problematic and do not 
readily fit the Caribbean scenario that is presented. The dissertation concludes that 
the Caribbean’s embrace of China and their divergent policy towards China is 
therefore mainly about the need for economic adjustment. 
 
Question 1: Why is there variation in the strategies employed by different 
Caribbean states vis-à-vis China? 
 
Resource Endowment and Caribbean Foreign Policy vis-à-vis China 
One of the primary arguments in this thesis revolves around the use of 
sovereignty for economic gain. It should be noted that for the purposes of this 
dissertation sovereignty is conceptualized as a resource endowment.  As 
highlighted in chapter 4, both Grenada and Dominica prior to their recent 
engagement with China had used sovereignty as a means of attaining economic 
adjustment. This is primarily seen in their establishment of offshore financial 
centers that were characterized by low tax rates and secrecy. In addition, 
Dominica’s use of sovereignty was even more overt in their institution of a very 
unique strategy of selling economic citizenship to foreign nationals. 
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As demonstrated by Palan,254 these strategies have been seen primarily in 
the microstates with populations well under one million. This may indicate that 
these are the states more prone to using this strategy given their lack of other 
natural resources. This reality is borne out across the Caribbean. The three states 
that have not tried establishing offshore financial centers are Guyana, Jamaica, 
and Trinidad and Tobago. These are in fact the three most resource rich countries 
of the English-speaking Caribbean. Guyana has vast quantities of timber and fish, 
Jamaica has bauxite, and Trinidad has oil and these resources are demanded by 
China and other large states. 
 
The smaller Eastern Caribbean countries are not endowed with any of 
these more attractive and strategic natural resources. It is therefore this lack of 
natural resources that leads smaller states in the Caribbean to be more creative. As 
noted before, this creative use of sovereignty includes the sale of economic 
citizenship and flags of convenience, and the setting up of offshore financial 
centers. This thesis argues that the creative use of sovereignty witnessed since the 
1990s is therefore a direct function of both the lack of other natural resources and 
the loss of trade preferences. In Dominica and Grenada’s current interactions with 
China, the creative use of sovereignty entails the selling of votes and recognition 
as we have seen in chapter 4. 
                                                 
254 Palan, The Offshore World: Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places, and Nomad 
Millionaires. 
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It should be highlighted that this creative use of sovereignty is not 
unanimously supported across the Caribbean. In many instances citizens in states 
without strategic natural resources have complained about this sale of 
sovereignty. High-level officials across the Caribbean have also expressed some 
concern about this strategy. Owen Arthur, the Prime Minister of Barbados, echoes 
much of this sentiment when he accused Caribbean states that recognized Taiwan 
of being,  
Countries that have been making themselves available to be purchased 
lock, stock and barrel. There are some countries that have no pride in 
policy and they are waiting there to be taken to by the highest bidder.255 
 
The fact is, however, that this strategy has been providing much needed 
aid and investment, despite the fact that the long-run net benefits may be small. In 
the absence of alternatives, it is quite possible that this activity will continue 
especially in the smaller Caribbean states that are desperately trying to find an 
avenue for achieving economic adjustment. 
 
Chapter 5 highlighted the Jamaican experience with China and one of the 
conclusions of that discussion was that the creative use of sovereignty was not as 
important in their context. Jamaica does indeed vote with China on various 
initiatives and does recognize China, but these are not the primary bases for 
                                                 
255 Cited in, "Taiwan Meddling in Bajan Polls - Arthur." 
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increased engagement with China. In fact, as it pertains to recognition, Jamaica 
recognized China in 1972 when there were no economic benefits to be gained by 
doing so and Jamaica has remained consistent in its recognition of China. 
 
 The reason for the reduced emphasis placed on the creative use of 
sovereignty in the Jamaican context is the fact the country has natural resources 
that are of interest to China. Jamaica exports its bauxite and coffee to China and 
the country has been engaged in the expansion of the manufacturing and tourism 
sectors of the economy for export to other states. This wider resource base means 
that it is less dependent on the sale of its sovereign resources. 
 
This, however, does not mean that Jamaica does not in any way trade its 
sovereign resources. The policy of supporting China in international bodies is 
inextricably linked to Chinese aid and investment. The voting position of Jamaica 
is therefore influenced by China’s aid. This is, however, not the sole resource that 
Jamaica trades with China as Jamaica does export significant quantities of bauxite 
to China. 
 
Tables 20 and 21 below attempt to synthesize the major empirical findings 
emanating from this discussion vis-à-vis natural resource endowment and the 
creative use of sovereignty. Table 20 highlights the fact that all three countries 
have sovereignty as a resource desired by China, but Jamaica also has bauxite and 
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given its international activism and stature in CARICOM also has some 
international influence. It is this fact that leads to divergent foreign policies 
between Dominica, Grenada, and Jamaica. Jamaica’s stance on Chinese 
recognition has been consistent, but this has not been the case in Dominica and 
Grenada.  
 
Table 20. The Relationship between Resource Endowment and the Consistency of 
Foreign Policy towards China in the Caribbean 
Country Resource Endowment (of 
interest to China) 
Consistent Foreign 
Policy (vis-à-vis China) 
Dominica o Sovereignty (votes, 
recognition) 
NO 
Grenada o Sovereignty (votes, 
recognition) 
NO 
Jamaica o Sovereignty 
o Bauxite 
YES 
 
 
What this discussion suggests is that the creative use of sovereignty is a 
strategy for smaller resource scarce countries that previously used sovereignty 
creatively. This use of sovereignty for economic gain results in an inconsistent 
foreign policy vis-à-vis China, as these states, in their interactions with China, are 
more focused on short-term economic gains and not long-term strategic 
considerations. Table 20 below shows that the countries that are more dependent 
on their sovereignty are indeed the ones with limited strategic natural resources. 
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Table 21. The Relationship between Resource Endowment and the Creative Use 
of Sovereignty in the Caribbean 
Country Resource Endowment (of 
interest to China) 
Creative Use of 
Sovereignty 
Dominica o Sovereignty (votes 
and recognition) 
YES 
Grenada o Sovereignty (votes 
and recognition) 
YES 
Jamaica o Sovereignty 
o Bauxite 
In Some Cases 
 
The dissertation therefore demonstrated that the variation in strategies employed 
by Caribbean states vis-à-vis China is explained by their resource-endowment, 
and more specifically, the possession of resources that are of strategic importance 
to China. 
 
 
Question 2: What Motivates China’s Interest in the Caribbean? 
 
This dissertation focuses on the Caribbean states, but the analysis would 
be incomplete without an analysis of the Chinese motivations in the region. China 
has showed a renewed interest in developing countries around the world. This 
interest is often framed in relation to China’s quest for resources. This is indeed a 
primary motivation for China’s policies in the Middle East and Africa, as well as 
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Latin America. As was shown in chapter 3, this not a primary motivation for 
China in the Caribbean region. As highlighted throughout this dissertation, the 
Caribbean is quite an eclectic array of countries, comprising independent, semi-
independent and colonies of industrialized countries. Even in terms of the former 
British colonies, there are major differences in culture, political systems and 
natural resource endowments. With the exception of Guyana, the major resource 
similarity between Caribbean states is their sun, sand and beaches. Given the vast 
differences between Caribbean states, especially vis-à-vis natural resources, it is 
obvious that China’s interest in the region is motivated by factors other than the 
resource-search motivation. 
 
The dissertation demonstrated that China has a tripartite motivation for its 
presence in the Caribbean—economics, recognition and influence. The economics 
motivation is related to the search for resources and markets. China is interested 
in the minerals found in Jamaica and Guyana, and the oil and natural gas in 
Trinidad and Tobago. But more importantly, Chinese interests at the economic 
level relate to accessing the Caribbean markets as a destination for Chinese 
exports. As was demonstrated in chapter 3, this has proved successful as 
demonstrated by the increase in the import of Chinese goods and the subsequent 
widening trade surplus that China has with the Caribbean. Recognition, for the 
purposes of this paper, is defined as support for China in its “One China Policy,” 
and it was shown that this policy is one of the primary drivers of China’s relations 
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with the Caribbean. The third motivation, and one of the leading determinants of 
Chinese Third World policy, relates to Chinese Influence. I conceptualized this 
variable as a two-fold goal—the signaling of China’s rise and support for the 
China agenda in multilateral forums. 
 
 China’s actions in the Caribbean are consistent with China’s general 
modus operandi with respect to aid in developing countries wherein China 
employs diplomatic strategies aimed at facilitating its economic and political rise. 
Third World leaders often see China as a benign power, but as was identified in 
the Caribbean case studies, and in Latin American and African context, China’s 
goal is solidly related to achieving its national interest, however defined. China’s 
aim is therefore its economic development and not necessarily the development of 
these developing countries. 
 
Hu Jintao’s multi-country visit to Latin America in 2005 was met with 
much enthusiasm and publicity. At every stop Hu signed various economic aid 
agreements and agreements for various investment projects. But the lingering 
question on the mind of pundits was, how much of the promises would really 
materialize? Miguel Broda of the Estudio Broda think tank highlights an 
important, yet often overlooked point, 
The ultimate loans are unlikely to take the form of direct capital outlays by 
Chinese companies…[i]nstead, China may offer a ‘tied loan’, at very low 
interest rates, for projects whose execution is then assigned to Chinese 
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state enterprises. Some way would have to be found to bypass an 
Argentinean law that mandates open bidding for state contracts.”256 
 
Peter Hakim shows that after Hu’s visit to Argentina and Brazil in 
November 2004, both countries anticipated significant increases in investments 
from China. But officials in both countries indicated that these expected 
investments had not materialized.257 
 
In addition to a lack of actual investment projects in Latin America, those 
that are embarked upon are characterized by an influx of Chinese workers after an 
agreement has been signed for a particular project. The Chinese project managers 
prefer to import workers rather than to access the available pool of domestic 
workers.258 
 
Kurlantzick argues that China employs a “maxi-mini” strategy as it relates 
to its provision of aid.259 In a quite rational manner, China aims to get the 
maximum return for the minimum cost. Furthermore, China often opts to provide 
aid for high-profile projects such as stadiums or parliamentary buildings. This was 
                                                 
256 "Magic or Realism?," The Economist, December 29, 2004. 
 
257 Peter Hakim, "Is Washington Losing Latin America?," Foreign Affairs 85, no. 1 
(2006). 
 
258 Dreyer, "From China with Love: P.R.C. Overtures in Latin America." 
 
259 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World. 
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mirrored in the Caribbean. The major contribution that China has made to the 
Caribbean relates to the building of stadiums that are less costly than 
infrastructure projects such as roads and schools. Relatively little funds have been 
provided for infrastructural development or assistance in the provision of health 
or educational services as promised in the agreements signed with Dominica, 
Grenada and Jamaica. The next section will more closely examine why Caribbean 
states have sought closer engagement with China when the net benefits are so 
limited. 
 
 
Question 3: Why do Caribbean states engage with China when doing so does 
not yield unambiguous economic benefits? 
 
The three case studies showed that the net benefits accruing from the three 
states’ interaction with China may in fact be quite low. Table 22 below presents 
the expected benefits from the increased engagement with China and also 
highlights the actual costs that have been associated with the Caribbean’s 
relationship with China. 
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Table 22. The Costs and Benefits Associated With the Caribbean’s Relationship 
with China 
EXPECTED BENEFITS ACTUAL COSTS 
Lack of Explicit Neoliberal 
Conditionalities 
Inflow of Chinese Laborers 
Speedy Pay-out of Chinese Aid Widening Trade Deficit with China 
Labor Absorption  
Infrastructural Development  
  
The Expected Benefits Associated with Chinese Aid 
The benefits of an intensified relationship with China, as articulated by the 
interviewees across the three states, were similar. Four key benefits were 
highlighted: a lack of conditionalities; speedy pay-out of Chinese aid; labor 
absorption; and infrastructure development.260 I will briefly discuss each point. 
 
Lack of Explicit Conditionalities 
In relation to the lack of explicit neoliberal conditions, the argument made 
is that Chinese aid lacks the traditional conditionalities attached to World Bank 
and IMF loans. This dissertation will, however, argue later in this chapter that the 
                                                 
260 Other benefits were put forward by the interviewees, but the four that are highlighted 
here are the ones that were consistently provided by almost all the interviewees in 
Dominica, Grenada, and Jamaica. 
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lack of conditionalities is really a lack of traditional neoliberal conditionalities 
and does not imply a lack of all conditionalities.  
 
Taylor argues that after the civil war in Angola, the Angolan government 
started negotiating a loan with the IMF aimed at placing Angola back on track for 
economic growth and development.261 The IMF insisted on the inclusion of 
transparency and good governance clauses that were aimed at stemming the 
rampant corruption existing in the Luande government. The Angolan government, 
however, decided to suspend its negotiations with the IMF after receiving a $2 
billion loan from the EXIM Bank of China.262 The Chinese loans ostensibly lack 
the onerous conditionalities of the IMF and World Bank. This scenario is also 
witnessed in the Caribbean as there are no conditionality clauses attached to 
agreements signed between Chinese and Caribbean government officials. 
 
 
Speedy Pay-out of Chinese Aid 
Another advantage of Chinese aid is also that the Chinese government 
starts construction or pays over funds to the government in a very short period of 
time. For example, Stephen Marks argues that one positive outcome of China’s 
explicit omission of conditions is that it can “move faster to produce visible 
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results on the ground.”263 Recall that in Dominica, work on the cricket stadium 
began only 90 days after the signing of the agreement with China. This lack of 
institutional bureaucracy is a far cry from what obtains with loans from 
multilateral agencies such as the IMF and World Bank as there is very little 
bureaucracy and explicit conditionalities to overcome in China’s case. 
 
Labor Absorption 
As China promises to invest more into these countries, the expected 
outcome is one of labor absorption wherein the new infrastructural projects would 
necessitate the employment of workers (both skilled and unskilled) in the 
production or building process. In the three case studies there was in fact 
significant employment of Caribbean nationals in the construction of cricket 
stadiums and roads, but as will be discussed later in this chapter, the labor 
absorptive potential of Chinese-funded projects was thwarted as there was an 
influx of Chinese workers employed on these sites. 
 
Infrastructure Development 
The final benefit that was discussed by interviewees in all three states 
related to China’s commitment to assist in infrastructural development especially 
vis-à-vis the building of roads, hospitals, and schools. China has made 
                                                 
263 Stephen Marks, "Introduction," in African Perspectives on China in Africa, ed. Firoze 
Manji and Stephen Marks (Nairobi: Fahamu, 2007). 
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commitments to these states, but these projects have been few. If China does 
honor its commitment then the Caribbean will be in a better position both 
economically and socially. The fact is, however, that as with the other three 
benefits, this benefit has not really accrued as China has made commitments that 
it has failed to follow through on. 
 
 
The Actual Costs Associated with Chinese Aid 
Inflow of Chinese Laborers 
One of the primary criticisms of China in Africa relates to Chinese firms 
importing Chinese laborers. Despite the more favorable agreement, Taylor further 
points out that this Chinese loan angered many members of the business 
community in Angola as one condition of the loan was that only 30 percent of the 
work would be contracted to Angolan firms. The other 70 percent would go to 
Chinese firms.264 This reality is mirrored across Africa and indeed, across the 
Caribbean as we have seen in the discussion of Dominica, Grenada, and Jamaica. 
 
While there are no explicit 30-70 provisions, the Chinese companies 
awarded contracts in the Caribbean region have in all instances imported a high 
percentage of Chinese laborers.265 In the case of the cricket stadiums in Jamaica, 
                                                 
264 Taylor, "Unpacking China's Resource Diplomacy in Africa." 
 
265 Interviews conducted with Jamaican and Dominican officials. 
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an Israeli company was hired along with the Chinese company to build the 
Trelawny stadium and to refurbish the stadium in Kingston.266 Both companies 
imported workers and as a result, the employment-creating potential of these 
projects were thwarted. 
 
The unemployment rate in Jamaica is 10.9 percent, in Dominica it is 23 
percent, and in Grenada it is 12.5 percent (see Table 6 in chapter 2). These 
countries are therefore not short of unskilled construction workers. In fact, in 
Jamaica construction workers are encouraged to seek work abroad due to the 
surplus of these workers. As noted in chapter 5, there was one protest involving 
Jamaican construction workers expressing their displeasure at the influx of 
Chinese workers and in both Dominica and Grenada, there was public outrage 
expressed in the press at the use of imported Chinese laborers. 
 
In the Caribbean context, the major explicit conditionalities seen in 
relation to Chinese loan agreements relate to the awarding of contracts to Chinese 
companies and the importation of Chinese laborers. These two realities are, 
                                                                                                                                     
 
266 Interview with a member of the Kingston Cricket Club. This individual reported 
visiting the Sabina Park cricket stadium while it was under renovation and he saw the 
Israelis in hardhats and the Chinese in straw hats working side by side to build a stadium 
for a game that neither country played. There are no official statistics available on the 
number of foreign laborers working on the construction of cricket stadiums across the 
Caribbean. 
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however, compounded by the widening trade deficit between the Caribbean and 
China. 
 
The Caribbean’s Widening Trade Deficit with China 
Table 23 below highlights the value of imports from China and exports to 
China between 2001 and 2006. The statistics show that the Caribbean’s trade 
deficit with China is widening. As these states search for new markets after the 
loss of preferential access to the EU, China does not represent a real alternative. 
In fact, Jamaican exports of bauxite represent the majority of the exports to China. 
As noted in Chapter 4, Grenada and Dominica do not export any products to 
China, but the imports of Chinese goods is rising at an exponential rate each year. 
As shown in Table 23 below, the 2006 deficit represents an almost 270 percent 
increase from the deficit in 2001. 
 
Table 23. CARICOM-China Trade, 2001-2006 
Year US$ Value of Exports to 
China  
US$ Value of Imports 
from China 
Percentage Change 
in Trade Deficit 
from Previous 
Year 
2001 $36,351,201 $200,553,703 
 
 
-- 
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Year US$ Value of Exports to 
China  
US$ Value of Imports 
from China 
Percentage Change 
in Trade Deficit 
from Previous 
Year 
2002 $46,824,661 $205,162,059 
 
-3.6% 
2003 $101,341,039 $275,159,800 9.78% 
2004 $169,481,594 $367,764,280 14.07% 
2005 $116,964,490 $492,693,537 
 
89.49% 
2006 $321,964,490 $761,733,016 17% 
Source: CARICOM Secretariat Database 
 
 
Given that countries such as Dominica and Grenada do not have any 
resources that are of vital interest to China, the one area that would serve to close 
the trade deficit and contribute to improvements in trade performance would be 
tourism. One much discussed aspect of the China relationship with countries in 
the Caribbean relates to the granting of Approved Destination Status (ADS). 
Chinese tour groups must obtain government approval when traveling outside of 
China and as a result, are only allowed to conduct tours in countries that have 
been given ADS by the Chinese government. China agreed to grant all states in 
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the Caribbean that recognized the One China policy and argued that this would be 
economically beneficial to the Caribbean. 
 
Most Caribbean states are heavily reliant on their tourism sector. This is 
the case for all the countries under study. The large Chinese population is quite 
attractive to leaders of these Caribbean states as the Chinese market represents a 
potentially lucrative source of tourists as over 19 million Chinese tourists travel 
overseas annually.267 In fact, the Chinese government lists Approved Destination 
Status (ADS) as one of the primary advantages of supporting China and the 
governments across the Caribbean have bought into this thinking.  
 
The reality, however, is that this influx of tourists may not materialize. At 
present, the Caribbean is not a prime destination for Chinese tourists. In addition, 
the costs involved in traveling from China to the Caribbean are out of the reach of 
ordinary Chinese nationals. In order for the expected increase in tourist arrivals 
from China to accrue, China must continue on its current path of development so 
that an increased number of Chinese citizens are able to improve their standard of 
living and to therefore be able to afford Caribbean vacations. The commitment of 
more Chinese tourists is therefore highly contingent on the continued growth of 
the Chinese economy, a decrease in the cost and inconvenience of traveling from 
                                                 
267 Ingrid Brown, Jamaica Preparing for Chinese Visitors (Jamaica Information Service,  
2006 [cited April 10 2006]); available from 
http://www.jis.gov.jm/foreign_affairs/html/20060205T150000-
0500_7972_JIS_JAMAICA_PREPARING_FOR_CHINESE_VISITORS.asp. 
 233 
China to the Caribbean, and importantly, the successful marketing of the 
Caribbean to the Chinese populace. It is therefore clear that China’s granting of 
Approved Destination Status to the Caribbean will not reduce the Caribbean’s 
existing trade deficit with China.  
  
Why then do Caribbean states engage with China when doing so does not yield 
unambiguous benefits? 
 
One criticism often espoused in relation to Chinese projects in the 
Caribbean relates to the lack of transparency in the awarding of contracts and the 
terms of the agreements signed with the Chinese government and Chinese firms. 
In an interview with one executive member of the Chamber of Commerce in one 
of the countries under study, it was revealed that they do not really know the 
terms of the actual agreements signed between their government and the Chinese 
government. This sentiment was echoed in interviews conducted across the three 
Caribbean states. 
 
This would seem surprising in such small insular countries, but this lack of 
transparency has been a feature of the foreign policies of these small Caribbean 
states since decolonization. This lack of transparency is in large part a function of 
the prevailing political system. The Westminster system of government 
concentrates significant amounts of power into the hands of the ruling political 
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party and especially the Prime Minister,268 and this concentration of power results 
in non-transparent decision-making processes. 
 
The ability of the Prime Minister to control foreign policy has been 
demonstrated across the Caribbean and this is evident in this exploration of the 
Caribbean’s relations with China. Skerrit, the Dominican Prime Minister has been 
accused on numerous occasions of being too secretive. As discussed in chapter 4, 
the decision to switch recognition from Taiwan to China in 2004 was essentially 
made by one individual—the Prime Minister. There were no parliamentary 
discussions and no assessments made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Skerrit 
made the decision by himself and the members of his own government and the 
wider population had little power over the decision.  
 
In St. Lucia, after John Compton’s United Workers Party (UWP) indicated 
that they were considering switching recognition to China the opposition St. Lucia 
Labor Party tried to get the issue debated in parliament, but the ruling government 
refused to do so.269 Given the government’s control of the parliamentary agenda, 
the opposition party had no way of placing its concerns on the agenda. 
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 The details of recent loan agreements signed between Jamaica and China 
are also not publicly known. As noted in chapter 5, not only are the terms of 
agreements not debated, but also the projects embarked on are proving to be of 
limited benefit to the Jamaican people. The construction of the Sligoville and 
Trelawny stadiums, for example, highlight the fact that the loans are not being 
channeled to their most productive ends. The nature of the Westminster political 
system is therefore one important explanation for the Caribbean’s continued 
interaction with China despite the low net benefits. 
 
 There are, however, other possible explanations that also explain the 
Caribbean states’ seeming pursuit of bad deals with China. One possible 
alternative explanation relates to the fact that was previously highlighted that 
China often does not follow through on its promises. The Caribbean states 
therefore expect more benefits that actually accrue. This was seen in both 
Dominica and Grenada where promises of hospitals and schools did not 
materialize. 
 
 Another possible explanation for the signing of these less than promising 
agreements with China relates to a simple time inconsistency dilemma wherein 
politicians are more concerned about short-run gains and therefore pay scant 
regard to long run implications that may or may not materialize. Caribbean 
politicians, and politicians across the world, are often accused of being primarily 
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concerned with getting re-elected. As such, the short-run political interests of 
politicians do not necessarily coincide with the long-run interests of the country. 
This fact is expressly seen in the Caribbean context. The Jamaican example of the 
Sligoville stadium is one prime example of this. The agreement to build the 
stadium was primarily aimed at political ends and not the long-run economic 
development of Jamaica. 
 
Another reason for signing the less than favorable agreements with China 
is the fact that the Caribbean states have become so dependent on some form of 
external assistance, whether in the form of direct aid or preferential trade 
agreements. With the deterioration of both ODA and the general international 
trading environment, these states are desperate for some external entity to assist in 
their process of economic adjustment. China is in fact one of only a few countries 
that is willing to provide developmental assistance to these Caribbean states. It is 
therefore for this reason that these states do not scrutinize the agreements that 
they have signed with China. 
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Question 4: What are the implications of the Caribbean’s strategy towards 
China for the study of small states in international relations? 
 
Small States and the Levels of Analysis Question 
 What does the preceding discussion suggest for our general study of small 
states? Chapters 1 and 2 highlighted the fact that in the political economy 
literature, small states are often understudied and misunderstood. This discussion 
has so far pointed to two important features of small states. First, small states are 
not homogenous. The Caribbean cases highlight this fact quite convincingly as 
there is some variation in the foreign policy approach depending on the resource 
endowment of the small state. Second, this study has shown that economic goals 
are the main drivers of small state foreign policies. There is, however, a third 
important facet of the small state academic discourse that this dissertation points 
to, and that is the perennial levels of analysis question.270 
  
Small states have been analyzed at all three of the traditional levels of 
analysis—system, domestic and individual levels. It was pointed out in chapter 1 
that all three levels of analysis are useful in understanding Caribbean foreign 
policy. The case studies have also made this point clear.  
                                                 
270 For a detailed discussion of the levels of analysis question in international relations 
see, Singer, "The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations." Also see, Barry 
Buzan, "The Level of Analysis Problem Reconsidered in International Relations Theory," 
in International Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). 
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Analyses of small states at the system level focus on the extent to which 
the prevailing international system affects behavior. The argument is that small 
states because of their lack of power are more affected by systemic realities that 
are often outside of their control. Changes in the structure of the economic system 
have had direct effects on the economies of all the Caribbean states and this is 
precisely the rationale behind their need to adjust. This is also the root of the 
notion that the foreign polices of small states tend to be reactive in nature. 
Because of a lack of power and therefore lack of influence in the determination of 
rules and general power and economic configuration, small states can only adjust 
to the prevailing order because, for the most part, they cannot exercise control 
over their international reality.271 
 
The case studies in this dissertation also point to the importance of state 
level variables in explaining foreign policy behavior. In particular, this thesis 
highlights the dimension of the political system. The countries studied have all 
adopted the Westminster parliamentary style of government and this system leads 
                                                 
271 Small states at various points have actually pursued foreign policies based on trying to 
determine the international environment that they must work in. The Jamaican example 
discussed in Chapter 4 highlights one small country that has tried to alter the prevailing 
international system. This was the case for numerous small countries during the 1970s 
and calls for a new international economic order. In more recent years small states have 
moved towards more emphasis on niche diplomacy where they try to influence 
international discussions and action in a given issue area that directly affects them. For a 
more detailed discussion of niche diplomacy see, Andrew F. Cooper, Niche Diplomacy: 
Middle Powers after the Cold War (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1997). 
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to some interesting findings vis-à-vis foreign policy formulation. One of the major 
points highlighted was the lack of transparency in the decision-making process 
given the fact that the ruling political party had complete control over the 
legislative agenda. 
 
 The Prime Ministers in all three cases were integral to foreign policy 
decision-making. The only other individuals having any control over the process 
are members of the Cabinet who are also selected by the Prime Minister. This 
points to the importance of the individual level of analysis in studies of Caribbean 
foreign policy. But as might already be clear, the importance of the individual 
level of analysis really rests on the domestic level of analysis (the political system 
in this case). It is because the countries being studied adopted a Parliamentary 
system that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet wield such an inordinate amount 
of power in such systems. 
 
These case studies therefore indicate that all three levels of analysis give 
useful insight into Caribbean foreign policy decision-making and their current 
adjustment strategies. The system level is useful in explaining the constraints 
facing the Caribbean states. The constraints and need for adjustment come from 
the reorientation in the international trading system away from non-reciprocal 
preferences to one where reciprocity and non-discrimination predominate.  At the 
individual level, or level of the actual leaders, this study shows that leaders are 
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crucial in choosing the adjustment strategy to be pursued. The domestic level or 
the state level in this discussion related to the political system in the Caribbean. It 
was demonstrated that the domestic level (political system) allows us to 
understanding how decisions of leaders are translated into actual polices. This 
study therefore built on the framework of Katzenstein in employing a multi-level 
analysis of small state foreign policy behavior. 
 
 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
This dissertation has argued that the prime explanation for the Caribbean’s 
increased relationship with China is the need for economic adjustment. It was 
shown in chapter 2 that the Caribbean states have traditionally been dependent on 
both aid and non-reciprocal trade agreements with developed countries. With the 
decline in ODA and the loss of preferential access to the European market, 
Caribbean states are engaged in a process of economic adjustment and their 
foreign policy is a key tool used in this process. China should therefore be seen as 
simply one aspect of the Caribbean’s adjustment strategy. 
 
It should, however, be noted that the dissertation not only aimed to 
provide an explanation for the Caribbean’s increased engagement with China, but 
it also aimed to explain why we witness foreign policy variation across a 
seemingly homogenous set of countries. As noted in previous chapters, some 
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Caribbean states such as Barbados, Guyana and Jamaica have consistently 
recognized China, while others such as Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia have 
moved back and forth between recognition of Taiwan and China. 
 
The arguments presented in this dissertation can be challenged from 
several directions, but one possible challenge would be a realist one. Waltz argues 
that great powers balance and weak states bandwagon.272 The concepts of 
balancing—teaming up against a rising power and bandwagoning—jumping on 
the side of the rising power, are important concepts in international relations, but 
they do not fit neatly into this analysis. Realists see the increased relationship with 
China as merely the Caribbean states bandwagoning with the new rising power—
China.  
 
This explanation is somewhat valid as the Caribbean states are indeed 
looking for an alternative to the US’ hegemony in the region and this is seen in 
their current embrace of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and China. The search for an 
alternative hegemonic power is, however, not the prime motivator in the 
Caribbean case. In interviews conducted specifically with foreign service officials 
in the three case studies they consistently noted that their countries had not 
considered the implications of their intensified relationship with China for their 
current relationship with the US. They admitted that challenging the US’ 
                                                 
272 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
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hegemonic dominance in the region is one underlying motivator, but the primary 
goal especially in Dominica and Grenada was to get developmental assistance and 
not to challenge the US. 
 
The bandwagoning argument predicts a similar outcome as the 
explanation proffered in this dissertation. Both arguments would predict that 
Caribbean states would increasingly engage with China. The difference, however, 
is that the bandwagoning argument cannot really explain why some Caribbean 
states would choose to recognize Taiwan and not China. China is the rising 
superpower—not Taiwan. As noted before, some states in the Caribbean 
recognize Taiwan and many actually switch between recognizing China and 
recognizing Taiwan. The bandwagoning argument cannot explain why this 
foreign policy variation is seen. 
 
In a similar realist vein, critics could also argue that the argument 
presented in this dissertation is simply one where the Caribbean states are merely 
seeking more power in the international system. Small states do not have the 
capabilities to alter the existing international order and are therefore seen as mere 
pawns. In their international economic relations, realists argue that they will, 
much like every other state, pursue a strategy of relative gains.  
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Krasner in fact sees the weak developing countries’ attempt at establishing 
a NIEO in the 1970s as a relative gains strategy aimed at catching up with the 
stronger, more developed states.273 In fact, Krasner argues that the concept of 
sovereign equality where each state, regardless of size, power, or wealth has a 
vote equal to all other countries, serves to magnify the power of small states. 
China is indeed aware of the idea of sovereign equality and, as was demonstrated 
in chapter 3, a key goal of China is to garner Caribbean votes in international 
bodies. Krasner is correct in arguing that sovereign equality increases the power 
of small states, but his analysis does not adequately explain the variation seen in 
foreign policy behavior across different Caribbean states. In the Caribbean 
context, traditional power-seeking behavior is largely absent from their foreign 
policies. 
 
Along similar lines, Lake argues that the NIEO was a “part of a larger 
class of mercantilist strategies employed by various countries at particular 
moments in history to redress politically important economic imbalances.”274 He 
argues that the NIEO was not a challenge to capitalism, but instead was a 
movement aimed at allocating more of the benefits of the existing international 
trading and economic system to developing countries. Lake further concludes 
                                                 
273 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism 
(Berkeley: university of California Press, 1985). 
 
274 David A. Lake, "Power and the Third World: Towards a Realist Political Economy of 
North-South," International Studies Quarterly 31, no. 2 (1987)., 220. 
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that, state goals should be equated with the pursuit of economic power.275 Lake 
therefore argues that a key aim of the NIEO was the facilitation of more capital 
inflows into developing countries and this would prove useful in diversifying 
these economies and would ultimately result in a mitigation of their economic 
vulnerabilities. Extending this argument to the Caribbean states seems quite 
plausible as attracting aid and capital inflows from China can be seen as an 
attempt to not only close the gap with developed states, but also to reduce the 
vulnerabilities accruing from their small size.  
 
Again, the problem with this argument is that the actions of the Caribbean 
states and the interviews conducted do not show this as a motivator in the 
Caribbean case. The Caribbean states are indeed seeking economic gains, but they 
are not thinking in terms of relative gains. As has been demonstrated throughout 
this dissertation, the Caribbean states are primarily engaged in a policy of 
economic survival and their foreign policy is one that is geared towards surviving 
and not maximizing economic power. The game that Caribbean states are engaged 
in is therefore not a relative gains or zero-sum one, but is simply about absolute 
gains and the achievement of economic prosperity. 
 
 Another alternative explanation could be that the increasing engagement 
with China is linked to a lack of interest on the part of Western industrialized 
                                                 
275 Ibid., 228. 
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countries since the end of the Cold War. This argument actually fits into the 
analysis provided. The decline in ODA to Caribbean states means that they have 
to find new donors. China represents one such donor. This explanation could also 
explain why Taiwan is also engaged with as it could be argued that Caribbean 
states are simply trying to gain as much assistance as they can and they choose 
between China and Taiwan based on an evaluation of which country would 
provide the most assistance. This seemingly strong argument relating to the lack 
of interest of the West cannot, however, explain why some of these states do not 
vacillate between recognition of Taiwan and China. Guyana is just as in need of 
assistance as Dominica, but Guyana has remained consistent in its recognition of 
China and Dominica has not. 
 
 There are therefore several possible competing explanations for the 
Caribbean’s increasing engagement with China, but they all exhibit some 
problems. This dissertation was aimed at showing both the reason for the 
increased engagement and the reason for the variation in foreign policies seen. 
The alternative explanations presented here are more useful in explaining the 
increased engagement, but they cannot adequately explain why the approach to 
China varies across these Caribbean states. 
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This chapter has demonstrated that natural resource endowment is the key 
variable explaining the variation in foreign policies seen in the Caribbean vis-à-
vis China. Dominica and Grenada are both lacking natural resources that are of 
interest to China and this results in their focusing on their sovereign resources and 
the concomitant rights of voting and recognizing other states. This focus on using 
their sovereignty means that their foreign policy is more based on economic gains 
and the primary way to gain economically from the relationship with China is to 
sell their votes and their recognition. The discussions in chapter 4 showed that in 
both cases it is therefore evident that they will continue to play the diplomatic 
game of switching recognition between China and Taiwan with a view to gaining 
the maximum level of aid and investment that is available. 
 
In terms of the limited net benefits, it was shown that the implicit 
conditionalities attached to Chinese aid are the major reason for these low net 
benefits. This situation is exacerbated by the nature of the domestic political 
systems in the Caribbean. The argument presented is therefore that the intensified 
relationship with China is pursued (despite these low net benefits) because of the 
nature of the domestic political system which results in a non-transparent pursuit 
of agreements with China and the lack of both Parliamentary and public debate 
relating to the details of the agreements signed with China. Other factors such as 
time inconsistency wherein the short-run benefits are privileged and the fact that 
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China is one of only a few countries that are providing aid to the region are also 
contributors to the signing of agreements that provide limited net benefits. 
 
 The cases discussed therefore highlighted some interesting aspects of the 
foreign policies of a group of small states. The discussion shows that analyses of 
small states are in fact much more complex than a cursory evaluation would 
reveal. The next chapter will point to some important extensions of the discussion 
provided in this dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 248 
 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The aim of this concluding chapter is to enunciate the major findings 
emanating from this study and to point to possible extensions of this work. As 
highlighted in the introduction, one of the primary aims of the dissertation was to 
explain the variation seen in the three Caribbean states’ approach to China. The 
three Caribbean states selected are seemingly homogeneous entities with similar 
political systems, history, geographic location, and vulnerabilities. Dominica and 
Grenada have both switched recognition between China and Taiwan, but Jamaica 
has remained consistent in its recognition of China since 1972. This dissertation 
posits the argument that in order to understand this foreign policy divergence, one 
must focus on the resource endowment of these countries. 
 
 Jamaica has a significantly wider natural resource base than Dominica and 
Grenada, and in addition, Jamaica has bauxite, which is of strategic importance to 
China. This dissertation, however, did not limit the discussion of resources to 
merely natural resources. The idea of sovereign resources was introduced 
primarily because the states that are less endowed with natural resources can use 
their sovereignty for some economic gain. 
 249 
 
In addition to highlighting the importance of resource endowment for 
foreign policy decision-making, this dissertation provides important insight into 
the nature of small state foreign policies. All the Caribbean states are small, and 
all have identified their small size as an important impediment to the attainment 
of economic growth and development. This argument is linked to the 
vulnerabilities that are associated with small size. Chapter 1 showed that the 
empirical evidence does not support the premise that small states are inherently 
disadvantaged, as they tend to perform quite well across a broad range of 
economic indicators. In addition, Table 3 (provided in chapter 2) showed that 
most of the Caribbean states have a higher HDI rank than China and in fact 
perform better than many other developing countries. Despite evidence to the 
contrary, these states have a foreign policy based on the underlying premise that 
their survival rests on access to trade concessions and aid from other countries.276 
 
 The relatively high HDI rank does not, however, in any way detract from 
the basic argument that the Caribbean economies are currently facing potential 
economic crises as they have lost access to the preferences previously available 
under the Lomé Conventions and are trying to adjust to the changing international 
economic realities. Having lost their guaranteed market, they are vociferously 
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trying to find new industries to enter and new partners to trade with. The 
increasing engagement with China is therefore in large part a component of their 
repositioning strategy. 
 
 
 
 
Caribbean Repositioning and the Role of China 
As noted in chapter 1, the economic situation in the Caribbean has 
changed significantly over the last ten years. In the past, Caribbean states were 
accustomed to significant allocations of aid,277 preferential access to European 
and US markets, and a general acceptance that small size brought unique 
challenges that necessitated some concessions from developed states. In addition, 
there was general consensus--and an international acceptance—that small island 
developing states (SIDs) faced even more vulnerabilities, in large part due to their 
susceptibility to natural disasters and ecological changes. 
 
 Consistent with Jackson’s depiction of quasi-states’ dependence on 
external assistance and aid, the economic performance and survival of Caribbean 
states have always been linked to access to external assistance. As this external 
assistance started to diminish and the international trading system became one 
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more solidly predicated on the principle of reciprocity in trade, the 1990s became 
a period of rethinking the Caribbean’s place in the prevailing international 
economic and political system. 
 
Richard Bernal, CARICOM’s lead negotiator, argues that in view of 
pressures from globalization and the dictates of neoliberal institutions such as the 
IMF and World Bank, Caribbean states must embark on a strategy of “strategic 
global repositioning.”278 For Caribbean states this strategic global repositioning is, 
The process of repositioning a country in the global economy by 
implementing a strategic plan. Such a plan is designed to consolidate and 
improve existing production while reorienting the economy by creating 
new types of economic activities. In most small developing countries, this 
means structural transformation, not structural adjustment.”279 
 
Bernal’s argument for a transformation or the need for some type of 
repositioning is accepted across the Caribbean. All the Caribbean states studied in 
detail in this dissertation have embarked upon economic diversification projects 
aimed at moving away from the heavy dependence on agricultural exports and the 
fragile tourism industry. In addition, all three countries have commissioned 
studies aimed at evaluating the usefulness of their foreign policy with respect to 
gaining economic development. 
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For Bernal, the process of strategic global repositioning includes 
envisioning new development perspectives, macroeconomic stability, improving 
competitiveness and productivity, modernizing international marketing, and 
forging strategic corporate alliances. These points are all relevant, but I would 
also add to Bernal’s list the importance of the strategic restructuring of the foreign 
policies of Caribbean states. This has in fact been one key area where strategic 
repositioning is most evident and as has been documented throughout the thesis, 
the increasing relationship with China is in fact a key aspect of the foreign policy 
repositioning of Caribbean states. 
 
 
 
 
China is Primarily Seen as a Possible Agent of Aid and Thus Adjustment 
 
 China, in the view of the countries studied, is not simply seen as another 
country with which to have diplomatic relations or merely another trading partner. 
As highlighted especially in the cases of Dominica and Grenada, both states lack 
natural resources that are of interest to China. Both Dominica and Grenada are 
seeking a new source of aid to compensate for the shortfall witnessed since the 
end of the Cold War. 
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As highlighted earlier, the Jamaican case is a bit more complex. Jamaica 
does in fact possess a traditional natural resource that is of interest to China and 
the country is quite willing to supply China with this commodity. The expansion 
in bauxite mining will have a positive effect on the economy and is contributing 
significant amounts to the GDP of the country. This increase in mining exports is 
actually compensating for the sharp decline in agricultural exports emanating 
from the loss of preferential access to the EU market.280 
 
Discussions with numerous Jamaican officials interviewed point to the 
fact that the island is engrossed in what is popularly known as “China-mania.” 
The government is in constant dialogue with the Chinese representatives on the 
island and several government agencies are using Chinese assistance to fund 
numerous development projects (See Chapter 3). The relationship with China is 
thus seen as an important component of the development strategy of the Jamaican 
government. 
 
 
Extensions of this Analysis 
Table 2 presented in the Introduction pointed to the most obvious 
extension of this analysis—an extension to all English-speaking Caribbean states. 
As noted at that point, a cursory look at the other Caribbean states reveals that the 
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pattern of their relationship with China is similar to that of the three case studies. 
It would therefore be useful to extend this framework to these additional 
countries. This dissertation, however, also points to other important areas of 
extension. Two possible extensions of this work relate to first, the nature of the 
conditionalities attached to Chinese loans and aid and secondly, to the 
implications of Caribbean’s increased engagement with the China for the 
Caribbean’s relationship with the US. 
 
Chinese Conditionalities 
The preceding chapter demonstrated that there are implicit conditionalities 
attached to Chinese aid and loans and other chapters provided evidence of this as 
well. In most instances these are not explicitly placed into the contracts, but there 
does exist an implicit assumption that Chinese firms will be contracted and that in 
many instances, Chinese laborers will also be imported. This importation of 
workers when there is already a stark unemployment problem serves to thwart the 
real benefits emanating from these signed agreements. This realization is not 
restricted to the Caribbean and this discussion has highlighted the importance of 
examining the true nature of Chinese developmental assistance across the 
developing world.  
 
As such, an important extension of this discussion would be both deeper 
analysis of the nature of these implicit conditionalities and a more in-depth 
 255 
examination of the actual spillover effects of these loans. This type of analysis 
would have to address the importance of the political system in determining 
foreign policy objectives. This dissertation has shown that the nature of the 
political system in the Caribbean is to a large extent non-transparent and anti-
democratic with the opposition leaders and the general public being unaware of 
the details of Chinese loan agreements. This analysis of the domestic foundations 
of foreign policy behavior can be extended to other small states in other regions to 
better assess whether or not China’s engagement actually produces net benefits in 
developing countries. 
 
The reality is that these lack of spillovers are evident in Latin America and 
parts of Africa—areas that do not have the Westminster political system. further 
research is therefore necessary to identify the specific political and economic 
structures and institutional framework that allows for a similar result in these 
countries. 
 
 In a similar vein, additional research is necessary in relation to the notion 
of implicit conditionalities. As noted in chapters 3 and 6, China often describes 
itself as an aid donor that is fundamentally different from the IMF or World Bank. 
China argues that their aid comes sans conditionalities such as fiscal austerity and 
economic liberalization. But this dissertation has demonstrated that there are 
indeed implicit conditions attached to Chinese aid and loans such as the 
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importation of Chinese laborers. Further research across the developing world is 
necessary to identify the range of implicit conditionalities that are attached to 
Chinese aid. 
 
The other pertinent extension relates to the idea of great power rivalry in 
the Caribbean. The US is the leading power in the region, both at the economic 
and military levels. The rise of China as an aid donor and trading partner can 
possibly result in a return to the great power rivalry witnessed during the Cold 
War. The extent to which this possibility exists is of importance to the Caribbean 
and will have implications for the Caribbean’s relations with the US. 
 
Great Power Rivalry in the Caribbean 
The implications of the evolving relationship between Caribbean states 
and China for the Caribbean’s relations with the world superpower and 
neighbor—the United States must be addressed. In 2005 the construction of the 
largest port in the Americas was completed in the Bahamas. The port construction 
was contracted to Hutchison Whampoa (a Chinese company), which is the same 
company that is currently controlling the Panama Canal. Hutchison Whampoa not 
only built the Bahamas port, but is also currently managing it, and the company 
also owns one of the main airports in the Bahamas. The port is important as it is 
close to the US east coast and has the capacity to handle more freight than any 
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other port in the region. The expected traffic through this port will provide the 
Bahamas with significant amounts of revenue. 
 
The Bahamas’ relations with China is very interesting and is a good point 
to start future discussions of the implications of the Caribbean relationship with 
China for the US. The US has in numerous fora shown its displeasure at a Chinese 
company operating the Panama Canal. In addition, the US government believes 
that the Company has ties with the Chinese military and is in fact a front for the 
military.281 
 
In spite of the US’ concerns about the Chinese company, in early 2006 the 
US awarded Hutchison Whampoa a no-bid contract to operate a US radiation 
detector used to scan freight destined for the US. This action set off a mini-
firestorm in the US because of the company’s ties with the Chinese military and 
the fact that this particular company had important interests so close to the US.282 
The fear was that the company could engineer the shipment of dangerous 
weapons and chemicals into the US that could then be used by terrorists. 
 
This incident is the first time that the US has shown much interest in 
relation to a Caribbean state’s increasing relations with China. It is quite possible 
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that as the relationship deepens, the US will become an important consideration 
when discussing Caribbean-China relations. 
 
In fact, David Jessop, the director of the Caribbean Council in Britain, 
argues that China’s emergence in the region is a direct result of a vacuum left by 
the US and Europe. Jessop argues that, 
In taking forward an Americas policy, China has stepped into a 
near vacuum. Both North America and Europe through disinterest, benign 
neglect and more recently as a result of newer global priorities have 
marginalized the Caribbean and, to an extent, even Latin America from 
their strategic thinking. Both Europe and the United States remain 
curiously silent about developments that suggest that the long-term 
strategic balance of power in the Americas is changing, if, as seems likely, 
Brazil continues to prosper and China emerges as a super power to rival 
the Unites States.”283 
 
Jessop’s discussion of the neglect of the region and China’s role in filling 
that void is also seen in Peter Hakim’s discussion of the new alliance formation 
developing in Latin America and the Caribbean with respect to China. He argues 
that since 9/11, the US has lost interest in the region and the little attention shown 
to the area, “has been sporadic and narrowly targeted at particularly troubling or 
urgent situations.”284 
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Hakim further notes that in recent years the region’s support for the US 
has diminished significantly. In fact, of the 34 countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, only seven supported the ongoing War in Iraq. In addition, the US is a 
bit perturbed by the fact that no government has been willing to join in the US’ 
denouncement of Chavez.285 
 
It is therefore evident that the increased engagement between China and 
countries in the US’ backyard have become an area of concern for some in the US 
government. Charles Shapiro, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for Western Hemisphere Affairs in a presentation to the US Senate outlines much 
of the prevailing negative perception of China in the US. Shapiro, however, in 
effect dispels the China threat thesis pointing out that Chinese investments to 
Latin America and the Caribbean only totaled US$8.3 billion, arguing essentially 
that China’s role is actually quite limited.286 The major area of concern related to 
military contacts. Military officials from China are increasingly visiting Latin 
America and military personnel in Latin America are increasingly viewing China 
as an alternative training site. Shapiro notes that the US is closely following the 
military exchanges and will try to ensure that the contacts do not undermine 
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democracy in Latin America and do not facilitate the flow of arms to rebel groups 
that may threaten security in the Americas.287 
 
What Shapiro fails to point out is that the move towards closer military 
contact between China and Latin American and Caribbean states was a direct 
offshoot of US actions. In 2002 the US passed the American Service Members 
Protection Act. This Act resulted in an end to US military aid to 12 Latin 
American countries because of their refusal to sign an exemption for US military 
personnel from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.288 Latin 
America and the Caribbean’s courting of China for military support is therefore 
directly a result of US actions. 
 
Shapiro, however, concludes with an optimistic outlook of Chinese 
engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean. He argues that there can be 
positive results from China’s engagement with the region, as it will result in 
China becoming a stakeholder in the prevention of terrorism, transnational crime, 
and counternarcotics.289 
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see, Dreyer, "From China with Love: P.R.C. Overtures in Latin America." Also see, 
Florencia Jubany and Daniel Poon, "Recent Chinese Engagement in Latin America and 
the Caribbean: A Canadian Perspective,"  (FOCAL, 2006). 
 
288 Jubany and Poon, "Recent Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
A Canadian Perspective." 
 
289 Ibid. 
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In the Caribbean, the countries studied are not really using China as a foil 
against the US. In fact, in interviews conducted across the Caribbean officials 
made it clear that their actions were based on economic expedience and in no way 
reflected a desire to alter the prevailing geopolitical reality. There is, however, 
some danger to this increased relationship with China, and this must be studied in 
greater detail. 
 
FINAL SUMMATION 
 This dissertation has shown that the foreign policies of small states are not 
unproblematic. Small state foreign policies are diverse, complex, dynamic and 
active. There are in fact differences in the approaches to and actual foreign 
policies pursued by even an ostensibly economically and politically homogenous 
group such as the Caribbean states. The decision to increasingly engage with 
China is not simply about bandwagoning with China or following the lead of 
other Caribbean states; the decision is actually rooted in the economic adjustment 
of Caribbean states. 
 
 The case studies have also pointed to significant disadvantages or limited 
benefits associated with Chinese loans and investments. The identified 
disadvantages relate to the widening trade deficit, the awarding of contracts to 
Chinese firms, and the importation of Chinese workers. These disadvantages are 
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not addressed because of the secrecy involved in the signing of agreements and 
the power wielded by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet in making these 
decisions. 
 
 Vaughan Lewis makes the case that, “Caribbean policy makers 
have tended to depend on the empathy of ‘external others’ for supporting the 
means of riding out structural economic shocks, seeking to an extraordinary 
extent goodwill or ‘bankable assurances from others.”290 This dependence on 
external assistance is a consistent component of Caribbean existence and China 
represents the newest stage in this process. 
 
It is imperative that Caribbean states use the benefits accruing from this 
intensified relationship with China to their advantage. The problem is that their 
adjustment strategies and foreign polices—consistent with other small states—is 
highly ad hoc and reactive. Across the Caribbean, regional leaders have not 
assessed the potential benefits and costs associated with this interaction with 
China and as a result, they have been unable to develop strategies to mitigate 
against some of the costs relating to the relationship. 
 
                                                 
290 Vaughan A. Lewis, "Looking from the inside Outwards: The Caribbean in the 
International System after 2000," in Contending with Destiny: The Caribbean in the 21st 
Century, ed. Kenneth Hall and Dennis Benn (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2000). 
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In order for the relationship with China to be of more benefit to the 
Caribbean states, each country must spend more time analyzing the substantive 
gains that have already accrued and the factors that have limited the attainment of 
other potential benefits. The relationship with China must therefore be better 
managed and closer attention must be paid to the net benefits of this engagement 
with China, if it is to truly benefit these small Caribbean states. 
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In recent years the relationship between Caribbean states and China has 
intensified. This dissertation argues that the Caribbean’s increased engagement 
with China is an important component of their economic adjustment strategy that 
was necessitated after changes in the orientation of the international economic 
system that they must operate within, particularly in relation to the loss of trade 
preferences and the sharp decline in official development assistance. 
 
Despite the seemingly homogenous nature of these Caribbean states there 
is in fact significant foreign policy variation seen vis-à-vis engagement with 
China. Some Caribbean states have consistently recognized China, while others 
have vacillated between recognition of China and Taiwan. The source of this 
variation lies in differences in endowment of resources that are of strategic 
importance to China. The more resource-endowed countries demonstrate more 
foreign policy consistency while the resource-poor countries have exhibited a less 
consistent foreign policy towards China. 
 
 The dissertation also explores the extent to which the relationship with 
China is beneficial for these states. It will be shown that despite the lack of 
explicit conditionalities accompanying Chinese aid and loans, there are important 
implicit conditionalities such as the awarding of contracts to Chinese firms and
 the importation of Chinese laborers that thwart the potential benefits accruing to 
Caribbean states from this relationship with China. 
 
 
